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Summary
Arbitration is widely regarded as an important alternative to litigation, particularly for
international commercial disputes. However, concern currently exists that arbitration is
becoming too slow and too expensive, partly through using procedures too similar to those in
the courts. Effective arbitration requires suitable legislation, the support of the parties and
their lawyers and appropriate initiatives from the arbitral tribunal. The UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 is the internationally accepted standard
against which the quality of a nation's legislation for international commercial arbitration must
be measured. A crucial aspect regarding suitable legislation is the role of the courts. This
thesis is essentially concerned with steps which have been taken or need to be taken in
Germany and South Africa to achieve effective arbitration.
It commences with a brief overview of the sort of delaying tactics which are often
encountered in international arbitration practice, including abuse of the court's powers of
supervision and intervention. The reception in Germany and South Africa of the UNCITRAL
Model Law is then discussed. In Germany it has been adopted for both domestic and
international arbitration. The South African Law Commission has recommended its adoption
in South Africa for international arbitration. The Law Commission has however
recommended a new separate statute for domestic arbitration because of the perceived
need for remedial measures to ensure improved arbitration procedures.
The thesis then examines the effect of the court's powers on effective arbitration, particularly
prior to the award. The current South African law is discussed as well as the changes
proposed by the Law Commission in the context of domestic and international arbitration.
The South African position is compared with that in Germany, both before and since the
introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1998. After a general discussion of the powers
of the court in the context of arbitration, two aspects are identified for special attention. The
first is the power of the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and the interaction between the
powers of the court with those of the tribunal in this regard. The second concerns the
granting of interim measures in the context of arbitration proceedings, with particular
attention to security for costs. In certain circumstances, and depending on the applicable
rules and legislation, it may be more appropriate for a party to seek such relief from the
tribunal, whereas in slightly different circumstances it may be preferable to seek such relief
from the court.
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Finally, steps are considered, which can usefully be taken by the arbitral tribunal itself to
promote effective arbitration by using the flexibility of the process. The extent to which the
tribunal is "master of its procedure" and thereby able to counter delaying tactics effectively is
subject to the doctrine of party autonomy. Specific techniques for more effective arbitral
procedures are suggested, namely a more interventionist approach, the use of preliminary
meetings, imposing timetables, improving the hearing, the effective use of documentary
evidence and discovery and finally the possibility of documents-only arbitration.
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Opsomming
Arbitrasie word wyd beskou as 'n belangrike alternatief tot litigasie, veral by internasionale
handelsgeskille. Kommer bestaan egter tans dat arbitrasie te stadig en te duur word,
gedeeltelik deur die gebruik van prosedures wat te veel met dié van die howe ooreenstem.
Doeltreffende arbitrasie vereis geskikte wetgewing, die ondersteuning van die partye en
hulle regsverteenwoordigers en toepaslike inisiatiewe deur die arbitrasietribunaal. Die
"UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration" van 1985 is die
internasionaal aanvaarde standaard waarteen die gehalte van 'n land se wetgewing vir
internasionale kommersiële arbitrasie gemeet moet word. 'n Kritieke oorweging by geskikte
wetgewing is die rol van die howe. Hierdie tesis behandel die stappe wat in Duitsland en
Suid-Afrika reeds geneem is of wat nog geneem moet word om doeltreffende arbitrasie te
bewerkstellig.
Dit begin met 'n kort oorsig oor die soort vertragingstaktiek wat dikwels in die internasionale
arbitrasiepraktyk raakgeloop word, insluitende misbruik van die hof se bevoegdhede van
toesighouding en inmenging. Die ontvangs van die "UNCITRAL Model Law" in Duitsland en
Suid-Afrika word bespreek. Die wet is in Duitsland vir sowel binnelandse as internasionale
arbitrasie ingevoer. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regskommissie het sy invoering vir internasionale
arbitrasie in Suid-Afrika aanbeveel. Die regskommissie het egter 'n nuwe afsonderlike wet
vir binnelandse arbitrasie aanbeveel weens die gewaarde behoefte aan regstellende
middele om verbeterde arbitrasieprosedures te verseker.
Die tesis ondersoek daarna die uitwerking van die hof se bevoegdhede op doeltreffende
arbitrasie, veral voor die arbitrasietoekenning. Die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse reg en die
wysigings, wat deur die Regskommissie vir internasionale en binnelandse arbitrasie
voorgestel word, word oorweeg. Die Suid-Afrikaanse posisie word met dié van Duitsland,
voor en na die invoering van die "UNCITRAL Model Law" in 1998, vergelyk. Na 'n algemene
bespreking van die hof se bevoegdhede in die samehang van arbitrasie word twee sake vir
besondere aandag gekies. Die eerste is die bevoegdheid van die arbitrasietribunaal om oor
sy eie jurisdiksie te beslis en die wisselwerking tussen die hof se bevoegdhede en dié van
die arbitrasietribunaal in hierdie verband. Die tweede het betrekking op die toestaan van
tussentydse regshulp in die samehang van arbitrasieverrigtinge, met besondere verwysing
na sekuriteit vir koste. In besondere omstandighede, met inagneming van toepaslike reëls
en wetgewing, behoort 'n party verkieslik sodanige regshulp by die arbitrasietribunaal aan te
vra, terwyl in effens ander omstandighede behoort die partyeerder die hof te nader.
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Ten slotte word stappe oorweeg wat nuttig deur die arbitrasietribunaal self geneem kan word
om doeltreffende arbitrasie aan te moedig deur die buigsaamheid van die arbitrasieproses te
benut. Die mate waarin die tribunaal meester van sy prosedure is en daardeur
vertragingstaktiek doeltreffend kan bekamp, is onderworpe aan die leerstuk van
partyoutonomie. Bepaalde tegnieke word voorgestelom meer doeltreffende
arbitrasieprosedures te bevorder, naamlik 'n meer intervensionistiese benadering, die
gebruik van reëlingsvergaderings, die oplegging van 'n rooster vir die arbitrasie, verbetering
van die verhoorproses, die doeltreffende gebruik van skriftelike getuienis en blootlegging en
laastens die moontlikheid van arbitrasie slegs op dokumente.
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Chapter One
General introduction
I. Introduction
Arbitration 1 is increasingly recognised throughout the international legal and business
community as an important method of resolving commercial and other disputes, which can
help to relieve the pressure on the civil justice system" as well as being sometimes the only
method for a party to an international commercial dispute to obtain an enforceable decision
by an impartial tribunal."
Advantages traditionally claimed for arbitration as opposed to litigation include that it is
cheaper and quicker to resolve a dispute by arbitration than to go to court." These
advantages legitimise the existence of arbitration as an alternative to litigation. However, in
recent years, a growing body of opinion has arisen to the effect that arbitration could lose
this status because it is becoming too slow and too expensive."
Historically, international arbitration has followed two streams: public-law arbitration between
states and commercial arbitration. Both types of arbitration have been known for many
centuries. Arbitration between states was used already by the ancient Greeks." Commercial
arbitration was well known to the Romans during the era of their domination of Europe." Due
to expanding international trade the nature of international arbitration changed dramatically
in the second half of the twentieth century." In common-law jurisdictions like England, the
change from court to arbitration was historically and conceptually only a change of forum,
not a change in the method of resolving disputes." The same trend occurred in international
2
3
For the purposes of this thesis, arbitration may be defined as a procedure whereby the parties to a
dispute, by mutual agreement, refer their dispute to a third party of their choice, known as an arbitrator,
for a final decision, after the arbitrator has first impartially received and considered evidence and
submissions from the disputants; see Butler, "Expediting Commercial Arbitration Proceedings: Recent
Trends" (1994) 6 SA Merc LJ 252.
SA Law Commission, Report Domestic Arbitration (May 2001) viii (Summary of Recommendations).
Redfern & Hunter Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3 ed 1999) 23-24; SA Law
Commission, Report A New International Arbitration Act for South Africa (July 1998) 1.
See generally regarding the advantages of arbitration Redfern & Hunter 23-24; Butler & Finsen
Arbitration in South Africa - Law and Practice (1993) 19-23.
See inter alia for this view Uff "Cost-effective Arbitration" (1993) 59 Arbitration 31; MustiII "Comments on
Fast-Track Arbitration (1993) 10(4) J of Int Arb 121-125; Goode "Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First
Century" (1998) 64 Arbitration 9; Butler (1994) 6 SA Merc LJ 251254-255.
Hammond "Arbitration in Ancient Greece" (1985) 1 Arbitration International 188.
Redfern & Hunter International Commercial Arbitration (2 ed 1991) 476.
MustiIl122-124.
Nariman "Mediation and the Arbitrators" 1999 ICC IArb Bull (Special Supplement) 43.
4
5
6
7
8
9
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arbitration. The formerly known forms of "fast-track arbitration" are nowadays often
presented as novel exceptions to a procedure which is not, by nature, fast. Arbitration today
is "a ritualistic process dominated by lawyers, with a presumption that the time-scale will be
measured in years rather than weeks."" Factors contributing to this trend are the increasing
complexity of commercial relationships, the tendency to use arbitrators who are experienced
lawyers but not experts in the field which is the subject-matter of the dispute and above all
the increasing domination of arbitral procedures by lawyers." Lawyers have moreover
become adept at disrupting the arbitration process by using delaying tactics, where it is in
their clients' commercial interests to do SO.12 These problems have stimulated growing
interest in ADR13 as an alternative to arbitration. Whereas ADR should usually be attempted
before resorting to arbitration, improved arbitration techniques will in turn increase the
chances of successful rnedlation."
If arbitration is to retain its traditional status as the preferred method of resolving commercial
disputes, the process will need to be made more efficient in practice. A respected
commentator on international arbitration, Julian Lew, stated in 1985 that truly effective
arbitration is dependent on the willing support of the parties, the lawyers representing those
parties, the arbitrators and the applicable national laws."
In the last two decades, much has been achieved regarding improved arbitration legislation.
In general, the objects of modern arbitration legislation are the resolution of disputes by an
independent and impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay and expense; party
10
11
12
13
Mustill123.
Mustill 123-125; Goode 11.
See para II below.
A definition of ADR ("Alternative Dispute Resolution") suggested by a United States lawyer is any
method of resolving any dispute that does not require the ultimate decision to be made finally by a judge
or by a jury: see Ide quoted by Nariman 43. This definition of ADR includes arbitration. The better view
is however that ADR comprises all procedures for dispute resolution other than litigation and arbitration:
the role of the third party (who could inter alia be described as a mediator or conciliator) is to assist the
disputants to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement of their dispute. See Street ''The Language of
ADR - Its Utility in Resolving International Commercial Disputes -the Role of the Mediator" (1992) 58
(2S) Arbitration 17 18; Nariman 44.
See Donaldson "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1992) 58 Arbitration 102 104. From a civil-law
perspective, DeWiit Wijnen "ADR, the Civil LawApproach" (1995) 61 Arbitration 38 41 argues that there
is less need for ADR in civil-law jurisdictions as litigation and arbitration have not got so out of hand
regarding their duration and expense. A view against any kind of ADR was taken by Fiss "Against
Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1073, who argues that settlement, far from being preferable to judgment,
is a form of coercive plea bargaining which owes more to imbalance of power than to fairness and which
is best treated as a highly problematic technique for streamlining court dockets. In his opinion, ADR
suppresses justice in favour of peace, while public interest values are subordinated to private
settlements, which deprive the courts of their power to give authoritative rulings for the benefit of society
as a whole. See further ch 3 para I below for a more detailed discussion on ADR in the context of an
arbitration agreement.
Lew Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (1986) 5. See also Lew "Achieving the Potential
of Effective Arbitration" (1999) 65 Arbitration 283 and the text at n 27 below.
14
15
2
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autonomy; 16 balanced powers for the courts; and adequate powers for the arbitral tribunal to
conduct the proceedings effectively." A major contribution to improved arbitration legislation
has been made by the UNCITRAL 18 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration."
As discussed below, the Model Law has recently been adopted in Germany and is likely to
be applied to international arbitration in South Africa.
Regarding balanced powers for the courts as an important objective of modern arbitration
legislation, the Secretary-General of UNCITRAL stated the following at an early stage of the
drafting process of the UNCITRAL Model Law:
"[I]t will be one of the more delicate and complex problems of the preparation of a model
law to strike a balance between the interest of the parties to freely determine the
procedure to be followed and the interests of the legal system expected to give
recognition and effect thereto. This involves, above all, a precise demarcation of the
scope of possible intervention and supervision by courts .... ,,20
Notwithstanding the respectable reputation arbitration generally has, the views on
commercial arbitration regarding court control have differed widely." At one end of the
spectrum one may find the view that arbitration would turn into an unacceptable theatre if it
is not constantly monitored. At the other extreme is the view that arbitration would suffer
from any outside interference and that local law barriers or benches must not impede parties
or arbitrators." Herrmann argues in favour of a rather restricted system: "Views on the
proper role of the courts are often cast in terms of concerns or fears. Such fears about too
much court interference and, less frequently, misgivings about too little judicial assistance
16 "Party autonomy" is an expression much used in arbitration literature. It has its source in the
consenusal basis of arbitration, and may be defined as the freedom of the parties to agree how their
disputes are to be resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest:
compare the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s1(b).
See SA Law Commission Domestic Arbitration 1-3; Butler "South African Arbitration legislation - the
Need for Reform" (1994) 27 CILSA 118 122.
UNCITRAL is the acronym for the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, which was
established in December 1966 and is based in Vienna, Austria. See further Redfern & Hunter (2 ed)
479.
See further para III below.
See Report of the Secretary-General: possible features of a model law on international commercial
arbitration (AlCN.9/207 of 14 May 1981) para 21, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus A Guide to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Intemational Commercial Arbitration (1989) 219.
Particularly English lawyers tended to support an extensive role for the courts in supervising the
arbitration process. This has gradually changed since 1979, culminating in the adoption of the
Arbitration Act 1996. See the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report on the
Arbitration Bill (1996) (usually referred to from the name of the chairman as the Saville Report) paras
20-22 regarding the Arbitration Act s 1(c); Saville "The Arbitration Act 1996 and its effect on International
Arbitration in England" (1997) 63 Arbitration 104 111. Compare the earlier more conservative English
response to the powers of the court in the Model Law of Kerr "Arbitration and the Courts - the
UNCITRAL Model Law" (1984) 50 Arbitration 3-16.
Herrmann "The Role of the Courts under the UNCITRAL Model Law Script" in Lew (ed) Contemporary
Problems in International Arbitration (1986) 164-165.
17
18
19
20
21
22
3
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are expressed primarily, often exclusively, with regard to foreign countries. Among the
reasons for such 'xenophobic' mentality are the more technical difficulties of dealing with the
courts abroad and, in particular, the frequent lack of familiarity with the foreign ('strange')
legal system." 23 The general trend within a modern approach towards international
commercial arbitration is clearly in favour of less court interference."
Regarding the efforts put into the design of modern and effective arbitration legislation, one
could argue that, given arbitration's consensual basis, the parties themselves are
responsible for the smooth conduct of their arbitration and others, more particularly the state,
should not bother about the disputants' private matters. "But the adequacy of dispute
resolution procedures is not a purely private matter; it is one profoundly affecting the public
good, for to the extent that the procedures are inadequate, time, money and effort are
diverted away from activity, which is economically and socially producnve.?" Moreover,
regarding it as a purely private matter, which only concerns the parties to the dispute, could
also increase the chance of lniustice."
In the light of improved arbitration legislation and the continued, and indeed, increased
willingness of the business community to use arbitration, two of Lew's four criteria" for
effective arbitration have been met. In 1999, however, Lew stated that the other two
ingredients for achieving effective arbitration, namely lawyers and arbitrators "have not been
as pragmatic or proactive" in achieving effective arbitration." He adds that lawyers see
arbitration as another playing field on which to exercise litigation skills to beat the other side,
with the result that the original twin merits of arbitration, speed and inexpensiveness, have
been sacrificed. In Lew's view it is up to the arbitrators to assume a proactive role to
manage the process and direct the lawyers' energies so that arbitration does resolve the
dispute effectively."
This thesis is in the first place concerned with what has already been achieved in Germany
and what is proposed in South Africa by way of improved legislation to promote effective
arbitration. As essential background to the discussion, the next section of this chapter sets
23
24
Herrmann 165.
Support for this view is provided by the increasing number of jurisdictions adopting the UNCITRAL
Model Law. See the SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 11 n 2 and 16-19; Lew (1999) 65
Arbitration 283-284.
Goode 9.
Goode 9.
See the text at n 15 above.
Lew (1999) 65 Arbitration 284.
Lew (1999) 65 Arbitration 284. He also points out that it is too soon to see whether the statutory duty
now imposed on arbitrators in England by the Arbitration Act 1996 s 33(1)(b) to adopt fair procedures
which avoid unnecessary delay and expense will achieve the desired result.
25
26
27
28
29
4
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
out some of the delaying tactics, which can be used in practice to undermine the
effectiveness of the arbitration process, particularly in a jurisdiction with defective legislation.
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an overview of the UNCITRAL Model Law,30the
German response to the Model Law,3l and the response proposed to it for South Africa by
the South African Law Cornrnlssion."
The second chapter examines the powers of the court in arbitration legislation and the effect
of these powers on effective arbitration. The chapter first examines the powers of the court in
general under the UNCITRAL Model Law, German law and South African law. This is
followed by a more detailed discussion of the powers of the court in relation to two specific
issues, namely jurisdictional issues and interim measures.
There are three reasons why South African and German arbitration law have been selected
for purposes of comparison, apart from the obvious one that this is a thesis written by a
German lawyer presented at a South African university. First, Germany has adopted a
different approach to the UNCITRAL Model Law compared to that proposed for South Africa.
Germany has adopted the Model Law for both domestic and international arbitration. South
Africa currently intends adopting the Model Law for international arbitrations only. Secondly,
both Germany and South Africa are desirous of establishing themselves as important
regional centres for international arbitration. This essentially requires good arbitration
legislation and preferably a culture of effective, modern arbitration practice complying with
international standards." Thirdly, arbitration practice in South Africa is based on the
(English) common-law adversarial approach whereas German arbitration practice is based
on the civil law tradition."
The third chapter of this thesis focuses on the contribution that lawyers and arbitrators can
make towards making the arbitral process more effective. The thesis as a whole seeks to
confirm the veracity of Lew's proposition that "[t]ruly effective arbitration requires willing
participants: businessmen, lawyers, arbitrators and national laws. This necessitates a
willingness and desire to overcome the political, legal, economic and cultural differences
30
31
32
33
See ch 1 para III below.
See ch 1 para III 1 below.
See ch 1 para III 2 below.
See Uff 31: ''The importance of arbitration internationally dictates that the domestic process must also
be fostered. No country can flourish internationally without the equivalent home-based institution."
To the extent that it deals with the detail of the arbitration process the UNCITRAL Model Law is intended
to be suitable for and to harmonise both traditions. See further ch 3 para 11.3 below for the distinction
between the adversarial and "inquisitorial" traditions.
34
5
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which divide the nations of the world, and to transcend the national and parochial distinctions
between the systems, views and concepts ."35
35 Lew Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 5.
6
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II. Effective arbitration undermined by delaying tactics
During arbitration proceedings there may be circumstances in which it benefits one party,
usually the respondent, if the proceedings are as time-consuming and inefficient as possible.
Therefore, that party will try to drag out the process by using dilatory tactics. The claimant
will usually want to proceed as promptly as possible, but the respondent, who if the claim is
well-founded is enjoying the use of the claimant's money, will want to protract the
proceedings, either to delay payment or in the hope that the claimant will abandon or settle
the claim."
A good example is a dispute concerning a construction contract. On the one hand, the
contractor is interested in getting the dispute settled as quickly as possible because that
party is dependent on payment, since it has to pay its suppliers and employees. On the other
hand, the employer, as the other party, may benefit if the dispute is not resolved. The
dispute could relate to a building, which has not yet been sold or rented out. Therefore the
employer is not deriving any income from this building. For this party it would be an
advantage to delay payment to the contractor as long as possible. Furthermore, a contractor
who claims to have been underpaid may consider that the objective is to reach a decision as
quickly and cheaply as possible. However, the employer could be a major public authority,
which regularly faces claims by contractors. It may see the objective as ensuring that any
such claims are thoroughly and painstakingly investigated in order that the taxpayer's money
is spent properly, as well as to deter other contractors from making speculative claims."
Some years ago, Harris, an English lawyer published an artlcle" containing a "respondent's
guide" to a number of measures, which can be taken by the respondent in order to cause
delay. These tactics will now be briefly examined to indicate the sort of tactics on the part of
a reluctant respondent which the claimant or arbitrator may have to anticipate. In chapter
three possible countermeasures will be discussed."
In analysing causes of delay in arbitration, it is possible to classify these causes in different
ways. First, it is important to distinguish between delaying tactics, including court
applications, prior to the award and those after the award." Further distinctions should also
however be made concerning delays, which are caused by the parties on the one hand, and
36
37
38
Goode 13.
Uff 32.
Harris "Abuse of the Arbitration Process - Delaying Tactics and Disruptions: a Respondent's guide"
(1992) 9(2) J of Int Arb 87.
See ch 3 para II below.39
7
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on the other hand delays caused by compulsory statutory provisions and arbitration rules,
which are applicable to the proceedinqs." In this context the extent of the court's powers to
supervise and intervene in the arbitral process can assume particular importance as too
extensive powers can be abused by a respondent with sufficient funds to utilise these
provisions." Last, but not least one should distinguish, where appropriate, between
domestic arbitration and international arbitration. As will be discussed in more detail below,
legislation designed for international arbitral proceedings often differs from that for domestic
arbitration in that it is more liberal in supporting party autonomy" and achieving a higher
degree of freedom for the parties and the arbitral tribunal from court control. In that context
the effect of the proposed South African approach of having separate statutes for domestic
and international arbitration law will be analysed."
Regarding delaying tactics prior to the award, the respondent could simply refuse to reply to
any communications. This could include refusing to appoint an arbitrator or to agree on a
sole arbitrator where the arbitration agreement so requires. Harris also refers to the situation,
because of such problems, where the court must ultimately appoint the arbitrator, which can
be time-consuming, especially in cases where the appointing court and the respondent are
in different countries." The applicable legislation may also allow the courts' decision on the
appointment of the arbitrator to be taken on appeal, thereby further delaying the arbitration
process." In addition, by whatever method the arbitrator is appointed, it is possible to
challenge the arbitrator during the arbitration. This, in some jurisdictions, may involve an
application to court for the removal of the arbitrator, which can be brought at any time." In
cases where the challenge was successful, valuable time is won for the reluctant party, since
40
41
This is the classification used by Harris 88.
Arbitral institutions are aware of this problem. The various editions of the LCIA Rules since 1985 have
been specifically drafted to counter delaying tactics and to ensure an efficient procedure: see Vigrass
"The London Court of International Arbitration" in Uff & Jones (eds) International and ICC Arbitration
(1990) 270 at 273-274. During the latest revision of its rules which led to the 1998 Rules, the ICC was
particularly aware of the need to address causes of delay which were inherent in the rules themselves.
See Calvo ''The New ICC Rules of Arbitration: Substantive and Procedural Changes" (1997) 14(4) J of
Int Arb 4-44; Derains & Schwartz A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration (1998) 8-10.
See generally Christie (1993) 9 Arbitration International 153-165 regarding the dangers of abuse of the
court's powers in the current South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, compared to the position under
the Model Law.
See n 16 above for the meaning of party autonomy.
See the discussion in ch 2 paras 11.1.2and 111.3.Regarding the reasons for having separate statues for
domestic and international arbitration see the text at n 116 below.
Harris 88. See also SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South
Africa 53-54 and 65. The Commission recommended precisely because of this problem that the power
to appoint arbitrators under article 11 of the Model Law where the parties' own mechanism fails should
be vested in an appropriate arbitral institution, designated by the Chief Justice, rather than in the court.
See ch 3 para II below.
Harris 90. Under article 13(2) of the Model Law, the challenging party would first have to utilise any
challenge procedure agreed to by the parties (e.g. that contained in article 11 of the ICC Rules) before
approaching the court. The grounds for challenge are restricted to those contained in article 12 of the
Model Law, the main basis for bringing a challenge being where it is contended that there are justifiable
doubts regarding the arbitrator's impartiality or independence.
42
43
44
45
46
47
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the appointment and confirmation procedure will start again. And even if the challenge did
not lead to the replacement of the arbitrator, in most cases the arbitral proceedings will be
delayed."
It has further been suggested that in cases where the arbitration process is based on a time-
table," which is agreed between the parties and the arbitrator, the respondent should
always and at all stages try to seek as much time as possible. Moreover, in cases where the
respondent fails to comply promptly with the stipulated time-limit, the penalties for this non-
compliance are often very modest. 50
After the appointment of the tribunal, a respondent can delay the proceedings, particularly in
complex disputes, by submitting as many documents as possible whenever the opportunity
arises." The respondent may seek the right to introduce further evidence, including
documents, only in the light of the way the case has developed, even during the hearing.52
Particularly where the English adversarial style procedure is used for the hearing, the
hearing can be drawn out by the presentation of irrelevant evidence and by undiscriminating
cross-examination, which is difficult for the inexperienced arbitrator to control.'?
Moreover, even after the tribunal has made its award, the losing party may delay
performance of the award, by, for example, refusing to pay the amount awarded. The
enforcement of the award by a national court may consume a long period of time as well, if
the application for enforcement is opposed. The losing party may even oppress the winning
party by offering to pay only part of the amount awarded in full and final settlement. If the
winning party does not accept this offer, the other party can threaten time-consuming court
proceedings to attempt to set aside the award or to oppose any enforcement proceedinqs."
In seeking effective countermeasures to delaying tactics, as mentioned above, it is
necessary to consider to what extent delay is caused or delaying tactics are facilitated by
defects in arbitration legislation. This topic is addressed in Chapter 2, with particular
48 For this reason article 13(3) permits the arbitrator to continue with the challenge and make an award
pending the court's decision on the challenge. See also ch 3 para II below on the appointment and
challenge of an arbitrator.
See further regarding the use and advantages of time-tables in arbitration proceedings ch three para 11.5
below.
Harris 89. Compare however article 25 of the Model Law regarding the tribunal's powers in the event of
default.
See Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 266-267 regarding the abuse in this way of the discovery process,
where the claimant has called on the respondent to disclose relevant documents; Harris 89-90. See
further ch 3 paras 11.7. and 11.8below.
Harris 90. See generally Harris 88-91 for a full range of possible delaying tactics prior to the award.
Compare Butler & Finsen 241-242.
See generally Harris 91-94 regarding delaying tactics after the award.
49
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reference to delays through the abuse of the statutory powers of the courts to supervise or
intervene in the arbitral process. The third chapter will focus more on steps that can be
taken by the arbitrator to counter delaying tactics, with or without the cooperation of the
lawyers acting for the parties.
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III. The UNCITRAL Model Law
In 1976 the UNCITRAL55 Arbitration Rules were published. They go back to an initiative
contained in a special report on "Problems concerning the application and interpretation of
existing multilateral conventions on international commercial arbitration and related
rnatters"." Their need was more apparent in ad hoc arbltratlon," where it was thought
desirable to regulate the steps to be taken in an arbitration, in order to be reasonably sure of
obtaining an award which would be enforceable under the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958.58
The UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 owes its origins to a request in 1977 by the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) for a review of the operation of the New
York Convention of 1958, in relation to an apparent lack of uniformity in the approach of
national courts to the enforcement of awards. An amendment to the New York Convention
was initially suggested by the AALCC but was not proceeded with. The request did however
result in a Report of the Secretary-General of UNCITRAL, which finally concluded that the
harmonisation of the enforcement practices of arbitral awards and the judicial control of
arbitral procedure could be achieved more effectively by the promulgation of a model or
uniform law, rather than an attempt to revise the New York convention." The ultimate goal
of a model law was seen as facilitating international commercial arbitration and ensuring its
proper functioning and recognition. The practical value of a model law would also largely
depend on the extent to which it provided answers to the manifold problems experienced in
practice. Thus, in preparing the model law an attempt would have to be made to meet the
concerns which have repeatedly been expressed in recent years."
The policy objectives adopted by UNCITRAL in the preparation of the Model Law has been
described as follows:"
• "the liberalisation of international commercial arbitration by limiting the role of national
courts, and by giving affect to the doctrine of 'autonomy of the will', allowing parties
freedom to choose how their dispute should be determined;
55
56
57
See n 18 above.
UN Doc AleN 9/64.
An "ad hoc arbitration" is an arbitration conducted under rules of procedure which are adopted by the
parties for the purposes of the particular arbitration. The term is used in contrast to an "institutional
arbitration" which is an arbitration administered by a specialist arbitral institution under its own rules.
See Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 44.
Ibid.
Redfern & Hunter (2 ed) 508.
UN Doc AleN 9/207 para 9.
Redfern & Hunter (2 ed) 509. See also UN Doc AleN 9/207 paras 16-24.
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• the establishment of a certain defined core of mandatory provisions to ensure fairness
and due process;
• the provision of a framework for the conduct of international commercial arbitration so
that in the event of the parties being unable to agree on procedural matters the
arbitration would nevertheless be capable of being completed; and
• the establishment of other provisions to aid the enforceability of awards and to clarify
certain controversial practical issues."
The final text was adopted by UNCITRAL in Vienna in June 1985 after four years of work by
a special working group. The outcome may safely be taken as embodying consensus on the
provisions that the drafters of international commercial arbitration clauses would like to see
in their chosen lex fori.62 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution
on 11 December 1985,63which recommended "that all States give due consideration to the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in view of the desirability of uniformity of
the law of arbitral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration
practice."
The Model Law has had a significant influence in harmonising national laws on international
arbitration, even in jurisdictions where it has not been adopted." It was suggested at the
outset of the drafting process by the UNCITRAL Secretary-General that probably the most
important principle of the Model Law should be the freedom of the parties to enable them to
facilitate the functioning of international commercial arbitration according to their
expectations." Because of improved arbitration legislation in many jurisdictions, the parties
to an arbitration are less likely to be adversely affected by provisions of national law applying
to their arbitration. Two points must however be emphasised. First, although the selection of
a set of modern arbitration rules may make it unnecessary for the arbitral tribunal or the
parties to refer to a national arbitration law for purposes of conducting the arbitration, those
rules cannot oust the mandatory provisions of the applicable national law, particularly those
concerned with public policy." Secondly, the Model Law is primarily territorial in its operation
62
63
64
Christie, "Arbitration: Party Autonomy or Crucial Intervention II" (1994) 111 SALJ 360,362.
Resolution No. 40/72 of the General Assembly.
Perhaps the best-known example is England. In 1989 the Departmental Advisory Committee (DAC) on
arbitration law, then chaired by Lord MustiII, rejected the adoption of the Model Law by England in a
fairly negative report. (See the text of the report published as "A New Arbitration Act for the United
Kingdom? The response of the Departmental Advisory Committee to the UNCITRAL Model Law" in
(1990) 6 Arbitration /nternationa/3 at 29.) The adoption of several provisions of the Model Law resulted
from subsequent deliberations of the DAC, under the chairmanship of Lord Steyn who stated that the
Model Law was "the single most important influence in the shaping of the [English] Bill". See Uff, 'The
Bill Tompkins Memorial Lecture 1994" (1995) 61 Arbitration 18 at 25. See also n 21 above regarding
the further report of the DAC in 1996 which explained the new Arbitration Act of 1996.
UN Doc AlCN 9/207 para 17, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 1195.
See Paulsson "Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters" (1983)
32 ICLQ 53 at 58. Compare too the SA Law Commission's Draft Arbitration Bill for domestic arbitration
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and only certain of its provisions apply to an arbitration held at a place outside the
boundaries of the relevant state, which has adopted the Model Law.67
The efforts of the UNCITRAL Model Law to harmonise national laws of arbitration mark a
further stage of a process to liberate international arbitration proceedings from the adverse
effects of their ties with national procedural law.68 This trend was arguably initiated in 1975
when the wording of article 16 of the ICC Rules of 1955 was chanqed." Formerly the
national law of the seat of the arbitration had to be applied in cases where the parties did not
agree otherwise. The new article 11 of the 1975 ICC Rules70 broke that link with the
procedural law at the seat of the arbitration proceedings. In terms of the new rule, "only that
procedural law is applied which the parties have agreed or the arbitrators have specified and
which does not have to be identical with any particular national arbitral Iaw"." The arbitration
is still however subject to the mandatory rules of the arbitration law of the seat of the
arbitration."
The roots of that trend may be found in the fact that prudent parties to international
arbitration proceedings had to take considerable trouble to establish the local arbitration law
applying at the seat of the proceedings, so as not to be surprised by local pitfalls. It was
furthermore often unsatisfactory to allow those provisions of national law governing
arbitration proceedings, which had often been designed for domestic arbitration proceedings
and which therefore could not fully satisfy the requirements of modern international
arbitration, to apply to international arbitration proceedinqs."
Because of different approaches adopted in Germany and South Africa" towards the
UNCITRAL Model Law it is necessary to consider briefly its intended scope of application.
The UNCITRAL Model Law is divided into eight separate chapters. After the first chapter of
general provisions, it deals in chronological sequence with the arbitration agreement, the
67
s 1(b): "the parties to an arbitration agreement may agree how their disputes are to be resolved, subject
only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest", which is based on the English
Arbitration Act 1996 s 1(b).
See article 1(2) of the Model Law, which specifies articles 8, 9, 35 and 36 as having extra-territorial
application.
Lionnet ''The New German Arbitration Act - A User's Perspective" (1998) 14 Arbitration /nternationa/59.
Prior to 1975, article 16 of the 1955 ICC Rules provided that where the rules were silent and the parties
had not chosen a law of procedure, the arbitrator had to look to "the law of the country in which the
arbitrator holds the proceedings". See Derains & Schwartz 208-209.
Article 11 of the 1975 Rules was substantially the same as article 15(1) of the current ICC Rules of
68
69
70
1998.
71
72
73
Lionnet 58.
See Derains & Schwartz 210.
Lionnet 58.
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composition of the arbitral tribunal, its jurisdiction, the conduct of the arbitral proceedings,
the making of the award and the termination of the proceedings. Its last two chapters deal
with recourse against the award and the recognition and enforcement of awards.
This thesis is mainly concerned with those provisions of the Model Law, which deal with the
relationship between the tribunal and the courts, particularly prior to the award, the
jurisdiction of the tribunal and conduct of the arbitral proceedings. These are the provisions
which may be regarded as crucial to prevent abuse of the arbitral process and the delay of
the proceedings.
The general or introductory provisions deal inter alia with the scope of the application of the
Model Law. It was prepared on the basis that it would apply to "international commercial
arbitration"." Although the word "arbitration" is not defined in the Model Law,76 it was not
intended to cover non-consensual, non-binding or "free" arbitration. Thus, compulsory
arbitration, which does not take place pursuant to an arbitration agreement and proceedings
such as the German "Schiedsgutachten", the Dutch "bindend advies" or the Italian "arbitrato
irritua/e" do not fall within the scope of the Model Law.77 Also, within the chapter of the
general provisions the relationship between the arbitral tribunal and the courts is defined.
This crucial relationship will be discussed in detail below."
Regarding chapter IV of the Model Law dealing with the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal,
the Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal itself is the determining authority, in the first
instance, of a question relating to its own jurisdiction. In this context the autonomy or
separability of the arbitration clause is also specifically recoqnised." The limits of the power
of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) will be
discussed tater." But, it may be stated here already that the UNCITRAL Model Law has
recognised a general trend in modern legal systems by adopting the concept of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz.
74
75
76
See the text below for these different approaches towards the Model Law.
See Holtzmann & Neuhaus 28, 40; Redfern & Hunter (2 ed) 510.
Compare the definition of arbitration for the purposes of this thesis in n 1 above. Art. 2(a) of the Model
Law clarifies arbitration for purposes of the Model Law to include "any arbitration, whether or not
administered by a permanent arbitral institution". It therefore includes both institutional and ad hoc
arbitration. See Holtzmann & Neuhaus 150.
Redfern & Hunter (2 ed) 510; Holtzmann & Neuhaus 151.
See ch 2 para II below regarding article 5 of the Model Law.
Redfern & Hunter (2 ed) 515.
See ch 2 para III below.
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1. The South African approach towards the Model Law
South Africa has recently experienced political, social and economic changes, which gave
the impulse for proposing the enactment of new legislation on arbitration. The reasons for
having new arbitration legislation are similar to those of Germany."
It was clear that there are certain defects in the current legislation. The Arbitration Act 42 of
1965 was designed for domestic arbitration and has no provisions specifically to deal with
the requirements of international arbitration. The South African Law Commission also felt
that the 1965 Act is characterised by excessive opportunities for parties to involve the courts
as a tactic for delaying the arbitration process and that it fails to pay sufficient respect to the
principle of party autonomy." The Commission has since also pointed out specific defects in
the 1965 Act relating to the powers of the arbitral tribunal for purposes of effective domestic
arbitration. These include the failure to confer a general discretionary power on the arbitral
tribunal to decide how to conduct the reference where the parties' agreement is silent.
Further, there is no provision regarding the power of the arbitral tribunal to deal with
jurisdictional issues. The tribunal also has no power to order interim measures."
Contrary to the German approach, the South African Law Commission in its report of July
1998 recommended adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law, initially at least, for international
arbitration proceedings only.84 It subsequently confirmed its view that the Model Law should
only apply to international commercial arbitration and not to domestic arbitration." Although
there is no single internationally accepted definition of "international arbitration" the
proceedings will be regarded as international if the disputing parties are of different
nationalities or, alternatively, if the transaction, which led to the dispute, has an international
character. The UNCITRAL Model Law however in article 1(3) combines both these criteria."
Some national legislatures have consciously distinguished between international and
domestic arbitration regimes. In some instances, separate statutes govern the two different
regimes. However, in others there is only one statute governing both domestic and
international arbitration, with certain provisions applying only to either international or
81
82
See para 111.2below.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 1. See also
Christie "South Africa as a Venue for Intemational Commercial Arbitration" (1993) 9 Arbitration
Internationa/153 at 165.
See SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 3 n 19 with reference to s 14(1) of the existing
Act. See further ch 2 paras III and IV below.
SA Law Commission ReportArbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 3.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 11-14.
See Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 14; Butler & Finsen 296.
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domestic arbitration. There is not necessarily a fundamental distinction between the law
applying to the two different fields of arbitration law.87 One reason for a distinction may be
that parties to a domestic arbitration are likely to have closer connection with the law of the
place of arbitration." There is moreover a tendency to adopt a more liberal approach in
respect of international arbitration by imposing fewer restrictions on the parties and the
arbitrator and by limiting the grounds on which a court will decline to enforce an arbitration
agreement or the award."
Notwithstanding the reasons referred to below90 for having a dualistic system, for the sake of
conceptual consistency, there is much to be said for having the same rules applying to both
situations. An important practical reason for trying to avoid a dualistic approach is the
difficulty of defining a clear dividing line between domestic an international proceedinqs.?'
However strong the reasons for a single set of rules for both regimes may be, the Law
Commission's Report on International Arbitration and the subsequent Report on Domestic
Arbitration suggest an approach which favours a dualistic system for various reasons."
1.1 The Law Commission's proposals for international arbitration legislation
South Africa aims to become an attractive and well-frequented venue for international
arbitration proceedings. It is hoped that in view of recent political and economic
developments, South Africa can anticipate greatly increased regional trade and other
economic links. As South Africa assumes its natural role as the openly acknowledged
regional economic power, it could also develop as a regional centre for international
commercial arbitration in respect of disputes involving at least one party in the region.93 In
addition it is also hoped that improved arbitration legislation will have the effect of
encouraging urgent necessary foreign investment in South Africa." Contrary to the position
in Germany, from a Southern African perspective it is also necessary to have an acceptable
venue at least somewhere in the sub-Saharan region. Because of the lack of commonly
accepted international arbitration venues in sub-Saharan Africa, disputes involving a (South)
87
88
Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 122.
See Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 122 citing the New Zealand Law Commission Arbitration (NZLC R20 1991)
paras 46-47.
Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 123. See also Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 12-13.
See the text below at n 109 as to why the Law Commission rejected the adoption of the Model Law for
both international and domestic arbitration.
Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 123; SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 12.
See SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 12-14.
Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 120.
Butler "A New Domestic Arbitration Act for South Africa" (1998) 9 Stell LR 3 at 5.
Note that in this respect the Law Commission urged the accession by South Africa to the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the Washington or
ICSID Convention of 1965) see report of the Law Commission, p. 2
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African party arising out of an international commercial contract with an arbitration clause are
often referred to Europe under the arbitral law of the place of arbitration." From an African's
party perspective foreign arbitrators would dominate the mbunal." Further, the tribunal
would have its difficulties to apply what is for most European lawyers an unknown African
substantive law, in the somewhat unlikely event that the African party's law is to be applied
to the merits of the dispute."
The Law Commission supports the adoption of the Model Law with only a few adaptations,
expressly with the view to achieving the goal of the Model Law to promote the harmonisation
and thus the uniformity of national laws pertaining to international arbitration procedures.
This approach also makes the South African version user-friendly and attractive to foreign
parties and their lawyers." An alternative approach could have been to reject the Model Law
as a sole basis for the new South African arbitration legislation and to use the English
Arbitration Act of 1996 as well. (This alternative approach would have been similar to that
ultimately recommended by the Law Commission for domestic arbitration only.)99 However,
the rejection of the Model Law for international arbitration would have delayed the reform
process. A detailed review of the current Arbitration Act would have been necessary in order
to have a single law for both international and domestic proceedings. As examples of
countries which have not adopted the Model Law and have adopted new arbitration
legislation applying to both domestic and international arbitration, one could use England,
France, the Netherlands and sweden.!" But, one should bear in mind that these countries,
unlike South Africa, have been established centres for international arbitration for a long time
and their arbitration laws are familiar to many lawyers throughout the international arbitration
community.'?'
95 Support for the statement in the text is provided by the "2000 Statistical Report" in (2001) 12(1) ICC
ICArb Bu1/5-13 regarding ICC arbitrations in 2000. 68 or 4.9% of the parties in cases submitted to the
ICC for arbitration in 2000 came from sub-Saharan Africa. No sub-Saharan venue was used and none
of the arbitrators came from continental sub-Saharan Africa although one Madagascan was appointed
as an arbitrator in 2000.
See Okekeifere "Enhancing the Implementation of Economic Projects in the Third World Through
Arbitration" (2001) 67 Arbitration 240 at 251-252.
Butler "The Proposed New International Arbitration Act: A Contribution To The African Renaissance?"
unpublished paper delivered at the SLTSA Conference: Bloemfontein, January 1999, 2. Disadvantages
of a European seat include the cost of the tribunal, the venue and accommodation, all payable in a hard
currency.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 14.
See para 1.2 below.
Another major international arbitration centre, Switzerland, which has a federal system, adopted federal
legislation, the Private International Law Act of 1987 for international arbitration, while the cantons
retained their own law for domestic arbitration. The new legislation is not based on the Model Law. See
generally Blessing "The New International Arbitration Law in Switzerland: A Significant Step Towards
Liberalism" (1988) 5(1) Journal of International Arbitration 9-88.
See Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 372.
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Besides recommending the adoption of the Model Law for international arbitration, the
Commission made two other main recommendations on international arbltration.!" The first
was the introduction of improved legislation to give effect to South Africa's accession to the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
1958. This is because although South Africa acceded to the New York Convention without
reservation in 1976, the legislation to give effect to this accession 103was considered by the
Law Commission to contain serious defects, which could no longer be tolerated.'?' Secondly
the Commission recommended that South Africa accept the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States of 1965 (ICSID).105
Section 3 of the Commission's Draft Bill for international arbitration provides that the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 does not apply to arbitration agreements, arbitral proceedings and
awards that are subject to the Draft Bill. It is therefore intended that the current Arbitration
Act should not apply to international arbitrations which will fall under the Model Law.106This
is because the current Act has certain provisions with no equivalent in the Model Law. To the
extent that the Commission did not consider it necessary to supplement the Model Law to fill
these gaps,107 it was felt desirable that the Draft Bill should contain all relevant statutory
provisions on arbitration and that it should not be necessary for parties to an international
arbitration to refer to other arbitration legislation as wel1.108
The reason for the Law Commission in its first report recommending that the Model Law
should initially at least be restricted to international arbitration is that it was feared that the
reform of the domestic arbitration law would give rise to a lively and time-consuming
discussion. Certainly, a main point of this debate would be the extent of the courts' powers of
assistance and interference. As in other countries this is always a difficult issue 109involving
as it does the interaction between the powers of the courts in the public interest and the
contractual freedom of parties to regulate their own affairs. Controversy regarding domestic
arbitration reform was also anticipated because of a perception among some black lawyers
in South Africa that some members of the white legal establishment saw arbitration as a way
102
103
104
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 2.
The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 40 of 1977.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 110. A more
detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.
See further SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 134-
153.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 23.
For example, the Commission considered it unnecessary to amplify the Model Law to include the power
of the court in s 8 of the 1965 Act to extend contractual time-limits for commencing arbitration
proceedings. However the Commission recommended additions to article 31 of the Model Law to deal
with costs and interest.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 23.
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of avoiding the courts, increasingly staffed by black lawyers."? The Law Commission in the
light of representations received also considered that the new legislation for international
arbitral proceedings was needed urgently and its implementation should therefore not be
delayed by the more protracted inquiry required for changes to the legislation on domestic
arbitration. The decision as to whether or not the UNCITRAL Model Law was suitable for
domestic arbitration in South Africa was therefore left until the next stage of its inquiry
dealing specifically with domestic arbitration.!"
1.2 Domestic arbitration
In its Report on Domestic Arbitration, the Law Commission identified and considered three
possible approaches to enacting improved domestic arbitration legislation.112 The first was
that originally suggested by the Association of Arbitrators in 1994,113namely to improve the
1965 Act by making the necessary changes to its provisions. The Commission however
pointed out that this approach takes insufficient account of the provisions of the UNCITRAL
Model Law. Since the Law Commission recommended the adoption of the Model Law for
international arbitration proceedings with a minimum of changes, the result would not only be
to have a dualistic system, but to have two arbitration statutes being fundamentally different
in a number of important aspects. This approach also has insufficient regard for the
objectives of a modern arbitration statute.!"
The second alternative considered was the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law for both
international and domestic arbitration. The Commission accepted that this approach was
possible in principle, inter alia because two developed countries, namely New Zealand and
Germany, and four developing countries, namely Kenya, Zimbabwe, India and Uganda had
recently followed this route.!" The Commission however mentioned a number of reasons
why this alternative should not be followed by South Africa.!"
109
110
See Christie (1993) 9 Arbitration International 165; Butler (1998) 9 Stell LR 8.
Butler unpublished paper delivered at the SLTSA Conference: Bloemfontein, January 1999, 3. The
Commission took particular care to address these concerns through a thorough consultation process,
which included the holding of regional workshops to which all interested parties were invited. See SA
Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 12; Report
Domestic Arbitration 8-10.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 8, 15.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 5-7. Compare the discussion in Butler (1994) 27
CILSA 129-135, who comes to the same conclusion as the Commission.
The Association's Draft Bill is contained in annexure B of the Law Commission's Discussion Paper 83 of
August 1999 which preceded the report.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 6. See the text at n 116 below for these objectives.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 11.
See also Butler (1998) 9 Steil LR 7-12.
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The first reason was that the 1965 Act has worked reasonably well in practice and is familiar
to a large number of persons involved in arbitration of whom many are unlikely to become
involved in international arbitration. Furthermore, it was stated that the 1965 Act has been
interpreted by the courts on numerous occasions, usually with satisfactory results and that
the replacement of the 1965 Act by the significantly different Model Law for domestic
arbitration would undermine legal certainty.!" Additionally, it was argued that some of the
existing wider powers of the court, which were rejected by the Law Commission as additions
to the Model Law for the international arbitration legislation, have been used beneficially for
domestic arbitration and should be retained in modified form.!"
Secondly, the Commission argued in its Report that it was important that the official Englbh
text of the Model Law be adopted for international arbitrations with minimum changes. This
text should then also be applied by the South African courts in the same way it is applied in
other Model Law jurisdictions, which will necessitate thorough reference to foreign
jurisprudence. This type of legal exercise is less practical for practitioners involved only in
domestic arbitratlon.!"
Thirdly, it was pointed out that the Model Law has certain gaps compared to the detailed
provisions of the 1965 Act and it would be necessary to fill these gaps for the Model Law to
operate effectively in domestic arbitration. This approach would however undermine the
goals of uniformity with other jurisdictions which have adopted the Model Law and promoting
South Africa as an attractive arbitration venue, which will otherwise be achieved through
adopting the Model Law with as few changes as possible. This problem could be avoided by
retaining a separate domestic arbitration statute.!"
The final reason given, particularly important in the context of this thesis, was "the urgent
need to take remedial measures" regarding procedures currently used in arbitrations
involving more complex disputes. These procedures "often result in the arbitration hearing
being far longer and more expensive than it would have been if the parties went to court".
117
lIB
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 12.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 11, with reference to s 8 (power of the court to extend
the time fixed in the arbitration agreement for commencing arbitration proceedings) and s 20 ((statement
of case for opinion of court or counsel during arbitration proceedings) of the 1965 Act, which have been
retained as ss 11 and 39 of the Commission's Draft Bill, with substantial modifications.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 13.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 13, citing s 14(1) of the current Act concerning the
specific powers of the arbitral tribunal, which is much more detailed than the comparable provision of the
Model Law, namely article 19(2).
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The Commission, in this context took note of provisions included in the English Arbitration
Act of 1996 to achieve the same purpose.!"
The third approach, and the one ultimately recommended by the Law Commission, is to
adopt what is essentially a new arbitration statute. The proposed Draft Bill retains the basic
structure of the 1965 Act and those provisions, which have worked well in practice.
Additionally it incorporates those features of the Model Law and the English Arbitration Act of
1996, which are in the Commission's view essential to ensure that the objectives of a
modern system of arbitration law are achieved.!" In this regard, four objectives were
identified by the Law Commission. These are first, the fair resolution of disputes by an
independent and impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or expense; secondly, the
acknowledgement of party autonomy; and, thirdly, balanced powers for the courts.!" Finally
the arbitral tribunal should have adequate powers to be able to continue with the arbitration
without avoidable delay by making an award in cases where one of the parties refuses to co-
operate or where the parties are unable to agree on a procedure to be followed.124
2. The German approach
Similar to South Africa, Germany experienced major changes in the last few years. The
reunification of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) in 1989 had the effect of the integration of the former GDR in the FRG and therefore
subject to the latter's arbitration law. And from the early 1990's Germany started to play an
important role regarding trade with the former COMECON partners (basically the eastern
European states). With these developments it became apparent that German arbitration law
had several defects.125
121 SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 14-16. These provisions include the statutory duties
imposed on the arbitral tribunal by ss 33 and 40 (compare ss 28 and 35 of the Draft Bill) and the
tribunal's power to cap recoverable costs in s 65 (compare s 56 of the Draft Bill). See also Butler (1998)
9 Stell LR 14-19. The Commission also decided to follow s 34(1 )(h) of the English Act rather than article
24(1) of the Model Law by empowering the tribunal to decide whether or not there should be an oral
hearing unless the parties otherwise agree (see s 33(1) of the Draft Bill and the Commission's Report
148 n 73).
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 7.
Compare the statement of general principles in s 2 of the Draft Bill, which is based on s 1 of the English
Arbitration Act of 1996.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 2-3.
To mention only a few:
§ 1028 ZPO provided a two-person tribunal as the normal number of arbitrators.
§ 1033 Nr. 1 ZPO provided for the expiry of the arbitration agreement upon the resignation of an
arbitrator.
§1033 Nr. 2 ZPO provided for the lapsing of the arbitration agreement in the event of a tie of votes
between the members of the two-person tribunal. (See Kreindler & Mahlich nA Foreign Perspective on
the New German Arbitration Act" (1998) 14 Arbitration /ntemationa/65 at 69.)
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Until 1998 the former German arbitration law was based on the lP0126 from 1879, the date
when the lPO was adopted. Although the case law developed and certain modern
approaches were later introduced within the structure, it could nevertheless not alter the fact
that the concept of German arbitration law was based on principles of the nineteenth
century."? Moreover, the somewhat archaic concept of the arbitration law was understood
by experts to be the main cause for the international reluctance to use Germany as an
arbitration venue.!" Indeed, compared to countries like France, England, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and Sweden, Germany was clearly not a popular venue for international
arbitration. In cases where Germany was selected as the place of the arbitration, awkward
provisions of the lPO were usually in effect avoided by choosing, for example, the ICC
Arbitration Rules for the proceedings, which was possible under the rather liberal German
lPO.129 In addition to the defects in the arbitration law referred to above, there was a lack of
trust among foreigners in Germany as a venue for international arbitration because of
perceptions arising from historical tactors.!"
As a specific shortcoming it was mentioned that the German arbitration law had no particular
provisions dealing with international proceedings, although the emphasis on international
arbitration was growing. Secondly, the former section of the lPO dealing with arbitration
contained provisions which were far removed from the reality of actual arbitration practice.!"
It is also interesting to note that a further point of criticism was that the discretion of the
arbitrator on how to conduct the arbitral proceedings was regarded as too extensive 132 and
the guidance of the proceedings by compulsory provisions was seen as too weak. It was
argued that this legal vacuum should be limited in favour of stricter guidelines and legal
certainty and predictabtlity.l" A final criticism was that the procedure to enforce international
arbitration awards was too complicated and contained too many escapes into appeals. The
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"ZPO" is short for ~ivilprQzer..Qrdnung.However, some (also German) authors translate this into "Code
for Civil Procedure" or "CCP". But to avoid confusion when reading German literature and foreign
literature about German law, it seems preferable to use the German "ZPO".
See the previous footnote.
Meyer-Teschendorf & Hoffmann "Eine neue Balance zwischen rechtsstaatlicher Sicherheit und
Optimierung der Justiz" 1998 ZRP 134.
Submission by the Federal German Government on the draft of the New Arbitration Act in
Bundestagsdrucksache (official Bulletin of the German Parliament) 13/5274 of 12 July 1996, 23. See
also Bockstiegel "An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act Based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law" (1998) 14Arbitration /nternationa/19-20.
Kreindler & Mahlich 70-71.
Kreindler & Mahlich 75.
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/527422. For example § 1028 ZPO, which takes a tribunal of two arbitrators
as the norm, was regularly excluded by the parties in their arbitration agreement.
§ 103411ZPO.
Bundestagsdrucksache 22.
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reduction of such appeals was therefore an important criterion for new arbitration
leqislation.!"
However, it was felt that the change of the arbitration law and the adoption of the UNCITRAL
Model Law by Germany could alter the situation and would have a positive effect to make
Germany an attractive venue for international arbitration proceedings, since the Model Law
is familiar to lawyers dealing with international arbitration world-wide. The positive effect of
the implementation of the Model Law and the "new attractiveness" would be of course firstly
an economic one, certainly for German lawyers. But a second important consideration is that
German jurisprudence would be able to influence the growing international jurisprudence
regarding international arbitration and the interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
The advantages of the Model Law were seen in the fact that it is based on a world-wide
consensus, it is clearly structured and contains a number of provisions, which come into
effect if the parties have no agreement about the issue.135 This was seen as the more
practical alternative to the former ZPO approach, where those cases were left to the
discretion of the arbitrator.!"
Apart from a few exceptions the new German Arbitration Act incorporates the complete
wording of the Model Law. The implementation of the Model Law was certainly facilitated by
the fact that it does not contain any provisions, which would have been regarded as
completely contrary to the German understanding of arbitration.!" The German legislation
has taken the harmonisation objective very seriously and included the provisions of the
Model Law almost unchanged in terms of form and contents. This reflects the view that it is
only possible to achieve the Model Law's aim of contributing to international harmonisation
of arbitration law if there is a willingness both with the structure of the law and with regard to
terminology and content of the individual provisions to dispense with a purely national point
of view in favour of harmonisation.l"
Finally, Germany also faced the question whether there should be one set of rules for both
domestic and international arbitration proceedings or whether the Model Law should deal
134
135
Meyer-Teschendorf & Hoffmann135.
These include e.g. the commencement of the arbitral proceedings (article 21 of the Model Law); the
appointment of the arbitrator and the challenge of arbitrators (articles 11-13); and the termination of the
proceedings (article 32). The former ZPO did not deal with these issues and left some of them to the
arbitrator under § 1034 II ZPO.
Bundestagsdrucksache 24. See also BockstiegeI21-22.
Bundestagsdrucksache 24.
Submission by the Federal German Government on the draft of the New Arbitration Act in
Bundestagsdrucksache 27. See also BockstiegeI21-22.
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with international arbitration only. On the one hand, the idea of an almost unchanged ZPO
for domestic arbitration and the Model Law for international proceedings was dismissed by
the drafters of the legislation on the ground that this would constitute two set of rules which
are so different in terms of structure, scope and terminology that the differences would
neither be explainable nor tolerable.!" On the other hand, the revision and updating of the
former arbitration provisions of the ZPO into a modern set of rules would result in a high
degree of similarity between the revised ZPO and the Model Law, so that two different sets
of rules would not have been justified."? The vast majority therefore agreed to the proposal
of the draft bill to achieve the revision of the ZPO by adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law for
both domestic and international arbitration proceedlnqs.!"
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Bundestagsdrucksache 25.
Bundestagsdrucksache 25.
Meyer-Teschendorf & Hoffmann 135. Bëckstieqel 22 points out that this also makes it unnecessary to
deal with the sometimes difficult distinction between national and international arbitrations when
applying the new law.
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Chapter Two
Court involvement prior to the award and interaction
with the powers of the tribunal
I. Introduction
This chapter deals with the involvement of the court in the arbitration process prior to the
award and the balance of power between the arbitral tribunal and the courts. In the course
of the discussion of certain powers of the court, the relationship between the powers of the
court and those of the tribunal will be examined, including their interaction in specific
circumstances.
First, with reference to article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law the general approach
regarding the scope of the court's powers in the context of arbitration proceedings will be
investigated. The drafters of the Model Law clearly accepted the need to restrict the court's
powers of intervention. The position in South African and German law will then be
considered. It will be seen that the powers of the court under the existing South African law
are, by modern standards, too wide. The restriction of the court's powers of intervention in
terms of the proposals of the South African Law Commission and under German law will
then be examined.
In order to be able to evaluate the different approaches one should bear in mind the possible
consequences of the court's involvement or power to intervene in the arbitration process
prior to the award. The need to limit court involvement was considered by both the drafters
of the new German legislation and the South African Law Commission.' The limitation and
control of court interruption was identified as a crucial factor for improving the efficiency of
arbitration process and in avoiding unnecessary delay and disruption." Nevertheless, as will
be shown by examples below, the court's assistance can be decisive to enable the arbitral
tribunal to make an enforceable award.'
After analysing the general provision in article 5 of the Model Law and the South African and
German responses, the focus will shift to the issues of Kompetenz-Kompetenz" and interim
2
3
4
See eh 1 para III above.
See also the comparison in eh 2 para 11.3 below.
See particularly the discussion of "interim measures" in eh 2 paras IV.1 and IV.S below.
See eh 2 para III below.
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measures." It will be shown that these two issues have a crucial role regarding the question
of court involvement in the arbitration process and its possible disruption, and therefore the
difference between effective and ineffective arbitration. The development of the principle of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz will be analysed as well as the implementation of the principle in
German and South African law. The advantages and disadvantages regarding the control
and limitation of the court's power to interrupt arbitration proceedings because of
jurisdictional issues prior to the award will be evaluated.
In the last part of this chapter the partial dependence of arbitral tribunals on the courts
regarding interim measures will be discussed. This dependence makes the issue of interim
measures a crucial one, particularly if one bears in mind the practical importance of interim
measures concerning the ability of the tribunal to make an effective award in some instances
and also the growing frequency of requests for interim measures in arbitration proceedings.
5 See eh 2 para IV below.
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II. Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
Article 5 of the Model Law will now be discussed to establish when court involvement in the
arbitration process is allowed under the Model Law. As discussed previously, whenever a
party seeks to delay arbitration proceedings, it may be worthwhile for that party to attempt to
involve the court in those proceedinqs." The party may for example claim that there are
issues in dispute, which are not covered by a valid arbitration agreement, which may
therefore not be decided by the arbitral tribunal, with the result that the dispute must be
referred to court. To name a few possible bases for this contention, the party may claim that
the arbitral tribunal is not competent because there is no arbitration agreement, or that the
arbitration agreement is null and void or has lapsed, or that it is not binding on the party
against whom the arbitral proceedings have been instituted." Even though the party may not
succeed with its objection, substantial delay may be caused.
In each such situation, the question has to be asked whether a court may intervene or not.
Article 5 of the Model Law8 states in this regard:
"In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in
this Law."
It has been said that the purpose of article 5 of the Model Law is to oblige the drafters of the
Model Law (as well as legislators adopting it) to specify any instances in which court control
is envisaged, in order to increase certainty for parties and arbitrators and further the cause of
uniformity."
Article 5 should therefore not be understood to express hostility to court intervention or
assistance in appropriate circumstances, but only to satisfy the need for certainty as to when
court involvement is permissible.'? It has also been said that article 5 is of the greatest
importance in establishing the correct balance between party autonomy on the one hand and
6 See ch1 paras 1.1and 1.11above.
Gaillard "Laws and Court Decisions in Civil Law Countries" ICCA Congress Series No.5 (1990) 162.
See too Christie (1993) 9 Arbitration International 154-160 for the range of delaying tactics currently
available under South African law involving court applications prior to the award.
See generally on article 5 of the Model Law Holtzmann & Neuhaus 216-219; Christie (1994) 111 SALJ
362-365.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 216.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 216. Regarding the necessity for court intervention, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal has noted the world-wide trend in international commercial arbitration towards restricting the
scope of judicial intervention; see Quintette Coal Limited v. Nippon Steel Corp. et aI, [1991] 1Western
Weekly Reports 219, where Quintette sought to set aside the award relying on articles 5 and 34 of the
Model Law.
8
9
10
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necessary intervention by courts on the other." It appears from the travaux préparatoires
that it was foreseen by the UNCITRAL Secretariat at the outset of the drafting process that
achieving this balance would be one of the more complex problems in the drafting of the
Model Law.12 It was also foreseen that this would require a precise demarcation of the scope
of possible intervention and supervision by the court," and recognised that this supervision
and control by the courts was not always welcomed by the parties, especially regarding the
arbitral tribunal's decision on the merits." Therefore judicial control over the tribunal's
decision on the merits needed to be limited to the utmost."
Experience has shown that court involvement can undermine effective arbitration, where an
unscrupulous party approaches the court merely as a delaying tactic." This problem of
parties using court intervention as a delaying tactic was also known to the drafters of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. During the drafting process "it was pointed out that resort to
intervention by a court during the arbitral proceedings was often used only as a delaying
tactic and was more often a source of abuse of the arbitral proceedings than it was a
protection against abuse"." Thus, it was important to determine a clear limitation of the
court's power and a precise demarcation of the scope of possible intervention and
supervision."
The UNCITRAL Model Law was created to be adopted by states as a part of their national
legislation. Therefore in determining the extent of court involvement the interpretation of the
opening phrase of article 5 "In matters governed by this Law, ..." assumes crucial
importance. It must be asked whether the phrase only refers to aspects of arbitration law
dealt with in the Model Law itself, or whether it also refers to national arbitration law in
general. Article 1 of the Model Law states that the law applies to "... international commercial
arbitration". There are however aspects of the law of international commercial arbitration
which are not dealt with by the Model Law.19 On a broader interpretation of the quoted
11
12
13
14
15
16
See Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 362.
See the extract from the First Secretariat Note AJCN.9/207 para 21, quoted in ch 1 at n 20 above.
AlCN 9/207 para 21, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 1196. See also Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 363.
AlCN 9/207 para 10, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 1193. See also Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 363.
AlCN 9/207 para 104, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 924 .. See also Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 363.
See e.g. the extract from SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 17, quoted in ch 3 n 182
below.
UN document AJ40/17 para 63, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 238 and Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 363.
Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 363.
These include the capacity of parties to enter into the arbitration agreement, the grounds on which a
dispute is considered non-arbitrable (compare article 1(5); consolidation of arbitration proceedings, court
enforcement of interim measures directed by the arbitral tribunal, costs and interest on awards. See
also Holtzmann & Neuhaus 218.
17
18
19
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phrase, general or residual powers of the courts to supervise arbitral proceedings as part of
national arbitration law could arguably apply.20
On a narrower interpretation court intervention would only be possible where permitted by
the Model Law. The Model Law envisages court involvement in the following circumstances,
namely article 8 (arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court), article 9 (interim
measures), article 11 (appointment of arbitrators), article 13 (procedure for challenging
arbitrators), article 14 (failure or impossibility of the arbitrator to act), article 16 (competence
of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction), article 27 (court assistance in taking
evidence), article 34 (setting aside an award) and articles 35 and 36 (recognition and
enforcement of awards). 21 In these named circumstances the court's power to intervene,
usually on the request of a party,22 is beyond doubt. But, article 5 should also have made it
clear that those instances were definitive and the courts shall have no residual jurisdiction to
intervene."
In fact, the UNCITRAL Commission was aware that the Model Law as a lex specialis could
not be complete in every respect and that other aspects would be governed by other rules of
domestic law.24 It was also understood, that the introductory words of article 5 "matters
governed by this Law" had a meaning, which was narrower than the term "international
commercial arbitration" used in article 1. This limited the scope of application of article 5 to
those matters, which were in fact governed by or regulated in the Model Law. Article 5 would
therefore not exclude court control or assistance in those matters, not dealt with in the Model
Law.25 The suggestion that a more precise definition of the phrase "matters governed by this
Law" should be included for the sake of clarifying the drafters' intention about the scope of
article 5's application was rejected. It was argued that in the majority of cases, in which this
question would be relevant, it should be possible to find the answer by using the normal
20
21
22
23
24
25
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 216.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 216.
Compare articles 34(2)(b) and 36(1)9b) regarding matters which the court can raise on its own initiative.
Christie 1994 (111) SALJ 363.
See UN document Al40/17 para 61 quoted in Holtzman & Neuhaus 238.
See UN document AlCN 9/246 para. 188, quoted by Holtzmann & Neuhaus 223 and Christie 1994 (111)
SALJ 363. The matters specified above where court intervention is permitted are the crucial fields where
court support is essential for the whole arbitration process. In other matters, not specified, the need for
court involvement is less clear. In the case of International Civil Aviation Organisation (lCAO) v Tripal
Systems Pfy.Ltd Recueil de jurisprudence du Quebec (1994) 2560, the ICAO asked the Superior Court
of Quebec to declare that it enjoyed an absolute immunity from judicial process of any kind. The Court
granted the motion for dismissal of the declaratory motion, having decided that the arbitral tribunal alone
was competent to decide the immunity issue. To this end, the court examined the conditions regulating
judicial intervention in the arbitral process (articles 16 and 34 of the Model Law) and concluded that
these conditions were not met. The court refused to intervene on the basis of article 5 of the UNCITRAL
Model Law; see CLOUT case 182. (CLOUT is the acronym for Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, collected
on UNCITRAL's web site www.un.org.atluncitral/cloutlabstract.)
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rules of statutory interpretation, taking into account the principles underlying the text of the
Model Law.26
As Christie points out, reference to the travaux préparatoires as an interpretation aid
presents no difficulty in a civil-law jurisdiction like France. The technique has however
traditionally not been permitted in common-law jurisdictions, although there has recently
been a less strict approach in this reqard." Several common-law jurisdictions when adopting
the Model Law have dealt with the problem by legislation. For example, the Hong Kong
Arbitration Amendment (No 2) Ordinance 1989, which adopted the Model Law, provided in
section 2(3):
"In interpreting and applying the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law, regard shall
be had to its international origin and to the need for uniformity in its interpretation, and
regard may be had to the documents specified in the Sixth Schedule.,,28
By giving this guideline for interpretation and by expressly stating that there should be an
interpretation in favour of uniformity of international arbitration, the legislature in Hong Kong
sought to prevent all attempts to interpret the arbitration legislation in a way which is contrary
to the underlying approach of the Model Law. At least the involvement of courts as a dilatory
tactic can be avoided in cases where the Model Law expressly limits the court's power to
intervene in favour of a ruling by the tribunal exclusively.
Similar provision for the use of the travaux préparatoires as an interpretation aid has been
included in Zimbabwe's version of the Model Law and has been recommended for South
Africa."
1. The South African approach
1.1. The current law
The following paragraphs do not attempt a full discussion of the powers of the courts under
the existing South African arbitration law.30 The main purpose of the discussion is to illustrate
26
27
UN document Al40/17 para 61 quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus 238; Christie 1994 (111) SALJ 364.
Christie 1994 (111) SALJ 364; SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act
for South Africa 30.
The documents specified in the Sixth Schedule are the Report of the Secretary-General of UNCITRAL
of 25 March 1985 (AlCN 9/264); the report of UNCITRAL on the work of its eighteenth session (Al40/17)
and the report of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong on the adoption of the Model Law. See
Christie 1994 (111) SALJ 364.
See SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 30-34 and
the Draft International Arbitration Bill s 8 and sch 2, which lists the full travaux préparatoires.
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the important difference in the balance between the powers of the court and party autonomy
under the existing arbitration law compared to that under the Model Law. It will be seen that
there is significantly greater emphasis on court intervention and less on party autonomy.
Although the judge-made powers of the court are less intrusive than those which existed in
England prior to 1979,31 it must nevertheless also be remembered that the powers of the
court contained in the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 are not exclusive and are supplemented by
certain powers under the common law.32
As stated above, the existing Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 applies to both domestic and
international arbitral proceedings, whereas the UNCITRAL Model Law was designed for
proceedings with an international character. The Law Commission has proposed the
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law for international commercial arbitration only and the
replacement of the 1965 Act for domestic arbitration by a separate statute, partly based on
the Model Law.33
Although, under the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, the parties to an arbitration agreement may
have intended their dispute to be settled outside the courts, the effect of the agreement is
not to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts in respect of that dispute." The potential for
involving the courts as a dilatory tactic under the 1965 Act is therefore a real dancer." If the
parties to an arbitration agreement consider the powers of the courts to intervene in the
arbitral process as too intrusive, thereby greatly increasing the risk of delaying tactics, they
may be tempted to seek to restrict these powers in their agreement, on the basis of party
autonomy. However, as the provisions regarding the powers of the courts are mandatory, it
is submitted that a contractual provision, which attempts to exclude or restrict these powers
of the court in relation to the dispute, would be void as being contrary to public policy."
30 See Christie (1993) 9 Arbitration International 153-165 for a discussion of these powers in the context of
international arbitration and Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 123-129 and 135-146 for a discussion of the court's
powers in the context of domestic arbitration.
The power held by English courts, prior to its repeal in 1979, to set aside an award because of an error
on the face of that award never applied in South Africa. See Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 125-126.
See e.g. the court's power to interfere with a procedural ruling of the arbitral tribunal prior to the award,
formulated in Tuesday Industries (Pfy) Ltd v Condor Industries (Pfy) Ltd 1978 4 SA 379 (T), where the
court was careful to emphasise that the power would only be exercised in exceptional circumstances
and on grounds that would justify the review of the award itself (382E-G). This power was recently
applied by the court in Badenhorst-Schnetler v Ne/2001 3 SA 631 (C).
See ch 1 para 1.111.1above.
Butler & Finsen 61, citing Parekh v Shah Jehan Cinemas (Pfy) Ltd 1980 1 SA 301 (D) at 305F-H.
See Christie (1993) 9 Arbitration International 165.
Compare Butler & Finsen 62 and 210-211. Public policy in this context must be understood as "the final
parameter of law that, while it is reflected in and often expressed by statutory and constitutional
statements of law, also dictates either consent or constraint, permission or prohibition, when statutes
and constitution are silent on a given matter". (See Buchanan "Public Policy and International
Commercial Arbitration" (1988) 26 American Business Law Journal 513.)
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The powers of the court regarding the arbitral process can be classified as powers of
assistance, supervisory powers and powers of recognition and enforcement." Under the
UNCITRAL Model Law, the court's power to enforce the arbitration agreement can be
classified both as a power of assistance and as one of recognition and enforcement,
because of the narrow grounds on which recognition of the agreement can be refused."
However, given the wide discretion of the court to refuse to recognise the arbitration
agreement under the current South African law, this power, depending on the particular
circumstances, is arguably more one of supervision than of assistance and recognition. The
supervisory nature of this power appears from section 3(2) of the 1965 Act," which provides
as follows:
"The court may at any time on the application of any party to an arbitration agreement,
on good cause shown -
(a) set aside the arbitration agreement; or
(b) order that any particular dispute referred to in the arbitration agreement shall not be
referred to arbitration; or
(c) order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with reference to any
dispute referred."
By merely alleging to have "good cause" a party may apply to the court for the setting aside
of the arbitration agreement under this provision. The court will then examine whether this
"good cause" exists. If so, the arbitration agreement will be set aside as stated under section
3(2) and the dispute will be referred to court. In one case, notwithstanding the court's
acceptance of the requirement that a very strong case must be made out, the court ordered
that the arbitration agreement should cease to have effect "on the surprisingly thin grounds
that legal problems and the credibility of witnesses are more properly dealt with by a court of
law, and that the one party had misgivings about an architect as arbitrator having to decide
on the credibility of a member of his own profession"." In any event, even if "good cause"
37 Butler & Finsen 61. Examples of the court's powers of assistance are ss 8, 23 and 38 regarding the
power to extend certain time limits, s 12 regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, s 20 regarding the
court's power to give an opinion on a point of law and s 21 regarding the general powers of the court.
Supervisory powers include the power to remove an arbitrator under s 13 and ss 32 and 33 regarding
the remittal or setting aside of the award. S 31, which gives the court the power to make an award an
order of court, is an example of the power of recognition and enforcement.
Under article 8 of the Model Law, the court must refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
arbitration agreement is "null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed". See further n 109
below regarding the meaning of this expression.
The supervisory nature of the power is less clear in the case of an application under s 6(2) to stay court
proceedings so that the dispute can be referred to arbitration. On the face of it the court's power may be
classified as one of recognition and enforcement (see Butler & Finsen 61 n 190) but in effect it can be
used by the court to supervise which disputes should be referred to arbitration.
See Christie (1993) 9 Arbitration /nternationa/156, with reference to Sera v De Wet 1974 2 SA 645 (T)
650A, 654F and 655H-656E. He argues that few arbitration agreements could be considered safe
38
39
40
32
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
cannot be proved, the application to court will cause a substantial delay to the arbitration
process.
Alternatively, a party wishing to have a dispute decided by litigation, notwithstanding the fact
that the dispute is covered by a valid arbitration agreement, can do so by referring the
dispute to court. The court will not deliver a decision, ruling that there is a binding arbitration
agreement and refer the dispute to arbitration of its own motion." If the opposing party
wishes to rely on the arbitration agreement, it will be forced to use one of two methods to
stay the court proceedings to allow arbitration to proceed. If it fails to raise the arbitration
clause by one of these two methods, it will lose its contractual right to arbitration and will be
forced into litigation. Therefore, it either must apply for a stay under section 6 of the
Arbitration Act or it must file a special plea requesting a stay under the common law.42
A party wishing to use section 6 to enforce the arbitration agreement must bring a
substantive application complying with the High Court rules. An informal application for a
stay is not sufficient. The court may stay the court proceedings if the court is satisfied that
there is no sufficient reason why the dispute should not be referred to arbitration in terms of
the arbitration aqreement." Notwithstanding the difference in wording between sections 3(2)
and 6, the courts have assumed that the onus borne by the party seeking to avoid arbitration
is the same for both sections. A person seeking to avoid arbitration under section 3(2) must,
as stated above, show "good cause" as to why the arbitration agreement should be set
aside. The respondent to an application under section 6(2) bears the onus of showing that
there is "sufficient reason" why the dispute should not be referred to arbitration." A possible
difficulty with the wording of section 6(2) is the following. Even if the court is satisfied that
there is no good reason why the dispute should be referred to arbitration, it "may" then stay
the court proceedings and is not apparently obliged to do so. As yet, this argument does not
appear to have been raised successfully in a South African court, but the wording is a further
indication of a balance in favour of court control rather than party autonomy.
The general powers of the court under section 21 of the 1965 Act may be characterised as
supportive rather than supervisory. Nevertheless, some of the applications sanctioned by
41
42
against such reasoning, having previously identified the underlying philosophy of ss 3 and 6 as one of
"nanny knows best" (155).
Compare Parekh v Shah Jehan Cinemas (Pty) Ltd above at 305G.
Butler & Finsen 63. In Stocks Construction (OFS) (Pty) Ltd v Metter-Pingon (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 35 (T)
39A-B, the court held that the wording of s 6 is permissive rather than obligatory, with the result the the
party wishing to arbitrate can choose the method by which it wishes to enforce the arbitration
agreement.
S 6(2); Butler & Finsen 64.
Butler & Finsen 64.
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this section could be used to interrupt and delay the arbitration proceedings. Certainly
applications for security for costs, discovery." and interim interdicts or similar relief require
closer investiqatlon." However, some of these supportive powers clearly help the tribunal to
come to an effective award within a reasonable period of time, as opposed to being used to
interrupt and delay the proceedings. An example is the court's power to make orders for the
inspection or the interim custody or the preservation or the sale of goods or property under
section 21 (1 )(e). This power, which is based on the state's sovereign power, can be
indispensable in circumstances where the arbitral tribunal itself cannot order such relief
effectively.
1.2. The proposed new legislation for international arbitration
In terms of the new legislation proposed for international arbitration in South Africa by the
Law Commission, the balance between the powers of the court on the one hand and respect
for party autonomy and the powers of the tribunal on the other hand will change significantly.
The Law Commission proposed that article 5 of the Model Law should be adopted
unchanqed." The Law Commission accepted that one of the objects of the Model Law was
to limit the involvement of national courts in international arbitration." One of the
considerations which motivated the Law Commission to recommend the adoption of article 5
was the desirability of promoting uniformity in Model Law jurtsdictions." The Law
Commission moreover accepted that the Model Law achieves the desired balance regarding
the powers of the court.'" It was recognised that on the one hand arbitration cannot function
effectively without the assistance of the courts. The Law Commission applied this argument
to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement and the award by a court order in the
absence of voluntary compliance, 51 but it can also be applied to interim measures. The Law
Commission was on the other hand acutely aware of the danger that the powers of the court
relating to intervention in the arbitral process prior to the award, which as first sight may
appear to be intrinsically beneficial, can be abused as a tactical ploy to gain time.52
Therefore, the adoption of article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law should be understood as a
45 See paras 1.3 and IV.3.3.1 below regarding the response of the SA Law Commission to s 21 (a) and (b),
which empower the court to order security for costs and discovery.
See the discussion of interim measures in ch 2 paras IV.3.2 and IV.3.3 below.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 51.
See the Report 16 and 51.
See the Report 51.
See the Report 18.
See the Report 17.
See the Report 17.
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severe limitation on "excessive opportunities for parties to involve the court as a tactic for
delaying the arbitration process". 53
Bearing in mind the need for uniformity with other Model Law jurisdictions, the Law
Commission decided that the continued availability of the powers of the court regarding
matters not dealt with by the Model Law was unnecessary. The Law Commission referred in
this regard to section 20 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, which deals with the right of a
party to refer a question of law to the court for an opinion during arbitral proceedings and
section 8, under which the court has the power to extend the time fixed in the arbitration
agreement for commencing arbitration proceeclnqs." Section 3(1) of the Draft International
Arbitration Bill therefore provides that:
" ... the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 shall not apply to an arbitration agreement, reference
to arbitration or arbitral award covered by this Act."
With this provision it is acknowledged that either the new arbitration legislation is applicable
to an arbitration, or the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 (or its proposed successor). The parties to
an international commercial arbitration in South Africa should moreover have the assurance
that the new arbitration statute contains all the relevant statutory provisions'" and that they
should not have to refer to other arbitration legislation as well.56 Foreign users of South
African arbitration law in an international arbitration can therefore know that there will be no
hidden pitfalls in terms of the further applicability of the 1965 Act. 57 If the new statute is
applicable, the 1965 Act and its successor are excluded. Principles of the common law on
arbitration, not dealt with in either statute could still arguably apply," where South African
law is the lex arbitri.
Finally, the Law Commission recommends that article 8 of the Model Law, regarding the
effect of an arbitration agreement on a substantive claim before the court, should be adopted
without alteration." This will result in a drastic curtailment of the discretion, which the courts
currently enjoy under sections 3 and 6 of the 1965 Act, not to enforce the arbitration
aqreernent." An important argument advanced by the Law Commission for adopting article
8 unchanged was the need to bring South African law pertaining to court enforcement of
53
54
55
Compare the Report 1.
See the Report 51 .
The Law Commission thereby also avoided the possible problems with the interpretation of the phrase
"In matters governed by this Law" in article 5, discussed above.
See the Report 23.
See the Report 23.
Compare Butler & Finsen 4.
See the Report 58.
See the Report 58. See further the text at n 38 above.
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international arbitration agreements into line with generally accepted international
standards."
1.3. The proposed new legislation for domestic arbitration
In its report on domestic arbitration the Commission urged the need to rethink the extent of
the court's powers. As in the case of international arbitration the emphasis is on the
necessity to reduce avoidable delay and expense in the arbitration process due to
inappropriate court involvement." The issue, which the Law Commission attempts to
address, is not the fear that the courts are incapable of exercising the powers conferred on
them by the arbitration legislation, but merely the danger of the court's statutory powers
being abused by unscrupulous parties as a delaying tactic." It is accepted that court
assistance is vital to arbitration and it is understood that the courts must be entitled to certain
supervisory powers as their price for this assistance."
Section 2(c) of the Draft Arbitration Bill therefore contains as one of the three general
principles on which the Draft Bill is founded a provision stating that "in matters governed by
this Act the court must not intervene except as provided by this Act." This provision is based
on article 5 of the Model Law, with substantially identical wording. The powers of the court
are therefore not only more restricted than those available under the 1965 Act but are also
deliberately aimed at preventing the abuse of applications to court as a delaying tactic." The
court's powers are however wider than those in the Model Law for international arbitrations
in some respects, in that certain powers of assistance contained in the 1965 Act have been
retained in modified torm." The circumstances in which the court can be approached to
clarify the tribunal's jurisdiction are now regulated by statute." Following the Model Law, the
right to take certain decisions of the court, which may be obtained prior to the award, on
appeal has been restricted." A good indication of how far the Law Commission was
prepared to go in reducing court interference is provided by section 9, which imposes the
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See the Report 58.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 16-17.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 17.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 16.
SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 26.
See s 11 of the Draft Bill regarding the court's power to extend the time fixed in the arbitration
agreement for commencing arbitration proceedings (comparable to s 8 of the current statute) and s 39
regarding the referral of a point of law to the court for an opinion prior to the award (comparable to s 20
of the current statute). The modifications compared to the current provisions are largely aimed at
preventing the abuse of these procedures.
See s 27 of the Draft Bill and para 111.3.3below.
See s 22(6) regarding the decision of the court to remove an arbitrator, s 26(5) regarding the court's
review of a preliminary ruling by the tribunal on its jurisdiction and s 40(3) regarding a decision by the
court on interim relief or certain procedural assistance.
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same strict limits on the court's ability to decline to enforce an arbitration agreement as those
contained in article 8 of the Model Law.69 The court's powers to grant interim relief in support
of the arbitration process have been strengthened. Nevertheless, again to prevent the abuse
of these powers as a delaying tactic, the conditions under which the court, as opposed to the
tribunal, may be approached for such measures, have been carefully clrcurnscribec." The
court's powers to intervene in the arbitration process by making procedural rulings have also
been curtailed."
2. Germany
2.1 The former German Law
The former provisions of the lPO comparable with article 5 of the Model Law were §§ 1045
and 1046. They provided a list of cases in which the courts were empowered to act. § 1045
lPO determined the jurisdiction of the court" to decide on the appointment of the arbitrator
(§ 1029 II lPO read with § 1031 lPO), the challenge of an arbitrator (§ 1032 lPO), the
recognition of the arbitration agreement (§1025 lPO), and the provision of measures which
the arbitrator considered it necessary to take (§1036 lPO).73 § 1046 lPO dealt with court
assistance for the enforcement of the award.
§ 1036 lP074 provided that for a measure, which the arbitral tribunal considered as
necessary, but to order this measure was beyond its power, a request to the court had to be
made by the party requiring such measure. Hence, where the state allows the substitution of
its own courts by the arbitral tribunal, it is logical that the tribunal is supported by the inherent
power of the courts. The state must take care that the reservation of the monopoly of certain
69
70
71
See n 38 above regarding these restrictions.
See s 40(1 )(b) and (e) and (2) of the Draft Bill anad para IV.3.2.1 below.
E.g. the power of the court to order discovery of documents in s 21(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act of 1965
has been intentionally omitted from s 40(1) of the Draft Bill, as control of discovery is a matter for the
tribunal. See ch 3 para 11.7 below.
Which court had jurisdiction could depend on the arbitration agreement. Alternatively it was the court
which would have had jurisdiction if the claim had been brought directly to court, or the court for the
district in which the arbitration commenced.
Maier, MOnchner Kommentar § 1045 NO.1.
The German text of §1036 ZPO read as follows:
"I Eine von den Schiedsrichtern fOr erforderlich erachtete richterliche Handlung, zu deren Vornahme sie
nicht befugt sind, ist auf Antrag einer Partei, sofern der Antrag als zulásslq erachtet wird, von dem
zustandigen Gericht vorzunehmen.
II Oem Gericht, das die Vernehmung oder Beeidigung eines Zeugen oder eines Sachverstandigen
angeordnet hat, stehen auch die Entscheidungen zu, die im Faile der Verweigerung des Zeugnisses
oder des Gutachtens erforderlich werden."
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powers for the court does not disable the tribunal from fulfilling its obligations. The state
therefore put the courts at the tribunal's disposal as set out in § 1036 lPO.
Since § 1036 I lPO did not set any limitation on the actions which could be requested, the
limits were determined by the courts. These were found in the cases, where the courts either
came to the conclusion that the request was inadmissible on procedural grounds or that the
tribunal had the power to undertake the requested action itself.75
However, it must be understood that although the court owed its jurisdiction to the request of
the applicant party, not to the arbitral tribunal itself, that request had to be based on the
tribunal's findings about the necessity for such a request and could not be brought to the
court independently by the applicant." Thus, as a matter of procedure, the tribunal itself
could not apply for a court order. But, the arbitrator or the chairperson of the tribunal was
entitled to apply for the court order in the name of one of the parties. The power of agency of
the tribunal was to be presumed until the presumption was rebutted by one of the parties."
The court proceeded by first scrutinising whether the parties validly agreed on a binding
arbitration agreement, then whether the tribunal was entitled to order the action itself and, if
not, whether the request to the court was admissible. The court did not determine whether
the action requested was necessary or reasonable."
§ 1035 lPO dealt with witnesses and expert witnesses, where assistance by the courts was
not necessary. Obviously the tribunal was empowered to interrogate witnesses and to gather
evidence. In the exercise of these powers the tribunal was not formally bound to apply the
law of civil procedure as laid down by the lPO.79 However, there was no legal basis to
administer an oath ("Vereidigung") or to order witnesses to appear before the tribunal. The
lack of these powers must be interpreted as a consequence of the carefully maintained
monopoly over such powers for the courts. The tribunal is merely legitimated by the choice
of the parties, based on the principle of freedom of contract, and does not derive its power
from the monopoly of state power, as this is reserved for judges under article 97 GG
("Grundgesetz", the German Constitution).
75
76
77
78
79
Schlosser & Stein-Jonas ZPO Kommenfar § 1036 no. 3.
Geimer 1997 § 1036 ZPO NO.1.
Geimer 1997 § 1036 ZPO NO.2.
Thomas & Putzo, § 1036 ZPO NO.3
Thomas & Putzo § 1035 ZPO NO.1. §§ 355 - 494 ZPO deal with evidence and witnesses in procedures
before the state court ("Landgericht"), to which the arbitral tribunals are not bound. See further the
comparison in ch 2 para 111.5below.
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Regarding the listing of the court's powers under §§ 1045 and 1046 lPO and the restrictive
wording of §§ 1035 and 1036 lPO, one can safely conclude that the powers of the court
could not be extended, either by the court, or by the parties, or by the tribunal itself, beyond
the cases provided for in these sections.
The limitation of the court's power under the former German arbitration law was
characteristic and based on a clear structure regarding the demarcation of the court's and
the tribunal's powers during the arbitration. The powers which were available to the courts
under the former law were comparable to those of the courts under the Model Law.80 The
former German lPO therefore reveals a modern approach to the powers of the court, which
were restricted to situations where its intervention was needed for the progress of the
arbitration proceedings. Extended powers, which would have created the impression of an
excessive opportunity to supervise the arbitration proceedings, were not available to the
courts under the former German arbitration legislation.
2.2. The new German arbitration law
With § 1026 lPO Germany adopted article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. § 1026 lPO
provides:
"In matters governed by sections 1025 to 1061, no court shall intervene
except where so provided in this Book." 81
It is therefore very similar to the wording of article 5 of the Model Law. Obviously, it was
intended not only to reproduce the wording, but also the meaning known from the Model
Law. A court therefore is only allowed to intervene where the tenth book of the lPO so
provides. In § 1062 I (1) - (4) lPO (comparable to article 6 of the Model Law) is a partial list
of situations where the court is entitled to do SO.82
The adoption of article 5 of the Model Law by § 1026 lPO was justified not only because the
provision was not something totally new, in a continental-European or German context, but
80
81
MaierMiinchener Kommentar zur ZPO §1036 no. 1.
The German text of § 1026 reads: "Ein Gericht dart in den §§ 1025 bis 1061 geregelten
Angelegenheiten nur Uitigwerden, soweit es dieses Buch vorsieht."
The court is the Higher Regional Court ("Oberlandesgericht") designated in the arbitration agreement
and failing such designation the Higher Regional Court in whose district the place of arbitration is
situated. For purposes of court assistance in obtaining evidence under § 1050 (equivalent to article 27
of the Model Law), the court is the Local Court ("Amtsgericht") (see § 10624).
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because it was also seen as a further clarification of the demarcation between the powers of
the courts and those of the arbitral tribunal."
§ 1050 lPO (comparable to article 27 of the Model law) replaces § 1036 lPO of the
previous legislation, referred to above. An important difference and major improvement,
compared to the former procedure, is the fact that the involvement of the courts regarding
the taking of evidence and other judicial acts, which the tribunal is not entitled to carry out, is
now initiated by the arbitral tribunal, or a party with the approval of the tribunal. Formerly the
request came from a party. The nature of the assistance the tribunal may request is the
same as under the former § 1036 and includes the examination of witnesses under oath and
the summoning of expert witnesses. In executing the request, the court must follow its
"normal" procedure, which does not include every procedure an arbitral tribunal could
choose. This logically derives from the fact that a court order could involve an interference
with civil liberties. The court is therefore strictly bound to a procedure where control over this
interference is provided. Contrary to the former § 1036 lPO, the current § 1050 now
provides that the tribunal is entitled to attend the court sessions and to ask questions. The
tribunal must therefore be informed of the date of the court session."
As mentioned above, § 1062 I (1) - (4) lPO contains a list of situations in which the court is
able to intervene, besides § 1050 lPO, by enumerating the issues on which the Higher
Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht, OlG) has jurisdiction. These include decisions on
requests regarding the appointment or challenge of arbitrators, a preliminary ruling on
jurisdiction by the tribunal, the enforcement of interim measures by the tribunal and the
setting aside or enforcement of awards. Although the wording differs, the effect of this
provision is very similar to the previous legislation.
To conclude, the new § 1026 lPO copied not only the wording of article 5 of the Model law,
but also the concept of this provision. The concept behind § 1026 lPO is, as explained
earlier regarding article 5, to establish that, subject to the arbitration agreement, the tribunal
has wide powers under the tenth book of the lPO to conduct the arbitral proceedings
effectively." Furthermore, subject to the exceptions expressly stated in § 1062 1 lPO,86
there can be no doubt that the way in which the tribunal exercises its powers during the
arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged in court until after the award is made. But, as
83
84
85
86
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/527432.
Geimer 1998, § 1050 ZPO NO.2.
See especially § 1042 4 ZPO, comparable to article 19(2) of the Model Law.
See e.g. §§ 1037-1038 ZPO regarding the challenge of an arbitrator or the termination of the arbitrator's
mandate and §1040 3 regarding a preliminary ruling by the tribunal on its jurisdiction.
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with article 5 of the Model Law, § 1026 ZPO establishes that the court's supportive powers in
the tenth book of the ZPO are still available.
3. Comparison
The adoption of article 5 of the Model Law by Germany and the Law Commission's
recommendation that it in,effect be adopted for both international and domestic arbitration in
South Africa indicates a clear intention in both jurisdictions to limit the court's powers of
intervention in the arbitration process, particularly prior to the award. The result should be to
encourage the use of arbitration as a vehicle for resolving disputes.
The limitation of the court's powers of intervention may be interpreted as a new confidence
towards arbitration. It will hopefully increase a spirit of partnership rather than rivalry and
competition between the courts and arbitral tribunals. The practical implications of this new
interaction between the court and the tribunal will be discussed in the context of jurisdictional
challenges and interim measures below. The role of the court in both jurisdictions will be
limited to what is generally recognised as necessary and desirable court support."
The topics selected for detailed discussion in this chapter regarding court involvement in the
arbitral process both concern court intervention prior to the tribunal's final award on the
merits. The goal of effective arbitration will of course not be achieved if there are excessive
opportunities for court involvement after the tribunal has made its final award. Both
jurisdictions acknowledge the principle of the finality of the tribunal's award" and the
grounds on which an award may be taken on review to the courts are restricted to those
which are internationally accepted, as set out in article 34 of the Model Law.89 These relate
to situations where there has been a substantial procedural defect or where the award
contravenes public policy. It was clearly understood that there should be no possibility of
taking the award on appeal to the courts on its merits, whether on fact or law.90
87 Compare Lew (1999) 65 Arbitration 286, regarding the satisfactory balance of court involvement now
achieved by the English Arbitration Act of 1996.
See regarding Germany §1055 ZPO and regarding South Africa the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 28 and
the Draft Arbitration Bill s 48.
See regarding Germany § 1059 ZPO and regarding South Africa the Draft International Arbitration Bill
sch 1 article 34 and the Draft Arbitration Bill s 52, which is based on article 34.
See Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 368 citing inter alia UN doc AlCN 9/216, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus
929.
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III. Kompetenz-Kompetenz
An issue, which is still highly controversial in some jurisdictions, arises when the arbitral
tribunal's jurisdiction to decide a dispute is challenged. The question is then who has the
power to decide the issue of jurisdiction?
Under the principle of Kompetenz-Kornpetenz'" one must understand the ability of an arbitral
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. It is a principle of fundamental importance in practice,
which prevents a party from seriously delaying or disrupting the arbitration simply by alleging
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitral tribunal. 92
It is a question of practical importance whether the decision about jurisdiction of the tribunal
in the particular circumstances should be made by the tribunal or by the court. Under many
national jurisdictions the power of the tribunal to decide on its jurisdiction was long denied
and under some it still is. The acceptance of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is a milestone in
international arbitration. In jurisdictions where this principle is still denied, the involvement of
the courts prior to the award to determine jurisdiction is often almost inevitable and can be
the cause of considerable delays by a party which wants to disrupt the arbitration process.
However, against this argument that an early decision by a court on jurisdiction is an
undesirable interruption of the arbitration proceedings, it can be said that an early court
decision on the question of the tribunal's competence to decide on the disputed matter may
have the benefit of avoiding wasted time and money, should the court decide that the
tribunal was not competent to decide the issue.
This section investigates how the UNCITRAL Model Law deals with the incisive principle of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The South African and German treatment of the concept, before
and after their response to the Model Law, will then be discussed. First, however, the
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz itself will be examined.
1. The principle
An arbitral tribunal may only validly determine disputes, which the parties have agreed that it
should determine. The authority or competence of the tribunal is rooted in the arbitration
agreement between the parties. Due to this agreement the tribunal gains the authority to
91 The German expression Kompetenz-Kompetenz can be literally translated in English as
Competence/Competence, and refers to the competence of the arbitral tribunal to decide upon its own
competence. See Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 264.
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decide the disputes between the parties, and the tribunal must take care to stay within the
terms of this authority."
The question of jurisdiction arises in those cases, where a party to the dispute denies the
authority of the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute and claims that the tribunal has no
jurisdiction. Thus, the party may seek to avoid arbitration with a challenge to jurisdiction. This
challenge can be partial, when it is claimed that the tribunal in terms of the arbitration
agreement has no jurisdiction about certain issues. Or the challenge can be total, for
example when it is claimed that the tribunal has no jurisdiction at all because of an invalid
arbitration agreement.94
The question is then who should decide about the scope of the arbitration agreement and
whether the arbitration agreement is valid and therefore whether the tribunal is acting within
its jurisdiction. Two points must be made:
First, it is now generally accepted" that in a case where the main contract between the
disputing parties is invalid for whatever reason, this does not automatically have the effect
that the arbitration agreement is invalid, too. This concept is based on the doctrine of
separability (or severabllity)." Secondly, even an invalid arbitration agreement does not
deprive the tribunal from the competence to come to such a decision.
The doctrine of separability is a generally accepted principle in terms of which the arbitration
clause in a contract is autonomous from the main contract. As a result the arbitral tribunal
has jurisdiction over the dispute even though the main contract may be invalid, as long as
the grounds for nullity do not affect the arbitration clause itselt." The prerequisite for the
tribunal's competence to decide on the validity of the main contract in terms of an arbitration
clause in that contract is the principle of separability. It results in there being no cross-
infection of the arbitration clause by the defect in the main contract." Furthermore, the
concept of separability enables the tribunal to rule on the merits of the contract, without
obliging it automatically to decide on its own jurisdiction."
92
93
94
95
Gaillard 163.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 260.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 261-262.
The existence of the doctrine is however disputed in existing South African arbitration law, as will be
shown from the discussion of Wayland v Everite Ltd 1993 3 SA 946 (W). See further para III 3.1 below.
See Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 263. For a detailed discussion of the theoretical problems with the
doctrine, see Schwebel Arbitration: Three Salient Problems 1-60.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 263; Holtzmann & Neuhaus 480.
Veeder "Laws and Court Decisions in Common Law Countries and the UNCITRAL Model Law" ICCA
Congress Series No.5 171.
Gross "Competence of Competence: An English View" (1992) 8 Arbitration International 207.
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Regarding the first point, where the main contract is void, but the arbitration agreement is
considered valid, the doctrine of separability empowers the tribunal to decide on the
consequences flowing from the invalid main contract.'?"
Regarding the second point, where a party challenges the arbitration agreement and there is
no valid arbitration agreement, there would consequently be no arbitral tribunal, which would
have the power to decide about anything. The tribunal would have to conclude that it cannot
decide the issue, because it has no jurisdiction. And at the end of the day, the tribunal could
arguably not even do that, since there should not be a tribunal in the first place. To avoid this
logical predicament, it is generally accepted that the examination by an arbitral tribunal of its
own jurisdiction in the event of challenge, involves the assumption that it has jurisdiction to
make the investiqation.!" This power is inherent in the appointment of an arbitral tribunal.
The tribunal must be able to look at the arbitration agreement, the terms of its appointment
and other relevant documents in order to decide whether or not to uphold a challenge to its
jurisdiction. This is part of the principle of Kompetenz-Kornpetenz!" and this principle allows
the tribunal to dismiss the argument that a tribunal whose authority has been contested can
only rule on the merits if an external authority has previously confirmed its cornpetence.!" It
is thus argued that the principle is one of placing convenience ahead of logic.104
If the question of jurisdiction is raised before a court the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz
dictates that the judge may only make a prima facie assessment of the existence of the
arbitration agreement, which apparently indicates that the authority for deciding the
jurisdictional issue is the arbitral tribunal. The court may not rule on the merits of the party's
claims concerning cornpetence.!"
Should the tribunal come to the conclusion that it has jurisdiction, it may be asked whether
this results in a binding award or whether the decision can be overruled and, if so, in what
circumstances. Under some restrictive legal systems the power to decide on the tribunal's
jurisdiction is reserved for the national courts, so that the tribunal cannot rule on its own
100 Compare SNE v JOC Oil Ltd (1990) 15 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 384. The majority of the
Bermudan Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the arbitration clause in a contract for the sale of oil
which the arbitral tribunal had found to be invalid. SNE was therefore entitled to enforce the award in
which it received compensation for the oil delivered under the invalid sale on the basis of unjustified
enrichment.
Gross 206.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 264.
Gaillard 163.
Gross 206.
Gaillard164.
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jurisdiction. On the other hand, a modern approach, using the doctrine of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, grants the tribunal the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. The principle
resolves logical difficulties where the jurisdiction of state courts and the jurisdiction of
arbitrators under a valid arbitration agreement are mutually exclusive in legal theory.!"
What the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz does not mean is that the tribunal has the last
word on its own competence. The position is rather that the tribunal will usually be the first to
rule on that question. But neither the tribunal's findings of fact nor its findings of law
concerning its own competence in any way bind the judges competent to hear an application
for the annulment of the award or a contested application for its enforcement. The
fundamental purpose of the doctrine concerns timing; namely to prevent disputes prior to the
award regarding the competence of the tribunal, which may be legitimate but are often
groundless, from unduly delaying the arbltratlon.!" The purpose of the principle of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is therefore purely chronological and not bierarchical.I"
In drafting arbitration legislation or rules, it was always a highly controversial issue as to the
stage at which court control over the tribunal's ruling on its competence should be permitted.
It was clear that the challenge of the tribunal's jurisdiction would always give rise to
opportunities for abuse by making a purely tactical challenge. Therefore, it was on the one
hand necessary to strike a balance between excluding court review as long as possible and
respecting the right to protection of the party challenging jurisdiction under the provisions of
the lex arbitri. On the other hand, it had to be borne in mind that permission for an early
review would disrupt the arbitral proceedings and encourage the parties to make
jurisdictional challenges. But review only at a late stage after the award, leading to the
finding that the tribunal has no jurisdiction would result in a waste of time and money for the
parties. The claimant in the arbitration would have accomplished nothing and would have to
resolve the dispute on the merits through litigation.
As will be seen below, different approaches have been taken under the various laws and
arbitration rules considered in dealing with these issues.
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Veeder 171.
Gaillard 163.
Gaillard 164
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2. The UNCITRAL Model Law
The UNCITRAL Model Law article 16 (1) articulates the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz,
concerning the arbitral tribunal's competence to rule on its own jurisdiction, by stating:
"The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement."
As the competence of the tribunal regarding its own competence is dealt with by article 16, it
is therefore a "matter governed by this Law" for purposes of article 5 of the Model Law. This
means that court control, regarding issues relating to the tribunal's jurisdiction, is limited to
that provided in the Model Law, referred to below.
The problem of logic referred to above, that there cannot be any ruling by the tribunal on
jurisdiction if there is no valid arbitration agreement does not arise under the Model Law.
Under article 16 even a tribunal, which in fact has no jurisdiction over a dispute, may at least
rule that it has no jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional issues under the Model Law will normally first be dealt by the tribunal under
article 16. However, it is also possible that the jurisdictional issue will first be considered by
the court under article 8. Article 8(1) provides that the court shall, at the request of a party,
stay any legal proceedings brought before it regarding any matter, which is the subject of an
arbitration agreement and refer the matter to arbitration, unless it finds that the agreement is
"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being pertorrned".'?" It is however possible that a
court faced with a request under article 8 may suspend its proceedings and await the
tribunal's decision on its jurisdiction,"? which is, however, not binding on the court.
Conversely, a tribunal, which has doubts as to the validity of the arbitration agreement and
109 The phrase "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" comes from Article II of the New
York Convention of 1958 and has been retained in the equivalent provision of the Model Law, article 8.
The SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 134 explained the phrase as follows:
"It has been suggested that the word 'inoperative' would cover those cases where the arbitration
agreement has ceased to have effect. This could occur where, as a result of the parties taking their
dispute to court, the issue has become res judicata. The words 'incapable of being performed' would
apply to cases where the arbitration cannot effectively be set in motion, for example the case where the
arbitral clause is too vaguely worded or the situation where the sole arbitrator named in the agreement
refuses to accept appointment."
This would be appropriate where the jurisdictional issue and the merits are so closely linked that it would
be difficult to decide the former issue without also deciding the latter, which is the province of the
tribunal. Compare Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General Insurance Co Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 81 (Com Ct) 85.
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learns of court proceedings, which deal with the issue of the validity or existence of the
arbitration agreement, may also suspend its proceedings, pending a decision by the court.!"
When court proceedings regarding a request under article 8(1) are pending, the arbitral
tribunal is authorised by article 8(2) to commence or to continue with arbitration proceedings
and even to render an award while the issue of competence is still pending before the court.
This provision provoked debate in the UNCITRAL Commission in the light of the policy
considerations referred to above.!" The view ultimately prevailed that in order to contribute
to a prompt resolution of the dispute, simultaneous proceedings should be permitted. If it
appeared that the arbitration proceedings would end up being unnecessary, the claimant
would probably seek to have those proceedings suspended, pending the decision of the
court. It is inherent in article 8(2) that the decision whether or not to continue with the
arbitration proceedings rests with the tribunal and not with the court.!"
Under the Model Law the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is mandatory: the parties
cannot therefore agree to limit the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction.!"
However, the arbitral tribunal's power is neither exclusive nor final. As discussed above
regarding article 8(2), the approach of the UNCITRAL Model Law is based on the
assumption that simultaneous proceedings regarding the competence of the arbitral tribunal,
before both the tribunal and the national court, are possible.!"
The decision of the tribunal regarding its jurisdiction can therefore be subject to scrutiny by
the courts in various circumstances. First, it may be subjected to immediate review by a
court under article16 (3), where the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has
jurisdiction. Secondly, it may be subject to a later court review under article 34 in an
application to set aside the award, where the tribunal only decided on the issue of jurisdiction
in its award on the merits of the case. Thirdly, even later review of the tribunal's jurisdiction is
possible in an opposed application for recognition and enforcement of the award under
article 36.116
111 Berger International Economic Arbitration 328. The court would lack jurisdiction to order a stay if it were
to find the arbitration agreement to be invalid, or that the dispute was not subject to the agreement,
thereby in effect confirming the tribunal's own lack of jurisdiction regarding the dispute.
See para 111.1above.
See Holtzmann & Neuhaus 306 citing UN doc A/40/17 paras 91-93, quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus
330-331.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 480. This was because of the importance of the principle for intemational
commercial arbitration. Individual states could nevertheless still decide to limit the tribunal's power in
this respect when adopting the Model Law. This has been done in the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s
30(1) which makes the tribunal's statutory power to rule on its jurisdiction subject to limits imposed by
the agreement of the parties.
See also Berger 328.
See Holtzmann & Neuhaus 479 and article 36(1 )(a)(i) or (iii) or (b)(i).
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In the first situation, where there is an application to court for review of the tribunal's
preliminary ruling pending, the tribunal is entitled under article 16(3) to continue with the
proceedings and render an award notwithstanding the pending court proceedings. It is
moreover up to the tribunal to decide whether to rule on its jurisdiction as a preliminary ruling
or in an award. This provision has been described as "an innovative and sensible
compromise"?" The provisions on court review as a whole encourage preliminary
jurisdictional rulings by the tribunal, while allowing the tribunal to postpone decision of
frivolous or dilatory jurisdictional objections, or ones that are difficult to separate from the
merits of the dispute.!" These provisions therefore achieve a sensible balance regarding
court control of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the light of the policy considerations set out
above.!"
3. The South African approach towards Kompetenz-Kompetenz
3.1. The position under the current law
In the following discussion frequent reference is made to English case law and other English
authority. This has been a common practice by the South African courts and by writers on
South African arbitration law. The reasons are the influence of English legislation on the
drafting of the current South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 and the abundance of English
authority, particularly on points which have not necessarily received detailed consideration
by the South African courts.V'
As a general proposition, the current South African position on Kompetenz-Kompetenz can
be stated quite simply. Arbitrators do have the power to rule on their own jurisdiction; but any
such ruling is provisional only and can be challenged in the courts.!" The often quoted
judgment of Devlin J Christopher Brown Ltd. v Genossenschaft Ósterreichischer
Waldbesitzer Holzwirtschaftbetriebe Registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschrankter
Haftung122 makes the position very clear:
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Holtzmann & Neuhaus 486.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 486.
See para 111.1above.
See Butler & Finsen 6, who nevertheless stress the need to have regard to certain differences between
the South African and English common law (non-statutory law) on arbitration as well as differences in
wording between the 1965 Act and the English Arbitration Act of 1950, which had a large influence on
the former statute.
Gross 207. This amounts to an accurate summary of the longer discussions in Butler & Finsen 176-177
and Jacobs The Law of Arbitration in South Africa 30-32.
(1953) 2 All ER 1039 at 1042B-G. It is quoted more fully by Jacobs 30-31 and Butler & Finsen 176.
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"The arbitrators cannot determine their own jurisdiction .... They are entitled to enquire
into the merits of the issue whether they have jurisdiction or not, not for the purpose of
reaching any conclusion which will be binding on the parties, because that they cannot
do, but for the purpose of satisfying themselves, as a preliminary matter, whether they
ought to go on with the arbitration or not.. .. They are entitled, in short, to make their own
enquiries in order to determine their own course of action, but the result of that enquiry
has no effect whatsoever on the rights of the parties."
The judgment in the Christopher Brown case can safely be taken as persuasive authority,
supporting the general rule on the power of arbitrators to reach provisional decisions on their
own iurisdiction.!" The provisional nature of the decision is a matter of logic, no arbitrator
acting under an arbitration agreement can finally decide whether he has jurisdiction to make
a binding award, any more than "a man can pull himself up by his own boot-straps't.!"
It is further argued by Jacobs that an arbitral tribunal, however, cannot confer jurisdiction
upon itself by deciding in its own favour some preliminary point upon which its jurisdiction
depends 125. In one sense the tribunal is deciding the point in its own favour as there is no
point in continuing if it is of the view that it does not have jurisdiction. The question of
jurisdiction will usually be raised before the tribunal by the respondent, so a finding that the
tribunal has jurisdiction is actually one in favour of the claimant rather than the tribunal.
Some years after the Christopher Brown case it was held in Willcock v Pickfords
Removets'" by Roskill LJ that
"One thing is clear in this branch of law. It has been clear ever since the decision in
Heyman v Darwins .... that an arbitrator cannot decide his own jurisdiction. Therefore
whenever a question arises whether or not there has been a submission to arbitration,
an arbitrator cannot in English law decide that issue. The only tribunal to decide is the
Court."
At first sight, this statement may appear to contradict the earlier decision in the Christopher
Brown case, thus overruling the established principle that an arbitral tribunal may investigate
the issue of its jurisdiction, of course with the limitation that it cannot make a decision binding
on the parties. Commentators are however agreed that the decisions can be readily
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Gross 209.
Veeder 173.
Jacobs 31.
[1979]1 Lloyd's Rep 244.
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reconciled, mainly on the basis that the reference to "decide his own jurisdiction" in the later
case must be read as "finally decide" .127
In the context of the danger of the abuse of applications to court as a delaying tactic, the
question must be asked: "At what stage of the arbitration process should a party be able to
approach the court to obtain finality on an arbitral tribunal's ruling on its own jurisdiction?" It
is argued that although an early application prior to the award would interrupt the arbitration
I
process, it has the advantage that the issue of jurisdiction would be finalised at an early
stage of the arbitration proceedings. The advantage of the reference of the jurisdictional
issue to the court only after the arbitral award is that there is no interruption of the arbitration
process and thus no opportunity to delay the process. But, if the court finds that the tribunal
lacks jurisdiction the whole arbitration would be a waste of time and money. On this issue
the English and thus the South Africa law adopted the "safe" approach. In an appropriate
case, the court can resolve jurisdictional issues at any time at the request of either party.128
From the above it can be concluded that a dissatisfied party may achieve a reversal of the
tribunal's ruling on jurisdiction either by obtaining a declaratory order or by successfully
resisting an application to make the award an order of court.l" The party could also apply to
court to have the award set aside.130 A party who wishes to challenge or clarify the
jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal can seek declaratory relief from the court even prior to
any decision on the matter by the arbitration tribunal.!" This view has been upheld and
underlined by Steyn J:
"Only the Court can definitively rule on issues relating to the jurisdiction of arbitrators.
And it is possible to obtain a speedy declaratory judgment from the Commercial Court
as to the validity of an arbitration agreement before or during the arbitration
proceedings. ,,132
For providing this range of opportunities for dealing with jurisdictional issues by the court, the
law was at one stage widely approved in England for its flexibility.133 It must be stressed that
it is the dissatisfied party, which has the choice of remedy under the current law. The trouble
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Gross 210.
Veeder 173.
The application would be made under s 31 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.
S 33(1)(b).
See South African Transport Services v Wilson NO 1990 3 SA 333 CN) for an example of an application
for a declaratory order on the arbitrator's jurisdiction prior to the award. The application was made with
the consent of the tribunal (3408) and brought prior to a ruling by the arbitrator on the jurisdictional
point.
Harbour Assurance Co Ltd v Kansa General Intemationallnsurance Co Ltd [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep 81 at
83.
Christie (1994) 111 SALJ 367.
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with this wide range of remedies for the dissatisfied party is that the danger of delaying
tactics and increased costs becomes more real.134 The former English and current South
African approach is certainly different to that of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which provides
that a decision as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal will usually be taken, at least in the first
instance, by the arbitrators thernselves.l" The Model Law also gives the tribunal control
over when the dissatisfied party should be able to approach the court, and the decision is no
longer left to that party.!"
Before discussing the response of the South African Law Commission to the Model Law in
the context of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it is first necessary briefly to consider the current
state of South African law regarding the related doctrine of the severability of an arbitration
clause from the main contract!" particularly when the main contract is alleged to be void.
This point was considered in the decision of Wayland v Everite Group Ltd.138 The court was
asked to order that certain disputes regarding the validity of a contract should be referred to
arbitration on the basis of an apparently comprehensive arbitration clause in that contract.
The court declined to do so on two grounds. First it rejected the availability of the doctrine of
severability or separability in the following terms:
"It seems to me to be eminently reasonable that a clause of a contract must stand or fall
with the whole body of the contract and not be declared excisable by the parties or that
such declaration should have any validity merely on the ground of the parties having
elected to say that the clause itself is severable from the contract. ,,139
The court made no reference to the fact that the doctrine of severability had previously been
recognised by the South African courts in the context of a voidable main contract. 140 It
unfortunately relied entirely on certain older South African and English decisions and made
no reference to recent English cases, such as Paul Smith Ltd v H & S International Holding
Inc141 and Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co
Ltd,142which had recently recognised the doctrine in the context of a void main contract, or
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Gross 211.
This is one of the consequences of article 16(3) of the Model Law.
See also the text at n 96 above for a discussion of this doctrine.
1993 3 SA 946 (W).
Wayland v Everite Ltd 1993 3 SA 946 (W) 951 H-I.
See Van Heerden v Sentrale Kunsmis Korporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973 1 SA 17 (A); SA Law Commission
Report Domestic Arbitration 57.
[1991]2 Lloyd's Rep 127.
[1992]1 Lloyd's Rep 81. The decision of the Court of Appeal referred to in n 147 below had not yet
been reported at the time the Wayland application was heard.
141
142
51
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
to trends in other jurisdictions. Secondly it accepted that if the agents of the respondent
lacked authority to enter into the main contract, it necessarily followed that they lacked
authority to enter into the arbitration clause.!" This is not necessarily the case, with the
result that this issue should have been more carefully investlqated.!"
3.2. The proposal for international arbitration
As discussed above, the current South African arbitration law on Kompetenz-Kompetenz has
been heavily influenced by English law. It is therefore perhaps useful to consider briefly the
relevant provisions of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 on the subject as background to the
Law Commission's response to article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. It will be recalled
that England decided not to adopt the Model Law, but that the provisions of the Model Law
ultimately had a much greater influence on the 1996 Act than was initially envlsaqed.!" Its
drafters set out to adopt, as far as possible, the scheme and language of the UNCITRAL
Model Law and at the same time to preserve as much as possible of the pre-existing English
arbitration law.!" The provisions of article 16 of the Model Law are spread over three
sections of the English Arbitration Act. The doctrine of separability, as developed by the
English courts.':" is given statutory recognition in section 7. It was put in a separate section
to emphasise that it is a distinct concept from Kornpetenz-Kornpetenz.!" The competence of
the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction is set out comprehensively in section 30(1):
"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to -
(a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement,
(b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and
(c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration agreement."
Unlike article 16(1) of the Model Law, this is a "contract-out" provtslon.!"
Arguably the most important change from the current law is contained in section 31, which
deals with court control over a tribunal's finding on its own jurisdiction. The tribunal may rule
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Wayland v Everite Ltd 1993 3 SA 946 eN) 951J-952A.
See Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 147-148 and the facts of SNE v JOC Oil Ltd (1990) 15 Yearbook
Commercial Arbitration 384, referred to in n 100 above.
See ch 1 n 64 above.
Hunter ''The Procedural Powers of Arbitrators under the English 1996 Act" (1997) 13 Arbitration
Internationa/345 at 346.
See particularly Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Assurance Co Ltd [1993]
3 All ER 897 (CA) for the culmination of this development.
See the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 43.
See the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 139.
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on an objection to its jurisdiction either in a special award150on that objection, or in an award
on the merits. Unless the parties agree which of these options must be selected, the choice
is left to the tribunal. The tribunal must make its choice having due regard to its general duty
to adopt fair, cost-effective and expeditious procedures.!" This effectively prevents an
objecting party, through its unilateral action, of being able to use a court challenge of the
tribunal's ruling on its jurisdiction prior to the award on the merits as a delaying tactic. The
English Arbitration Act also contains a third mechanism for dealing with jurisdictional
questions. In certain circumstances the matter may be referred to the court under section 32,
which has no counterpart in the Model Law, before the tribunal is required to rule on the
jurisdictional issue.152
For purposes of international arbitration the South African law Commission recommended
that article 16(1) and (2) of the Model Law should be adopted unchanged. This would not
only deal adequately with the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but deal with the confusion
surrounding the doctrine of severability, created by the Wayland case.l" The Law
Commission was also satisfied that article 16(3) of the Model Law,154which regulates court
control over the tribunal's findings on jurisdiction, achieved the desired degree of court
control, while enabling the tribunal to prevent court review of its ruling on jurisdiction being
abused as a strategy for delay.155The Law Commission makes no express reference to the
contents of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 in the context of its discussion of article 16. It
presumably considered sections 30-32 but regarded modifications to article 16 in the light of
the English statute as inappropriate in view of its declared policy of keeping changes to the
official English text of the Model Law to a rninimurn.l'"
3.3. The proposal for domestic arbitration
Section 26(1) of the South African Law Commission's Draft Arbitration Bill for domestic
arbitration provides that "[u]nless the parties otherwise agree a tribunal may at the instance
of a party or on its own initiative rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement". Section 26(1) is based on
150 The drafters wished to avoid the concept of a ruling as a preliminary question used in article 16(3) of the
Model Law. The effect is the same: a special award on jurisdiction can be taken on immediate review to
the court under s 67. See See the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 142.
See the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 146 and s 33 of the Act.
See the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 43. S 32 is discussed in para 111.3.3below.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 72-73. See para
111.3.1above for the Wayland case.
See para 111.2above.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 73.
SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 4 and 18.
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article 16(1) of the Model Law. However, unlike the Model Law, under influence of the
English Arbitration Act of 1996, it expressly provides that the tribunal's statutory power to
rule on its own jurisdiction is an opt-out provision, enabling the parties to limit the tribunal's
power to rule on its own competence by aqreernent.!" Section 26(2) expressly provides that
for purposes of section 26(1), an arbitration agreement forming part of a contract must be
treated as severable from the other terms of that contract. The rejection of the doctrine of
severability in Wayland v Everite Group Ltd158 is thereby overruled in the context of domestic
arbitration as well.159
Section 26(3) makes it clear that a party is not precluded from raising a plea that the tribunal
has no jurisdiction by reason of its participation in the appointment of the tribunal. This
provision is based on and consistent with article 16(2) of the Model Law.
Like article 16(3) of the Model Law, section 26 envisages two alternative stages for court
control of the tribunal's findings on its jurisdiction. First, section 26(5) provides that if the
tribunal decides on a jurisdictional point in a preliminary ruling, a party who is dissatisfied
with that ruling may apply to court within 14 days"? for the court to review the ruling. To limit
the use of such applications for review as a delaying tactic, the court's decision is in terms of
section 26(7) not subject to any appeal. Furthermore, section 26(6) gives the tribunal the
power to continue with the arbitral proceedings and render an award, while the court's
decision is pending. Both these provisions are consistent with article 16 of the Model Law.16l
Secondly, if the tribunal elects to make its finding on jurisdiction in an award on the merits, a
party dissatisfied with that part of the award can apply to have the award set aside.162 It
appears that it is up to the tribunal, rather than the court, to decide whether the jurisdictional
challenge should be decided as a preliminary ruling or in an award.!"
157 SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 57. See the discussion at n 114 and 119 above
regarding article 16(1) of the Model Law and s 30 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996.
1993 3 SA 946 (W). See the discussion at n 138 above.
Report Domestic Arbitration 57.
The time limit of 30 days in article 16(3) of the Model Law and s 25(5) of the Draft Bill with Discussion
Paper 83 was shortened by the Commission to 14 days in its Report as being more appropriate for the
needs of domestic arbitration.
See the discussion of article 16 at n 117 above. The SA Law Commission rejected a suggestion that al/
jurisdictional challenges should be decided as a preliminary matter for two reasons. First the tribunal
must exercise its discretion having regard to its general duty to avoid delay and expense. Secondly, in
some cases it is impractical to separate a decision on the jurisdictional issue from a decision on the
merits (See Report Domestic Arbitration 58).
See s 52, especially s 52(2)(a)(i) and (iii) and Report Domestic Arbitration 57-8.
This is also the position under article 16(3) of the Model Law. See too Report Domestic Arbitration 58
para 3.138.
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The degree of court control provided in section 26 thus corresponds with that provided by
the equivalent provisions of the Draft International Arbitration Bill and the Model Law.164
However, unlike the Draft International Arbitration Bill, section 27 of the Commission's Draft
Arbitration Bill for domestic arbitration empowers the court to determine the tribunal's
jurisdiction as a preliminary point in certain circumstances. The Commission explained the
need for this provision, which is based on section 32 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996,
as tollows.!" A question regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal may be referred directly to
court by virtue of section 9 of the Draft Bill. Section 9 is based on article 8 of the Model Law
and replaces section 6 of the 1965 Act. It provides the opportunity for a defendant in court
proceedings to apply to the court to stay the court proceedings on the ground that there is an
arbitration agreement between the partles.!" Unlike the 1965 Act, the reason for denying
such a stay of the court proceedings is limited to the court finding that there is no valid
arbitration agreement or that the agreement is inoperative or incapable of being
performed."?
On the basis of section 9 the court can thus refuse a stay of the court proceedings on the
application of the defendant in those proceedings if it is satisfied, for example, that the
tribunal would lack jurisdiction either because the arbitration agreement is void or because it
is tnoperatlve.!" A reason for adopting the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz as regulated
by article 16 of the Model Law in the Draft International Arbitration Bill was to ensure the
avoidance of delay.169
However, the Law Commission was also concerned about the situation where the claimant
in an arbitration may be aware that the respondent objects to the jurisdiction of the tribunal,
without the respondent taking any part in the arbitration."? The Commission in this regard
quoted the Report of the Saville Committee:
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Report Domestic Arbitration 58-59.
Report Domestic Arbitration 34-35.
The reason for this change was that although the Commission found the that the court under ss 3 and 6
of the 1965 Act had generally been supportive of arbitration in exercising its discretion, there were
instances where the court has appeared to be unnecessarily ready to exclude arbitration and to tackle
the dispute itself. The Commission referred in this regard to Sera v De Wet 1974 2 SA 645 (T). See
Report Domestic Arbitration 35 and n 40 above.
Report Domestic Arbitration 58.
See Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 73.
Report Domestic Arbitration 58. The claimant thereby runs the risk of the respondent opposing a court
application for enforcement of the award on the basis that the tribunal had no jurisdiction. Failure to
take part in the arbitration at all would not constitute waiver by the respondent of the right to contest the
tribunal's jurisdiction.
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"In such circumstances, it might very well be cheaper and quicker for the party wishing
to arbitrate to go directly to the Court to seek a favourable ruling on jurisdiction rather
than seeking an award (or preliminary ruling on jurisdiction) from the tribunal."!"
Section 27 now grants the court the power to scrutinise the question of jurisdiction on the
application of a party, but subject to stringent conditions designed to ensure that this method
of establishing whether or not the tribunal has jurisdiction will only be used in exceptional
circumstances. The application requires the consent of all the parties to the arbitration
proceedings. Alternatively, the tribunal must consent and the court must be satisfied first,
that the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs,
secondly, that the application was made without delay and thirdly, that there is a good
reason why the matter should be heard by the court as opposed to the trlbunal.!" One may
safely presume that the burden of proving the named prerequisites is with the applicant. The
Commission was nevertheless of the opinion that section 27 is unlikely to be used otten.?"
The Law Commission has thus adopted a reasonably practical approach. It has avoided
requiring questions of jurisdiction to be first determined by the tribunal in all situations. A
direct approach to the court is permitted in limited circumstances, particularly where it is
foreseeable that an award by the tribunal would not be complied with voluntarily but would
have to be enforced by the court in the face of opposition because of the tribunal's alleged
lack of jurisdiction.
4. Germany
4.1 The former German Law
Under the former German arbitration law it was regarded as logical that the arbitral tribunal
could not rule on its own jurisdiction on the basis of an arbitration agreement to the extent
that its decision was binding on the state courts.!" The decision of a tribunal on the validity
of an arbitration agreement could not bind the state courts, because they had the jurisidiction
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Report Domestic Arbitration 58-59, citing the Saville (DAC) Report of 1996 para 141.
S 27(2) and Report Domestic Arbitration 59.
Report Domestic Arbitration 60.
Geimer from Zoller, ZivilprozeBordnung 1997, § 1025 No. 57; JZ (Juristen Zeitung) 1989, 201 BGHZ
26.5.1988. The decision of the tribunal was considered as being binding only where the tribunal denied
its own jurisdiction. The reasoning was that the arbitration agreement was "consumed" (verbraucht),
SchOtze, Handbuch des Schiedsverfahrens 70.
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to decide finally on the tssue."" Nevertheless, under § 1037 lPO, 176 the arbitral tribunal
could continue with the arbitration without regard to jurisdictional or other objecnons.!"
However, a valid objection against a claim in a state court on the basis that an arbitral
tribunal had jurisdiction about the issue in question, led not only to the suspension of the
court proceedings as in common-law countries, but also to the dismissal of the case as
being inadrnissible.!" In such a case the court had no discretion about the issue, and there
was no room to decide on a forum non conveniens where the court might have regarded the
arbitration proceedings as inexpedient.!" However, in a case where the arbitration
agreement was invalid and the tribunal therefore had nb jurisdiction about the issue, a
decision of a state court would declare the award of the tribunal null and void and not merely
rescind or set aside the award."?
Similar to the position in common-law jurisdictions and under article 8 of the Model Law, the
defendant in court proceedings wishing to raise the arbitration agreement had to rely on §
1027a lPO, by claiming that the state court had no jurisdiction because of a binding
arbitration agreement. The fact that arbitration proceedings may already have commenced
did not by itself permit the defence of a lis pendens (Rechtsanhánqiqkeit) to be raised, as
would have been possible if proceedings regarding the same dispute had been pending
before another state court. Furthermore, a state court would not declare itself not competent
by reason of the arbitration agreement, if no party relied on the aqreernent.!"
Nevertheless, the BGH (Bundesgerichtshof fur livilsachen; Federal High Court of Justice,
Civil Division) took a different approach to other German courts. It determined in two
important and authoritative decisions that the question of competence was a question of law,
which was arbitrable under § 1025 lPO.182 The parties could therefore agree (in an
arbitration agreement assumed to be separate from the main contract) that the arbitral
tribunal had jurisdiction to decide on the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement. In
these circumstances, the court could only scrutinise the validity of this Kompetenz-
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Thomas & Putzo Zlvilprozeêordnunq, § 1041 NO.6.
§ 1037 lPO provided that the tribunal could proceed with the arbitration proceedings and render an
award even in the case of a claim that the arbitration proceedings are not permitted. The tribunal could
do so particularly in the case of a claim that no valid arbitration agreement exists, that the arbitration
agreement did not apply to the dispute submitted for resolution, or that one of the arbitrators was not
qualified to act in the capacity of arbitrator.
Kreindler & Mahlich "A Foreign Perspective on the New German Arbitration Act" (1998) 14 Arbitration
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Kompetenz clause itself, but not the result the tribunal came to by exercising its power to
decide the issue.183 Some authors even went as far as arguing that a Kompetenz-
Kompetenz provision is implied in every arbitration aqreernent.l" The BGH agreed with this
conclusion, upholding the tribunal's Kompetenz-Kompetenz, even if an express agreement
to this effect was absent.l" The principle initiated by the BGH was later justified by the
argument that, assuming the doctrine of equality between the courts and the arbitral tribunal,
this doctrine would be violated if the tribunal was to be deprived of the competence to rule
finally on its jurisdlction.l'"
4.2 The new German arbitration law
The provisions of the new German arbitration law reflect the canon of article 16 of the Model
Law although there is at least one minor difference. Both provisions are however based on
common ground regarding the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the
acknowledgement of the doctrine of separability. As shown above, these two principles are
not new to the German arbitration system and their reapplication by the new legislation was
therefore not an innovation.
The doctrine of separability is expressed in § 1040 I 2 ZPO.187 The arbitration clause is
thereby given a different status to other clauses in a contract. Unlike the rule in §139 BGB
(BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch, Civil Code), which provides that in the case of an agreement,
which is partly void, the whole agreement has to be treated as void, the new § 1040 I 2 ZPO
maintains that the arbitration agreement keeps its validity even where the main contract is
void.
However, it is particularly regarding Kompetenz-Kompetenz that modifications were made in
relation to the former German provisions and the Model Law.
Under § 1040 I ZP0188 the tribunal is empowered to investigate the issue of competence. In
cases where the tribunal concludes that it does have jurisdiction, it must normally rule on the
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lerbe 188.
To be understood as paragraph 1040 subsection one, second sentence.
§ 1040 lPO provides:
"I. The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction and in this connection on the existence or validity
of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall
be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.
II. A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission
of the statement of defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that he has
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matter by means of a preliminary ruling (Zwischenentscheldj.l'" An appeal against the
tribunal's finding to a state court can then be launched within one month after notice of the
tribunal's finding (§ 1040 III ZPO). While the case is pending before the court, the tribunal is
entitled either to proceed with the arbitration and even render an award in order to avoid
delay or alternatively to await the decision of the state court about the issue of jurisdiction.
Besides having the power to investigate its competence, the tribunal is under a duty to do
so. It is argued that since a void arbitration agreement and therefore the lack of competence
of the tribunal is a sufficient reason to set aside an award,"? it is therefore a matter of fair
procedure to indicate the right of objection as set out in § 1040 II ZPO.191
Unlike the Model Law, the new provision of §1040 III ZPO provides that where the tribunal
considers that it has jurisdiction in the face of a challenge by one of the parties, the tribunal
must "in general" rule on the issue of jurisdiction by means of a preliminary ruling. This has
the following consequences. First, because the tribunal's decision that it has jurisdiction
should in general be made at an early stage of the arbitration proceedings, a possible
decision by a court about that issue will come at an early stage as well. Operating in the
same direction, is the requirement that a plea that the tribunal is acting outside its jurisdiction
shall be raised not later than the statement of defence as set out by § 1040 II 1 ZPO. This
can be seen as the manifestation of the maxim venire contra factum proprium. A foreseeable
time frame is thus given to jurisdictional challenges with the result that the sudden raising of
the plea that the tribunal has no jurisdiction as an unscheduled disruption during the
proceedings is usually not feasible.192
Secondly, and probably more importantly, in cases where the tribunal's decision that it has
jurisdiction is not taken on appeal to the court within one month as set out in § 1040 III 2
ZPO, the jurisdictional issue cannot later be raised again during court proceedings for the
challenge or enforcement of the award, after the arbitration proceedings are over.193 This
189
190
191
192
appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is
exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the
scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case,
admit a later plea if it considers that the party has justified the delay.
III. If the arbitral tribunal considers that is has jurisdiction, it rules on a plea referred to in subsection 2 of
this section in general by means of a preliminary ruling. In this case, any party may request, within one
month after having received written notice of that ruling, the court to decide the matter. While such
request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.
(Unofficial translation by the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS) and the German Federal Ministry of
Justice Translation as published in (1998) Arbitration InternationaI7.)
Habscheid, Das neue Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 1998 Juristen leitung NO.9, p. 448
As provided in § 1059 II No. 1a, c, No. 2a lPO.
Geimer 1998, § 1040 NO.2.
§ 1040 II 4 lPO, following the Model Law, does allow the tribunal to admit a plea on jurisdiction at a
later stage if the objector is able to justify the delay to the tribunal's satisfaction.
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/527444.193
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therefore postulates that as soon as a party allows its involvement in arbitration proceedings
without objection before or during an early stage of the proceedings, the jurisdiction of the
tribunal cannot be challenged later in the event of an unfavourable award for that party.
The argument that the early review of the tribunal's jurisdictional finding by the court is an
interruption of the proceedings in any case, which can therefore be abused as a delaying
tactic, is valid. However, the wording of § 1040 by providing that the tribunal in finding that it
has jurisdiction must do so in general by means of a preliminary ruling, leaves sufficient
room for the tribunal to act differently if necessary. This will be in exactly those cases where
it is obvious that the challenge of jurisdiction has only the purpose to delay the arbltration.'?"
Even where the tribunal deals with a jurisdictional challenge in a preliminary ruling, as
another countermeasure against delaying tactics, the tribunal is empowered to continue with
the arbitration and make an award, while an appeal to the court on the tribunal's preliminary
ruling on jurisdiction is pending.195
Where the tribunal decides to reserve its finding on jurisdiction to be dealt with in its award,
the examination of the question of jurisdiction by the court is then left to be dealt with in
proceedings to enforce or challenge the award.
5. Comparison and evaluation
It is noteworthy that under both the new German arbitration law and that proposed for South
Africa, it is acknowledged that an important reason for including the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz in their new arbitration legislation is a matter of defeating delaying tactics during
the arbitral proceedings. The principle basically tries to restrict groundless litigation over the
competence of the arbitral tribunal, thereby paralysing the arbitration.!" Under both systems,
Kompetenz-Kompetenz provides freedom from unnecessary court interference. This is the
real meaning and effectiveness of the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and it is thus
much more than the simple fact that the arbitrators are allowed to continue their work.!"
The usual practice in an international arbitration is nevertheless for an arbitral tribunal to
issue an interim award on jurisdiction.!" if asked by one of the parties to do so. This enables
the parties at an early stage to know where they stand and would save them spending time
194
195
196
197
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/527444.
See § 1040 III 3 ZPO, which follows article 16(3) of the Model Law.
Gaillard164.
Gaillard164.
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and money on arbitral proceedings which prove to be invalid.199 If, however the arbitral
tribunal realises that the respondent in the arbitration is bringing a suit before the court
merely for dilatory purposes, which may be particularly obstructive if the party is determined
to fight the dispute on the validity of the arbitration clause through all stages of appeal, the
tribunal must have the power to continue with the arbltratlon."? The Model Law deals with
this problem by expressly authorising the tribunal to continue with the abritration during the
court proceedings and also by providing that the court's decision on jurisdiction is subject to
no appeal.201
In practice, moreover, a respondent in an international arbitration raising an objection with
the tribunal to its jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, must bear in mind the fact that the
tribunal rarely will make a ruling, which puts itself totally out of business. But it is not
uncommon for the tribunal to steer a middle course under which the tribunal will deny its
competence on some but not all issues put forward by the claimant. This is not from any
cynical or self-interested desire on the part of individual members of the tribunal but rather to
avoid leaving the claimant with no adequate remedy in respect of its claims. Otherwise the
claimant may usually be left only with the possibility of suing the respondent in its "home"
court.202
Nevertheless, however wide the powers of the tribunal may be to determine its own
competence, by bringing a challenge before the national courts, where permitted to do so,
the party hostile to arbitration necessarily forces the attention of its opponent and the
arbitrators away from the arbitration and requires the opponent to concentrate on the court
proceedings, at least until the challenge is settled. Gaillard considers it as naive,
notwithstanding the arrangement in article 16(3) of the Model Law, to imagine that the
arbitration will go forward uninterrupted while elsewhere a judge, who is not necessarily even
required to hear the tribunal's own reasons for upholding or rejecting its competence,
determines the jurisdictional question.203
198 In a Model Law jurisdiction, this will involve making a ruling as a preliminary question, rather than an
award, under article 16(3).
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 271.
Berger 331.
Article 16(3), which has been adopted by the Law Commission in South Africa without amendment. §
1065 I ZPO, read with § 1062 I 2 ZPO does however allow a limited right of appeal to a higher court.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 273.
Gaillard164.
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The German and proposed South African systems can be characterised as systems of
restricted concurrent control. 204 It can be said that there are advantages and disadvantages
attendant on any approach as to when a review of the tribunal's jurisdictional finding by the
court can be made. The main pragmatic argument against concurrent court control is that to
allow recourse to the courts during the course of an arbitration is likely to encourage
delaying tactics on the part of a reluctant respondent. 205 An approach which permits court
challenges on jurisdiction only after the final award can also be defended on the dogmatic
ground that it minimises interference by local courts with the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal. On the other hand, it creates the possibility of injustice, in that if the jurisdictional
objection is upheld, the entire arbitration procedure would have been a waste of time and
costs.
In addition it can be argued that a reviewing court, when faced with an identical arbitration
clause, may be more reluctant to invalidate the award, issued after a full arbitration hearing,
than it would be to deny the tribunal jurisdiction under that same clause prior to the
arbitration proceedings taking place. Although the reviewing court might be aided in its
analysis by the tribunal's own assessment on the issue of competence, it cannot be
assumed that the court would be led astray by faulty reasoning or other mistakes made by
the tribunal.206 This could lead to the conclusion that in terms of efficiency, early court control
would bear the greater advantages. Nevertheless, one should also bear in mind that cases
of lack of jurisdiction and wrong decisions by the tribunal on jurisdictional issues are
relatively rare compared to attempts to use applications to court on jurisdictional issues as a
delaying tactic. It is therefore clearly preferable, on balance, that court review prior to the
award on the merits should be possible only in those cases, where the tribunal is prepared to
allow it.
A party's right to bring jurisdictional objections before the tribunal must also be weighed
against the need to ensure speedy proceedings and the efficiency of the arbitral process as
such.207 The party, who with full knowledge of the circumstances, behaves as if it accepts
the jurisdiction of the tribunal and with it the validity of the arbitration agreement, only to deny
204 Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 269 define "concurrent control" as a system where a national court is involved
in a question of jurisdiction before the tribunal has made a final award on the merits.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 269. Reiner "Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit nach ësterreichischem
und franzësischem Recht" 1986 ZRVg/201 was of the view that at least 90% of such applications were
motivated by delaying tactics.
Gaillard 165.
Berger 352.
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this jurisdiction after submitting its defence, violates the principle of venire contra factum
proprium.208
One should also ask why Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the tribunal, without the possibility of
any court scrutiny, is still excluded. In the above quoted decisions, the courts ruled that
arbitrators are not entitled to rule finally on their own competence, " ...because that they
cannot do".209On reflection, it is obvious that there can be no attempt to exclude totally final
court control. Why is that so? It may be a lack of confidence in the tribunal, which may be
composed of non-lawyers or non-experts regarding arbitration procedure. It may be a lack of
confidence that this tribunal is able to come to a correct decision. It then seems that the
issue of jurisdiction is too complicated to be dealt with in the final instance by anybody else
but judges. Ultimately, however, court support for the arbitration process is subject to
essential judicial supervision. Jurisdiction is one of those areas where judicial supervision is
deemed essential to ensure confidence in the arbitral process itself, rather than in the
particular tribunal.
The South African Law Commission endeavours to justify wider judicial control on
jurisdictional issues prior to the final award in the domestic context by stating that this
facilitates procedural efficiency in certain narrowly defined circumstances."? This does not
imply that arbitrators are less competent to decide jurisdictional issues in a domestic context.
Nor was the Law Commission motivated by concerns about consumer orotectton.i"
It must be conceded that a wrong decision on the question of the tribunal's jurisdiction can
lead to serious consequences for the parties. Every subsequent decision by the tribunal,
which erroneously claims to be competent to rule on the merits of the case, may lead to a
totally different result to the one a court would have reached. First, the tribunal normally has
a wider discretion than the court regarding the applicable procedure, as the court is subject
to its national law of civil procedure. This difference will be reflected in the way the hearings
will be held and evidence admitted. Further, the tribunal could be in a position where it is not
obliged to come to a finding on the merits on a strict application of substantive law but may
be authorised to act as amiable compositeur.212 This could result in an award than differs
significantly from the judgment of a national court in the same dispute. A tribunal's award,
208 Berger 353. Compare article 4 of the Model Law (equivalent to § 1027 ZPO) regarding waiver of the
right to object.
Devlin J in Christopher Brown Ltd v Genossenschaft Osterreichischer Waldbesitzer
Holzwirlschaftbetriebe Registrierle Genossenschaft mit beschrankter Haftung [1953] 2 All ER 1039 at
1042.
See para 111.3.3above regarding s 27 of the Draft Arbitration Bill.
This is provided for by s 58 of the Draft Bill.
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unlike a court judgment is also not subject to review on the merits. Nevertheless, as stated
earlier, if the tribunal or a state court denies the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal in an
international arbitration, the claimant may be left only with the opportunity to sue in the
"home" country of the respondent, which may be totally impractical for the claimant.213
212
213
Compare article 28(3) of the Model Law.
Compare Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 285.
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IV. Interim measures of protection
Efficient arbitral proceedings or, alternatively, their possible inefficiency caused by extensive
court interruptions during the conduct of the arbitration are closely connected with the issue
of interim measures. This is because here the connection between the arbitral tribunal and
the court and the tribunal's dependence on the court can be characterised as more intense
than elsewhere, and is indeed sometimes crucial for the efficacy of the arbitration process.
Part of the reason is that the courts will often have to deal with the actual merits of the
dispute in more detail, compared to the situation regarding Kompetenz-Kompetenz where
the court may have to touch on one aspect only. As will be discussed in more detail below, a
decision on the question of interim measures can in effect be a decision on the merits of the
case.i"
Furthermore, where the tribunal is unable to order the interim measures or in a situation
where one party applies to the court directly, the tribunal has to cope with a second
authority, which interferes with the arbitration. It is obvious that this may initiate severe
problems in terms of keeping the duration of the arbitration within a reasonable time scale.
One can therefore anticipate different approaches as to when court interference is necessary
or justifiable and the situations in which it should preferably be avoided.
In the following discussion the principle of interim measures will be explained and the
different approaches will be examined. In addition to a general discussion of the relevant
provisions of the Model Law and the South African and German approaches to interim
measures in international and domestic arbitration proceedings, the question of security for
costs will be scrutinised in more detail.
1. The principle
The final and binding character of the award of an arbitral tribunal is regarded as being just
as fundamental to the process as consent.ê" It follows logically from an arbitral tribunal's
authority to issue a binding award that, from the inception of the proceedings, it must have
214 See for example Relais Nordik v. Secunda Marine Services Limited 24 Federal Trial Reporter 256, a
judgment on 19 February 1988 by the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, from CLOUT, case 182:
The Court dismissed the application for an injunction on the grounds that the applicant had not made out
a strong prima facie case for an injunction. Also, damages would compensate any loss suffered by the
applicant. Moreover, the court held that the remedy sought was not an interim measure within article 9
of the Model Law. The applicant was seen as attempting to have the court rather than the arbitrators
resolve the substance of the dispute, notwithstanding the respondent's objection pursuant to article 8 of
the Model Law to the dispute being decided by the court.
Compare the definition of arbitration in ch 1 n 1 above.215
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the authority to make such orders - including interim measures - as are necessary to
preserve its capacity to render a fair and effective award.216 It is argued that derogation from
that general principle, designed to preserve its capacity to render an effective award, or a
suggestion that an interim measure might not be binding, but merely precatory is
fundamentally incompatible with the arbitral funcnon.ê"
Interim measures address the requirement of a party for immediate and temporary protection
of rights or property pending a decision on the merits of the dispute by the arbitral tribunal.
The two most common forms of interim relief are attachments and lnjunctions.ê" Interim
measures may include, for example, an order which requires corrective measures in
environmental disputes, an order directing advance payment of part of a claim to alleviate
hardship, a confidentiality order for the protection of trade secrets and an order directing the
appointment of a receiver or liquidator.ê"
The term "interim measures" does not however include measures, which may also be urgent
and in a certain sense provisional, but which are procedural as far as their function is
concerned. Examples include orders to the parties to clarify their statements of case or to
produce documentary evidence held by them or for the appointment of an expert by the
tribunal.22o In general, the nature of genuine interim measures is that their function is not
directly connected with the resolution of the dispute, but is either to stabilise the private-law
relations between the parties or to prepare for and assure the effective execution of the
award.221 The drawing of a clear distinction between interim relief and procedural rulings is
however not always easy. An order for the preservation of evidence can be classified as
interim relief, but an order for the production of evidence appears to be more in the nature of
a procedural ruling. The distinction can be important, for instance, because under the current
South African arbitration law the court has the common-law power to review, prior to the
award, a procedural ruling by the arbitral tribunal in exceptional clrcumetances.ê"
216 Donovan "Powers of the Arbitrators to Issue Procedural Orders, Including Interim Measures of
Protection, and the Obligation of Parties to Abide by Such Orders" (1999) 10(1) ICC ICArb Bull 57 at
65.
Donovan 68.
See Wagoner "Interim Relief in International Arbitration" (1996) 62 Arbitration 131. Attachment may be
sought to prevent the dissipation of assets that are the subject of the arbitration. An injuunction may be
requested to protect property rights at issue in an arbitration.
Wagoner 131; Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 345-346.
Wagoner 131 n 1.
Stalev "Interim Measures in the Context of Arbitration" 1994 ICCA Congress Series No.6, 104.
See n 32 above.
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In the context of arbitration, one must distinguish between interim measures ordered by a
court as a result of a request by a party or the tribunal and interim measures ordered by the
tribunal itself. The distinction is important for at least two reasons:
First, the scope of the power of the tribunal, irrespective of any limitations in the applicable
law or arbitration agreement, is restricted to those measures which have an inter partes
effect. The tribunal's interim measures are restricted to those which the parties themselves
could have achieved by agreement, thus excluding any measures affecting the rights of third
parties.223
Secondly, in cases where a party may choose between the court and the tribunal as the
authority to order the interim measure required, it must be carefully considered which will be
the most effective and expeditious forum in the particular circumstances. The tribunal should
nevertheless be satisfied that it does have jurisdiction224 as the basis and extent of its
competence to grant interim measures may be controversial. 225 One can distinguish in this
regard between a positive and a negative approach.
Under the negative approach express provisions of the applicable law give exclusive
competence to the courts to order interim measures of protection and at least by implication
proclaim interim measures ordered by the arbitral tribunal to be excluded. The current South
I
African legislation provides an example of a qualified negative aoproacn.f"
In many other jurisdictions the positive approach towards the power of the arbitral tribunal to
grant interim measures prevails. There is an express provision, for example, in article 17 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law, which gives the tribunal the non-mandatory power to order
interim measures of protection, that is on a "contract-out" basis.227 The alternative positive
approach is to allow the parties by agreement to confer on the arbitral tribunal the power to
order interim measures of protection, that is on a "contract-in" basis.228 This agreement could
223 Berger 338; Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 347. Interim measures in modern arbitration practice may however
sometimes indirectly affect the rights of third parties. See the text at n 230 below.
See Lew "Commentary on Interim and Conservatory Measures in ICC Arbitration Cases" (2000) 11(1)
ICC ICArb Bull 23 at 25, who states that the tribunal will have to look in the parties' agreement, the
chosen rules and the applicable law. The provisions of the agreement and rules are subject to
mandatory provisions of the appllicable law.
Compare the text to n 216 above, from which it appears that the tribunal logically does have inherent
jurisdiction to grant such measures, subject to restrictions in the applicable law and the arbitration
agreement.
See ch 2 para IV.3 below. Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 346 cite the Greek Code of Civil Procedure as an
example of the negative approach. The Greek Code article 889 prohibits an arbitral tribunal from
granting interim measures.
See ch 2 para IV.2 below.
To this extent, the current South African approach may also be calssified as a positive approach.
224
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be made explicitly in the arbitration agreement or implicitly by submitting the dispute to the
rules of an arbitral institution, which give the tribunal such powers.229
However, the general rule is that an arbitral tribunal may only issue mandatory orders
directed to the parties. If the orders go beyond that ambit, they must be issued by the
competent national or local court.230 A classic example is where a claimant wishes to obtain
an order to freeze sums held in a bank account, of which the respondent is the account
holder. Here, the interim measures are sought against the bank at which the account is
held.
National arbitration statutes do not in general provide any details on the preconditions with
which the tribunal has to comply when ordering provisional relief even though interim
measures of protection have the potential to "cut deep" and thereby affect the rights of the
parties to a significant extent.231 It is nevertheless generally agreed that a basic and
indispensable prerequisite for an interim measure of protection by the arbitral tribunal is a
request by one party to the tribunal and the prima facie competence of the tribunal to hear
the underlying dispute.232 This is so because a provisional measure ordered by the tribunal
without a prior request from one of the parties would violate the principle of party autonomy,
which governs the proceedings and forms an inherent limitation on the tribunal's procedural
powers and discretion.233
Furthermore, the more a requested measure affects the rights of the party concerned, the
greater the diligence required from the tribunal in ascertaining its competence to grant the
measure. This requirement is based on the principle of reasonable conduct and due
process, meaning that a possible injury caused by the requested interim measure must not
be out of proportion to the advantage which the claimant hopes to derive from it. The
severity and urgency of the requested measure should also be a yardstick for the tribunal's
decision whether or not to schedule a hearing prior to ordering the interim measure. The
229 Stalev 108. Compare Reymond "Security for Costs in International Arbitration" (1994) 110 LQR 501 at
504, regarding the position under the 1988 edition of the ICC Rules. Although the rules did not confer
the power to grant interim measures on the tribunal expressly, in several ICC arbitrations, it was
nevertheless assumed that the tribunal did have such power, by virtue of the provision in article 26,
which required the tribunal to make every effort to ensure that the award is enforceable at law.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 347.
Berger 335.
In this context, the case law of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is of particular significance, as described by
WOhler "Zur Bedeutung des Iran-United States Claims Tribunal fur die Rechtsfortbildung" from
Rechtsfortbildung durch Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 103.
Berger 335.
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right to be heard must be weighed up against the requirement of a measure, which may only
be effective if it is ordered without advance warning to the affected party.234
One commentator has said that a survey of trends in ICC arbitrations has indicated that
there are mainly three requirements which must be met before an arbitral tribunal will grant
interim measures. First, the tribunal must avoid pre-judging the merits of the case, although
the applicant should be able to make out a prima facie case on the merits. Secondly, the
matter must be urgent: there is no need to grant an interim measure if the relief requested
can await the final award. Thirdly, the applicant will have to show irreparable or at least
substantial harm if the interim measure is not granted.235
As mentioned earlier, it is not unusual in arbitral proceedings, for an interim measure to be
ordered by a court. In several jurisdictions it is expressly provided that a request to a court to
order interim measures is not incompatible with the existence of an arbitration agreement
covering the dlspute.f" The parties, by having entered an arbitration agreement, have not
renounced access to court protection, in cases where, by the very urgency of the situation,
effective protection otherwise to be obtained from the tribunal would not be available.237
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions it is the only way for a party to protect its interests,
because in these jurisdictions the arbitral tribunal does not have the power to order interim
measures at all.
Regarding the prerequisites for an order by a court or the tribunal, there are also different
approaches towards granting interim measures in different jurisdictions. France for example,
developed a means of interim protection that did not require the element of urgency at all.
The so-called référé-provision could be ordered in any case where the claim for interim relief
was not seriously objectionable. But, in a judgment in 1990 the French Cour de Cassation
has made clear that the use of this doctrine by the court in arbitration proceedings in effect
amounted to disregarding the arbitration agreement if the requirement of urgency was
abandonsd.ê"
234 Berger 337. See the text below at n 273 regarding the Anton Piller order, which can be used under
South African law for the preservation of evidence.
Lew (2000) 11(1) ICC ICArb BuI/27-28.
See the UNCITRAL Model Law article 9. In England the House of Lords came to this conclusion
independently of legislation. When properly used, interim measures from the court reinforce the
arbitration agreement, the tribunal's procedural powers and the award and are not intended to bypass
them: See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1AIIER 664 (HL) 688e-g
per Lord Mustill.
E.g. if the tribunal has not yet been appointed.
See Schlosser (1992) 8 Arbitration Internationa/194 citing 1990 Revue de I' arbitrage 635.
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The request for interim measures, either to a court or to a tribunal, may be abused by a party
in order to delay proceedings. Here one must also bear in mind the opportunity which the
opponent may have, depending on the circumstances, to appeal against the order,
particularly if the tribunal does not proceed with the arbitration while the issue regarding
interim measures is dealt with by the court. Therefore, both the tribunal and the court have to
take into account that the request for an order for interim measures can often be intended to
delay the arbitration proceedings or at least have that effect. 239 One may argue that a
request for an interim measure may often come from the claimant, who initiated the
arbitration in the first place and who will not be the one to delay the arbitration proceedings.
However, the claimant may during the course of the arbitration face a substantial counter-
claim by its opponent, which it has to take seriously and which puts it in the position of a
respondent. This development could cause the claimant to try to delay pursuing its claim
now that it seeks to avoid liability itself.240
Moreover, the respondent in arbitration proceedings may request the tribunal or the court to
order security for costs. The application may be brought because of genuine concerns about
the claimant's financial stability or purely as a delaying tactic.
Both these scenarios illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing in practice between genuine
applications intended to protect legitimate rights and the abuse of opportunities provided by
the applicable law or rules for interim measures as a delaying tactic. Different approaches in
national arbitration statutes towards interim measures from the courts and the tribunal must
be evaluated against this background.
2. The UNCITRAL Model Law
In this section the power of the courts and arbitral tribunals under the Model Law to grant
interim measures will be analysed in more detail, also with reference to the interaction
between the relevant provisions of the Model Law. Furthermore, the important topic of the
enforcement of orders for interim measures by the tribunal will be scrutinised.
239 In Delphi Petroleum Inc. v Derin Shipping and Training Ltd (3 December 1993) the Federal Court of
Canada, Trial Division (CLOUT case 68) noted that it had a mandate to render assistance in matters of
evidence in arbitration but that it should avoid taking measures conducive to dilatory tactics by the
parties.
Harris (1992) 9(2) J of Int Arb 87.240
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Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law deals with the power of the arbitral tribunal to order
interim measures as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a
party, order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal
may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. The arbitral
tribunal may require any party to provide appropriate security in connection with such
measure."
The UNCITRAL Model Law takes the positive approach, referred to above.ê" towards
interim measures, by granting the arbitral tribunal the power to order interim measures of
protection unless the parties agree that the tribunal should not have this power. Article 17 is
related to but also distinct from article 9, which deals with the granting of interim measures
by the court. Article 9 provides that it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a
party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of
protection and for the court to grant such a measure. Both articles 9 and 17 were based on
article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.242 However, article 9 of the Model law goes
further than article 26(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The latter states merely that the
request to a court for interim measures is not incompatible with the arbitration agreement.243
Article 9 adds that the granting of such measure by the court is also not incompatible with
the arbitration agreement. The addition is logical in that article 9 is also addressed to the
court and not merely to the parties and the tribunal. 244
Article 9 is broader than article 17 in that the latter deals only with the power to take interim
measures relating to the subject-matter of the dispute and does not address the other types
of measures commonly available nor the enforcement of any measures ordered.245 However,
article 9 does not actually grant any authority to the court to order interim measures but only
states the principle that certain orders for interim relief by the court, if permitted under the
applicable national law, are not inconsistent with the arbitration aqreernent.ê"
241
242
243
See n 227 above.
See Holtzmann & Neuhaus 330 and 531. See ch 1 n 56 regarding these rules.
It is generally recognised that an arbitration agreement by no means excludes protective provisional
orders rendered by a court. Some American courts have nevertheless been reluctant to do so, arguing
that the mandatory referral to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement (such as is provided
for by Article II the 1958 New York Convention) prevents them from ordering protective measures,
because the approach to the court for such measures bypasses the arbitration agreement. See
Schlosser 194 and compare n 236 above regarding the English Channel Tunnel case.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 332.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 333.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 530.
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From the parties' perspective article 9 of the Model Law is important where the tribunal is not
yet appointed or for other reasons cannot grant effective interim measures in the
circumstances. Protective measures ordered by a court normally presuppose a situation of
urgency. The court's power therefore derives from the fact that the parties, by having
entered into an arbitration agreement, have not renounced access to court protection in
cases where, by the urgency of the situation, effective interim protection would not otherwise
be available from the arbitral tnbunal.ê" Here, as is the justification for interim measures
generally, the court should order interim measures when necessary to preserve the capacity
of the arbitral tribunal to render an effective award. In this sense the court should support,
not substitute the tribunal's authority.248
Dogmatically, the need for the tribunal itself to be able to grant interim measures can be
justified as follows:
"The function of [an arbitral] tribunal, once an issue has been brought to it, is to take the
necessary steps according to law towards reaching a decision in accordance with the
principle of the equality of the parties. This presupposes that the issue brought to it,
once committed to the [tribunal], must as far as possible be preserved in that form, free
from interference by unilateral action of a party, until the determination made by the
[tribunal]. It means also that the principle of equality cannot be disturbed by the superior
force available to one party, wherewith to impair or interfere with the subject matter until
determination.
It is thus inherent in the authority of a tribunal that ancillary to the power of judgement, it
must have the power to issue incidental orders to ensure that the subject matter of the
suit is preserved intact until judgement. ,,249
Regarding the scope of power granted to the tribunal by article 17 of the Model Law
regarding interim measures, it was questioned during the discussions of UNCITRAL's
Working Group, what the scope of this power should be and whether it should be more
restricted. Examples mentioned which possibly fell within the power included measures to
preserve goods such as depositing them with a third person, opening bank letters of credit or
preserving evidence until a later stage of the proceedings. It was ultimately agreed that the
wording, as quoted above, of "such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may
247
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Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (1993 ICJ 375 at 376), which concerned the application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
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consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute" was preferable to a more
restrictive or specific description."?
As stated above,251it is generally understood that it follows from party autonomy that one of
the parties must request the order for an interim measure and the tribunal cannot take the
initiative itself. Article 17 recognises this, and states it explicitly. In this regard the wording of
article 17 is clearer than that of article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Article 17
empowers the tribunal at the request of a party to order any party to take certain interim
measures. Article 26(1) of the Rules states that at the request of either party "the tribunal
may take any interim measures it deems necessary" in respect of the subject-matter of the
dispute. Under the Model Law the tribunal itself cannot take steps to attach or preserve
goods by arranging for packers and storage. It must order the parties to do so. However,
because the tribunal requires the cooperation of the parties for interim measures it orders to
be effective, the change would seem to have little practical significance.252
One may nevertheless ask how specific the request for interim relief should be and to what
extent, if at all, the precise form of interim relief should be left in the discretion of the
tribunal? It is theoretically possible that party could make a general request that the tribunal
should order "such interim measures as the tribunal deems necessary", so that the party will
be able to enforce a future award in its favour. Alternatively, the party could request a very
specific order, for example, the completion of a certain phase of a construction to prevent
irreparable harm, pending an award regarding the dispute.
In the case of a general request, where it is for the arbitral tribunal to choose the necessary
order itself, one could argue that this at the end of the day is a measure substantially
initiated by the tribunal and not by a party, especially because the scope of the tribunal's
order may differ vastly from the measure the party had in mind.
But if it were to be necessary for the party to submit a very detailed request for a very
specific order, the arbitral tribunal may come to the conclusion that the measure, which the
party applied for, is inappropriate. The tribunal will therefore not render an order at all, unless
the party requests a measure which the tribunal considers as necessary and appropriate in
the circumstances. Either way it would amount to a measure deemed by the tribunal to be
necessary. This does not detract from the requirement that the process must be initiated by
250
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See n 232 above.
Holtzmann & Neuhaus 532-533.
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a request from a party, not by the tribunal of its own motion. In practice, the request will have
to be properly motivated and supported by argument and the other party will have the right to
respond before the request is granted. The applicant can also ask for "alternative relief'
besides the specified relief to allow some flexibility during argument. The tribunal will also
have to consider the effect of the order requested on the opposing party, as the party which
will have to comply with it.
This leads on to a very important issue regarding interim measures, namely the
enforceability of the order, which will have to be carefully considered both by the applicant
and the tribunal. The UNCITRAL Secretariat during the drafting of the Model Law drafted a
sentence for inclusion in what became article 17 to provide that the arbitral tribunal could
request a court to render executory assistance. However, the UNCITRAL Working Group
subsequently decided not to include this provision because it dealt in an incomplete manner
with a question of national procedural law and court competence and would probably be
unacceptable to many states.253 Further complications could arise in a situation where the
court is not ready to support the tribunal's view on appropriate interim measures and to
execute its order.254 Thus, the question of execution of interim measures was left to the
provisions of national law.
Regarding enforcement of interim measures, Stalev argues that since the arbitral tribunal is
empowered by the Model Law to order interim measures, it is logical to assume that they
could be enforced via exequatur of the court, like the award on the merits of the dispute.255
One may agree that the tribunal's measure may be enforced via exequatur. It is however
questionable whether the enforcement of the order for interim measures is based on exactly
the same principle as the enforcement of an award on the merits of the case, which is
provided for by express provisions of most national statutes, including those enacted to give
effect to the New York Convention.
Especially in the light of the need for cross-border enforcement, the enforcement of interim
measures under the New York Convention is not without difficulties. This is because the
ruling of the tribunal is rendered as an interim measure and not as an award. The order for
interim measures by the tribunal is not final. It may happen that the order is subsequently
withdrawn or modified by the tribunal in the light of changed circumstances. A prerequisite
253 Holtzmann & Neuhaus 531 citing UN doc A/CN9/245 quoted in Holtzmann & Neuhaus at 539-540.
Compare the text below at n 282 regarding the South African response to article 17.
Compare the UNCITRAL Commission's report (UN doc A/40/17) paras 168-169, quoted in Holtzmann &
Neuhaus 547, where the Commission decided not to incorporate a solution to possible conflicts between
interim measures directed by the court and those directed by the tribunal.
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for enforcement under the New York Convention is that the tribunal's decision is final and not
subject to any appeal.256 This prerequisite can hardly be met with an interim measure, since
the tribunal reserves the right for itself to change the interim order. And if one imagines a
situation where the tribunal has withdrawn the earlier order, it may be difficult for the party
who complied with the order in the first place, to recover what it paid.
However, if a party fails to comply with the order of an interim measure of protection, the
arbitral tribunal (under article 17) could possibly request the assistance of the relevant
national court, if sanctioned by the national law of the state when adopting the Model Law.
(Under article 9 it is the party itself which is entitled to request assistance from the court.) If
the court, by applying its own domestic laws, comes to the conclusion that the conditions for
the relevant measure are present, it may order the interim measures of protection requested
by the arbitral tribunal.
These problems illustrate the importance in the interests of effective arbitration of the party
requiring interim measures making the right initial choice between approaching the tribunal
under article 17 or the court under article 9.
The lack of definite court enforcement of the tribunal's order does not necessarily mean that
the interim measures of protection ordered by a tribunal are useless or have no obligatory
force, so that non-compliance is without any sanction. First, the same sanctions as in case of
breach of contract could be applied to non-compliance with the order for interim measures,
namely damages. The parties may even empower the tribunal by agreement to impose
penalties or punitive damages in order to compel the non-complying party to obey the interim
measure of protection. Furthermore, the fear that the tribunal when rendering its award on
the merits may look unfavourably on the party that does not comply with the order may also
be a strong motivation for a party to fulfil voluntarily the obligation imposed by the arbitral
tribunal.257 An interesting example of possible contractual provisions for sanctions regarding
interim measures may be found in article 25(2) of the LCIA Rules on security for costs. The
concluding portion of the rule provides:
"In the event that a claiming or counter-claiming party does not comply with any order to
provide security, the Arbitral Tribunal may stay the parties' claims or counterclaims or
dismiss them in an award."
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Compare Article V((1 )(e) of the New York Convention and the South African approach discussed in para
subsection IV.3.1.2 below.
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First, where the order for security for costs is directed against a claimant, who in the majority
of cases will be anxious to proceed with the arbitration, the tribunal's direction that it will stay
the hearing on the claim pending compliance with the order for security, will effectively
encourage such compliance. However, where the claimant is for tactical reasons reluctant to
proceed, the staying of its claim may suit it very well, thereby undermining the goal of
effective arbitration.
It is nevertheless beyond doubt that the threat to a party of having its claims or
counterclaims dismissed is a very strong motivation to comply with the order of the arbitral
tribunal on a voluntary basis. This sanction places the tribunal in a stronger position with a
better opportunity to enforce its authority. However, one can also argue that to disregard the
claims or counterclaims as a sanction against a non-complying party would therefore lead to
an award, which disregards the merits of the dispute. Beside doubts about the soundness of
this approach in legal theory,258 it can also be questioned whether the dismissal of claims or
counterclaims, not on the merits, but as a sanction for default, will necessarily be upheld by
a national court which is requested to recognise the award. Even where the parties have
agreed to this sanction by agreeing to use the LelA Rules, it should only be imposed by the
tribunal at the applicant's specific request and after considering alternative sanctions and the
likely effect of the sanction on the recognition or enforceability259 of the award at the
probable place where recognition or enforcement may be required.
3. The South African approach
As previously pointed out, from a party's perspective, the effectiveness of the arbitral
proceedings may ultimately depend on having taken the correct decision as to which
authority to approach for interim measures during those proceedings, namely the court or
the tribunal. On the one hand, the order of the tribunal may be rendered in a shorter period
257
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Stalev 110.
In effect, the tribunal abandons its function as a fact-finder and decision-maker on the merits by using
this power. Notwithstanding the parties' agreement to use the LCIA Rules, one may doubt that it was
truly the parties' desire and aim, when they entered the arbitration agreement, to be denied an
arbitration hearing and an award, which is based on the merits, because of a party's non-compliance
with an order for interim relief. In the somewhat analogous case of a party failing to attend the hearing
after due notice, the tribunal must still base its award on the available evidence and its findings on the
merits of the dispute.
Recognition of an award,as opposed to enforcement, is usually sought by a successful respondent in an
arbitration, which has had the claim against it dismissed. It is possible that where the claim is dismissed
under article 25.2 of the LCIA Rules, but the counterclaim granted, the original claimant (respondent
regarding the counterclaim) may resist enforcement of the counterclaim on the ground of the alleged
lack of due process in the arbitral proceedings through the dismissal of the claim, without the tribunal
considering its merits.
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of time and probably, because of the greater informality of the procedure, with less expense.
On the other hand, if problems with enforcement are anticipated or the element of surprise is
required for the success of the measure.f" the party requiring interim relief would be well
advised to apply to court.
Under the current South African legislation the arbitral tribunal lacks the powers to order
interim measures, comparable with the powers which the tribunal enjoys under article 17 of
the Model Law, unless these powers are conferred on the tribunal by the agreement of the
parties.261 However, under section 21 of the 1965 Act, the courts have the power to order
"an interim interdict or similar relief', to secure the amount in dispute and to order security for
costs in arbitration proceedings to the same extent that they could have granted equivalent
relief in court proceedings.262
In this section the new approach proposed by the Law Commission will be discussed. The
first part of the discussion will deal with interim measures in general followed by a separate
discussion of security for costs. Under the proposed new approach it is necessary to
distinguish between measures which can be ordered by the arbitral tribunal and those which
can be ordered by the court, as well as between domestic and international arbitration. The
discussion commences with interim measures, which can be ordered by the tribunal in the
context of domestic arbitration.
3.1. Interim measures ordered by the tribunal
3.1.1 Domestic arbitration
Unlike section 14 of the 1965 Act, which confers no general power on the arbitral tribunal,
section 29 of the Law Commission's Draft Arbitration Bill for domestic arbitration commences
with a general power: "Unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal may conduct the
arbitration in such manner as it deems fit". This is one of the provisions intended to give
effect to one of the objectives of a modern arbitration statute, namely to ensure that the
arbitral tribunal has adequate powers to proceed with the arbitration and complete it without
avoidable delay, particularly where the parties cannot agree on the procedure or where one
is failing or refusing to cooperate.ê" The general power, as well as the tribunal's specific
powers, including those dealing with interim measures discussed below, is subject to the
260
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See the discussion of Anton Piller orders below.
Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 151, relying on the fact that the list of powers of the arbitrator in s 14(1) of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 makes no reference to interim measures. See also Petz Products (Pfy) Ltd v
Commercial Elrctrical Contractors (Pfy) Ltd 1990 4 SA 196 (C) 202H, which dealt with security for costs.
S 21 (1)(a), (f) and (g).262
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tribunal's general duty. This general duty is twofold. The tribunal must observe the
requirements of due process and conduct the arbitration using procedures which avoid
unnecessary delay and expense.F"
Section 29(2) of the Draft Arbitration Bill contains the specific powers of the tribunal,divided
into two groups, namely those which can be exercised by the tribunal on its own initiative
and those which can only be exercised by the tribunal on the application of a party. This
latter group contains two powers relevant to interim measures. All the specific powers apply
unless the parties otherwise agree. Section 29(2)(b)(iii) empowers the tribunal on the
application of a party to order any party to take such interim measures as the tribunal may
consider necessary for the protection of the subject matter of the dispute. This power is
comparable to article 17 of the Model Law, discussed above, and to the power the tribunal
enjoys under the Draft International Arbitration Bill.265 In terms of section 29(2)(b)(iv) the
tribunal may also on the application of a party order the party to preserve for purposes of the
arbitral proceedings any evidence which is in that party's possession or under that party's
control. 266
Although the powers the tribunal would enjoy under the proposed legislation are obviously
broader than its powers under the current law, its powers under section 29 are narrower than
those conferred on the court by section 40 of the Draft Bill,267discussed in below.
Although the tribunal may only exercise its discretionary power to grant interim measures on
the application of a party, the tribunal in exercising that discretion, cannot be forced in a
direction where the applicant is in effect taking control of the arbitration. If the tribunal
regards an application for interim measures to be without merit and merely a tactical
manoeuvre, the application can be refused. More difficult is the question as to whether the
tribunal is able to refuse an order in cases where the need for an order for interim measures
is beyond doubt, but where it is also clear (at least to the tribunal), that the court is in a better
position to grant effective relief.
On the one hand the tribunal's power is clearly discretionary and must be exercised with
regard to the need for effective arbltratlon.ê" On the other hand, an indication that the party
263
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SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 2-3.
The general duty is imposed by s 28(1) of the Draft Bill. S 28(2) expressly requires the tribunal to comply
with its general duty in s 28(1) when exercising its powers; Report Domestic Arbitration 60.
Report Domestic Arbitration 62 and para IV.3.1.2 below.
This power is based on the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 38(6); see Report Domestic Arbitration 62.
Report Domestic Arbitration 62.
See ss 29(1) and (2) and 28(1 )(b) and (2) of the Draft Bill.
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should rather approach the court would have to be given in such a way that the tribunal's
duty to act impartially between the parties is not brought into doubt, by the tribunal creating
the perception that it is assisting one party with procedural advice.269 It would also appear
that the tribunal cannot refuse an application for interim relief which is within its powers,
purely because the tribunal believes that it would be more appropriate for the applicant to
approach the court. In an effort to ensure that court applications under section 40 are not
abused as an attempt to review the tribunal's decisions on procedural matters and interim
measures where the court and tribunal have concurrent jurisdiction, section 40(2) provides
that the court must not grant interim relief where the tribunal, being competent to grant the
order, has already determined the matter.270
Forms of interim relief which have enjoyed particular attention in England in recent years are
Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders. The former has been recognised in South Africa
as an anti-dissipation lnterdlct.'" the purpose of which is to insure that a party will be able to
give effect to certain judgments or awards against it. It has nevertheless been said that the
applicant should not be free to obtain an injunction merely if it fears that the respondent's
legitimate dealings will frustrate the judgment or award. If for example a Mareva injunction
were available as general "security" for damages or debt, the remedy would operate as the
counterpart of security for costs (which, unlike Mareva relief, protects defendants against
impecunious plaintiffs).272 An Anton Piller order is aimed at the preservation of evidence.273
This can also operate as a drastic remedy with the result that an English judge has said that
"the practice of the court has allowed the balance to swing too much in favour of plaintiffs
and that Anton Piller orders have been too readily granted with insufficient safeguards for the
respondentsv.ê" Anton Piller orders must be considered as a necessary and important
procedural tool in common-law procedural systems, when handled by prudent parties. In the
wrong hands they have also been called the "nuclear bombs" of civil procedure since a well-
269
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The provision was taken from the Draft International Arbitration Bill sch 1 article 9(3), which was
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Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 63.
See Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1994 3 SA 700 (W) but compare the decision on appeal 1996 4 SA
348 (A) 3711-372C.
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Scott J in Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. v Robinson [1987] Ch 38 at 76. For the requirements
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presented application for such an order to a court will be difficult to turn down and it follows
that "the practitioner and not the judge has his finger on the weapon's detonator'J"
Of particular importance in the context of arbitration proceedings is the fact that anti-
dissipation orders and Anton Piller orders are usually granted ex parte, that is without notice
of the proceedings being given to the other party until the application has been heard.276 As
stated above, the Commission has recommended in section 29(2)(b )(iv) of its Draft Bill that
the tribunal should, on application, be able to order a party to preserve evidence. The
Commission was however firmly of the view that this power should not be exercised on an
ex parte basis, in view of the tribunal's duty to avoid unilateral communications as part of its
duty of trnparnatlty?" A party should therefore only apply to the tribunal under this provision
where it is reasonably sure that the other party will comply voluntarily with an order made by
the tribunal.
The Law Commission, contrary to its recommendations on article 17 of the Model Law for
international arbltratlon.ê" has not recommended specific provisions to facilitate court
enforcement of interim measures ordered by the tribunal. This may be because it is easier
for a party to approach the court in domestic arbitration. In international arbitration, the court
from which interim measures are sought is not necessarily the court at the seat of the
arbitration and could be in a different country.i" Be that as it may, parties may have to
consider incorporating contractual sanctions in their arbitration agreement to facilitate
compllance.ê"
3.1.2. International arbitration proceedings
The Law Commission has recommended that South Africa should adopt article 17 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law for international commercial arbitrations, to enable the arbitral
tribunal to grant interim measures of protection.ê" The tribunal has no such power under the
275 Scott J in Columbia Pictures Industries Inc. v Robinson [1987] Cho38 at 75. See also the concerns of
Froneman J in Pohlman v Van Schalkwyk 20001 1 SA 690 (E) at 698-699.
See the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 201; Report Domestic Arbitration 62. Combined with the
effects such an order has on the proceedings and its economic effect, one should also not
·underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find that a decision against them has been
made without their being afforded any opportunity to influence the course of events' (John v Rees
[1970] Cho345, 402).
Report Domestic Arbitration 62. See also the DAC (Saville) Report of 1996 para 201.
See para IV.3.1.2 below.
See the UNCITRAL Model Law article 1(2), which provides that article 9, dealing with interim measures
by the court, is one of those provisions of the Model Law which apply to an arbitration being held in
another state.
See the discussion in para IV.2 above.
SA Law Commission ReportArbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 74-77.
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current arbitration law and the introduction of such a provision based on the Model Law and
on recent trends all over the world is an important and necessary innovation.
Special attention was paid by the Law Commission to the matter of enforcement of orders for
interim measures granted by the tribunal. As discussed above,282article 17 of the Model Law
does not provide measures for the enforcement of orders made by an arbitral tribunal
regarding interim measures. The Commission's Report refers to other jurisdictions, which
provided such measures to enable the tribunal's order to be enforced as an award.283The
discussion concluded with the recommendation that the South African version of article 17 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law should have as an additional mandatory provision:
"(3) The provisions of articles 31, 35 and 36 shall apply to an order under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this article as if such order were an award.,,284
The result of applying article 31 as well as article 35 and 36 is that the order must comply
with the formal requirements of an award as stated in article 31 and must especially contain
the reasons for the order in terms of article 31(2). The argument set out above285that a party
will tend to comply with the tribunal's orders in any event, because it would otherwise fear
that its non-compliance could influence the tribunal against it when making the final award
was obviously not strong enough for the Commission. The Commission expressly stated that
the intention was not to turn every interim order into an award. The effect of article 17(3) is
that an order for interim measures by the tribunal will be recognised and enforced in South
Africa and by the South African courts as if it were an award, subject to the defences in
article 36.286The intention is not however to make the order an award, but to facilitate
enforcement outside South Africa. It will nevertheless no longer be necessary for a party to
consider using an application to court for interim measures under article 9 for this purpose.i"
This modification to article 17 undoubtedly increases the effectiveness of the tribunal's order,
keeping in mind the relative speed of the possible enforcement of the order by the courts as
an award. Additionally, as articles 35 and 36 have ex-territorial effect, interim measures
ordered abroad will be enforceable in this way in South Africa. On the other hand this
advance may be partially offset by the requirements the order has to meet under the
282
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proposed article 17(3). However, the knowledge that the enforcement remedy exists
certainly encourages parties to apply to the tribunal rather than the court in the first instance
and thus supports expeditious and cost-effective arbitration.
3.2 The court's power to order interim measures of protection
3.2.1 International arbitration proceedings
The court's power to order interim measures of protection will change under the Draft
International Arbitration Bill proposed by the Law Commission. Under the current law,
section 21 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 empowers the court to order interim measures
generally as well as security for costs. As mentioned above, the tribunal has no such powers
under the existing law.
The Law Commission recommends the adoption of article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
thus confirming the principle that the request to a court for interim measures is not
incompatible with the arbitration agreement. However the Commission recommended that
the wording of article 9 should be expanded to deal with certain issues in more detail.288
First, it was felt that the court's powers under section 21 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 are
too wide in terms of creating opportunities for delay and interruption through court
tnvolvernent.ê" The Commission was nevertheless of the view that there are powers of the
court to grant interim measures of protection which are clearly desirable where the matter is
urgent and there is a need for effective sanctions to ensure compliance."? There was no
doubt that the total exclusion of the court regarding interim measures would have been
wrong. To understand the range of the court's involvement, the amplified article 9 must be
read with article 5, which limits the involvement of the national courts in international
commercial arbitration by stating, as set out earlier, that in "matters governed by this Law, no
court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law".291The court's powers under the
cornrnon-Iaw.ê" which are not excluded by section 3 of the Draft International Arbitration
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Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 59-65.
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 17 and 60.
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 60.
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 60. See para II above.
The common-law powers include the power to grant a declaratory order or an interdict to prevent an
arbitration from proceeding (see Butler & Finsen 61). The Commission referred expressly to the court's
power to review a procedural ruling by an arbitral tribunal while the arbitration is still in progess. (See
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 61which refers to Tuesday Industries
(Pty) Ltd v Condor Industries (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 379 (T), recently applied in Badenhorst-Schnetler v
Ne/2001 3 SA 631 (C).)
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Bill,293are therefore excluded through the wording of article 5, to the extent that they overlap
with powers conferred on the court by the Model Law. Besides spelling out the powers
regarding interim measures which the court may exercise in the new article 9(2), the
Commission nevertheless considered it advisable to reinforce article 5 further, by adding
article 9(5), which states expressly that the court has no powers to grant interim measures,
other than those contained in article 9.294
Article 9(2) of the Law Commission's Draft Bill expressly empowers the court on application
to grant an order to prevent the award being rendered ineffectual through the dissipation of
assets by the other party. Article 9(2) does not refer to a court order for the preservation of
evidence, which is dealt with by an addition to article 27.295As article 27 is concerned with
court assistance for the taking of evidence, court assistance for the preservation of evidence
should more logically be dealt with by article 9(2). This would then have the further
advantage of making such assistance subject to the procedural safeguards against abuse of
the court's powers in article 9(3), discussed below.
On a comparative note, section 44 of the new English Arbitration Act of 1996 also greatly
reduces the scope of the court's powers of assistance, compared to the powers formerly
available under section 12(6) of the Arbitration Act of 1950, on which section 21 of the South
African Arbitration Act of 1965 is based.296 Section 44(3) of the 1996 Act, for example,
provides that the court may, on application, make orders in a case of urgency where the
court thinks it is necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets. Otherwise, as
set out in section 44(4), in a case which is not urgent, the court shall only act on the
application of a party with the permission of the tribunal (and on notice to the other party and
the tribunal), or with the agreement in writing of the other party. These provisions are
designed to prevent the abuse of Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders in arbitration
proceedinqs.""
In amplifying article 9 of the Model Law the Law Commission identified the need to deal with
the issue of competing applications for interim measures from the court and the tribunal. It
293
294
S 3 excludes the court's statutory powers under the 1965 Act in international commercial arbitrations.
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 61. As article 9(5) deals with the
court's powers to grant interim measures, it would not exclude the court's power to review a tribunal's
procedural ruling during the arbitration. However, article 34 does cover the review of an award on
procedural grounds. It is at least arguable that the common-law power is excluded by article 34 read
with article 5.
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 202 and 209.
Report Domestic Arbitration 74-75.
Compare the discussion in para IV.3.1.1 above.
295
296
297
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
originally suggested the addition of an article 9(3), which would have dealt with the problem
as follows:298
"(3) Where:
a) a party applies to a court for an interim interdict or other interim order; and
b) an arbitral tribunal has already ruled on the matter, the court shall treat the ruling or
any finding of fact made in the course of the ruling as conclusive for purposes of the
application. "
The Commission reasoned that the inclusion of article 9(3), which was identical to the
Scottish version of article 9(3), would serve to expedite court applications on interim
measures of protection, in that the arbitral tribunal's factual findings on the issue would no
longer be open to dispute. The court would be bound by those findings. It was also intended
to prevent article 9 from being abused as an opportunity for disguised appeals against the
arbitral tribunal's rulings on interim measures. It was furthermore intended to be used as an
instrument to enforce rulings on interim measures by the arbitral tribunal, albeit indirectly.299
Notwithstanding these arguments in support of the above quoted wording, Professor Pieter
Sanders expressed the view that article 9(3) in this form could create the opportunity for a
party to take the tribunal's order for interim measures on review,30oalthough this was clearly
not the Commission's intention.
The Commission took heed of the criticism and misunderstanding. It therefore decided to
deal with the problem of competing applications for interim measures with one party
approaching the arbitral tribunal and the other the court by regulating the circumstances in
which the court may exercise its power to grant interim measures in more detail. 301The
wording of article 9(3) as finally recommended is in the form of a qualified prohibition,
derived from the Zimbabwean version of the Model Law.302The court shall not grant an order
for interim measures of protection unless-
"a) the arbitral tribunal has not yet been appointed and the matter is urgent; or
298
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Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 62. Although the report refers to
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See Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 63, which refers to an oral
comment by Prof Sanders, the doyen of Dutch arbitration lawyers, at the International Conference on
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See the (Zimbabwe) Arbitration Act 6 of 1996 sch 1 article 9(3) and compare s 44(3)-(5) of the English
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b) the tribunal is not competent to grant the order; or
c) the urgency of the matter makes it impractical to seek such an
order from the arbitral tribunal".
Furthermore, the court shall not grant any such order where the tribunal, being competent to
grant an order, has already determined the matter. This emphasises that the court cannot
review a tribunal's findings on interim measures except as part of an application to set aside
the award.
3.2.2 Domestic arbitration
The proposed general powers of the court, comparable to those in section 21 of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, are contained in section 40 of the Law Commission's Draft
Arbitration Bill for domestic arbitration. The general powers of the court to decide on
procedural matters, which are more properly left to the arbitral tribunal, have been
restricted.303 However, the court's powers to grant interim measures to ensure that the
arbitral proceedings are ultimately effective have been strengthened. For example, the court
may ensure that an award, which may ultimately be made is not rendered ineffective by the
dissipation of assets.304 The court also has a new power under section 40(1)(b) to order
preservation of evidence and therefore to grant an Anton Piller order in arbitration
proceedings.305 Both these powers are subject to the safeguards imposed by section 40(2)
of the Draft Bill, which are based on the Law Commission's proposed addition to article 9 of
the Model Law for international arbitration.306 In this way, the Law Commission tries to
ensure that the court's power to order interim measures will be only used in support of
effective arbitration and not abused as a delaying tactic.
3.3 Security for costs
Unlike the position in German law, discussed below,307 both the current and proposed South
African arbitration law make express provision for a party (usually the claimant) to be
ordered to give security for the other party's costs in the arbitral proceedings, in certain
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circumstances. The reasoning underlying an order for security for costs is the following. The
respondent, who must often participate unwillingly in an arbitration to resist a claim made
against it, could be put to considerable expense, even if its defence is successful. Although
the successful party is usually awarded costs, the respondent may find itself in a position
where it is unable to enforce an award ordering costs in its favour, if the unsuccessful
claimant has no money or is outside the jurisdiction of the court.30e
Security for costs in arbitration proceedings has recently been the subject of an intense
debate. This debate has however been more concerned with who should have the power to
make such order, rather than with the continued availability of the remedy as such.
Currently, the power to order security for costs in South African arbitration law is reserved
exclusively for the courts309 unless the parties provide otherwise in their arbitration
aqreernent."? However, in the light of English experience, there is grave concern about the
wisdom of vesting the power in the court, particularly in the context of an international
arbitration. In the following discussion, it will first be explained why it was decided to take the
power away from the courts, before the scope of the proposed new power for the arbitral
tribunal is discussed.
3.3.1 Security ordered by court
The crucial issue facing the Law Commission regarding security for costs in the new
legislation was whether the court should retain its power to order security for costs, which it
currently enjoys under section 21 (a) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. As pointed out above,
the arbitral tribunal has no power under the current law to order a party to give security for
costs unless that power is conferred on the tribunal by the agreement of the parties.
Moreover, although the parties can do this under the current law, it appears that such action
is not a common occurrence in practice, unless it is provided for in specific institutional rules
adopted by the parties.?" In the absence of such an agreement, the only authority able to
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See the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s 21 (1)(a).
See Petz Products (pty) Ltd v Commercial Electrical Contractors (pty) Ltd 1990 4 SA 196 (C) at 203 H-I:
"The powers conferred by the Act upon an arbitration tribunal do not include the power to order parties
to furnish security for costs. It may well be that an arbitration agreement may include a submission of a
dispute as to security for costs of the arbitration proceedings to the arbitration tribunal, but that was not
the case here."
Compae 0yre ''The Power of an Arbitrator to Grant Interim Relief under the Arbitration Act 1996" (1999)
65 Arbitration 113 at 119, who made this statement with regard to parties providing extended procedural
powers in general by agreement in England prior to the 1996 Act. A set of rules widely used in
construction arbitrations in South Africa, namely the Rules for the Conduct of Arbitrations (4 ed, August
2000) of the Association of Arbitrators (Southern Africa) does not empower the arbitrator to order
security for costs (see rule 11).
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grant such an order is the court.312 It has been suggested that the theory behind the tribunal
not being able to grant security for costs, unless the parties so agree, was that it is the duty
of the tribunal to decide the substantive merits of the dispute referred to it. It is argued that
the tribunal would not be performing its duty if it made an order for the provision of security,
since the merits of the dispute could be determined without such an order.?"
The issue of whether the court should be able to order security at all was highlighted by
controversy surrounding the exercise of its discretion by the courts in practice. In the often
cited case of Coppée-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (in liq) (the
Ken-Ren case)?" the House of Lords in England directed the claimant in certain arbitration
proceedings to provide security for costs. The arbitration was held in London between two
foreign parties under the 1988 Rules of the ICC. Shortly after the terms of reference were
established, Coppée applied to the Commercial Court in London seeking an order for
security for costs. The application was dismissed by the Commercial Court and an appeal to
the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. 315 Contrary to the Bank Mel/at decislon.?" the House
of Lords held that it had the power to order security for costs and that such power is not
contrary to the ICC procedure. It was therefore a matter of discretion whether security should
be ordered or not. 317
The 1988 ICC Rules were silent about the matter of security for costs and did not expressly
confer the power to grant interim measures on the arbitral tribunal. But from article 8.5 of the
former ICC Rules318 the existence of such power could be inferred, as it provides that an
application to court for interim relief should be only made in "exceptional circumstances"
once the file has been transmitted to the arbitral tribunal. The wording of article 8.5 therefore
312 S 21 (1) provides: "For the purposes of and in relation to a reference under an arbitration agreement, the
court shall have the same power of making orders in respect of - (a) security for costs ...as it has (in
respect of) any action or matter in that court."
Saville ''The Arbitration Act 1996 and its effect on International Arbitration in England" (1997) 63
Arbitration 104 at 106. Lord Saville did not subscribe to the theory, which seemed to him to entail a very
narrow view of arbitration.
[1994] 2 All ER 449.
The decisions were based on the authority of Bank Mel/at v. Hel/eniki Techniki SA [1984] 0.8.291. Kerr
LJ in this case concluded at 309-310: "Since I consider that in an arbitration under the ICC Rules, which
has no connection with this country other than that it had been agreed between foreign parties that any
such arbitration was to take place here, it would be inappropriate in principle to make an order for
security for costs on the ground that the claimant is ordinarily resident abroad, I would also regard it as
wrong in principle to make any such order on the ground that the claimant may be unable to pay the
other party's costs if the award requires him to do so."
See the previous footnote.
Coppée-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (in liq) [1994] 2 All ER 449 at 461 d.
Compare article 23.2 of the 1998 Rules
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suggested that in ordinary circumstances the arbitral tribunal should be the authority to deal
with this rnatter.?"
The English 1950 Act section 12(6)(a) provided the same power to the High Court to order
security for costs in respect of an arbitration as it has in ordinary litigation, mainly when the
plaintiff is ordinarily resident out of the jurisdiction or is a nominal plaintiff.320
In the Ken-Ren case the only connection with England was that the parties or the institution
under the rules of which they have contracted have chosen London as the place of
arbitration, precisely because it was for them a neutral venue. From the perspective of
international arbitration under the ICC Rules, one may therefore question the logic of the
words of Lord Woolf in the Ken-Ren judgment, where he states" ...if it is not appropriate to
make an order in this case, then I have difficulties in envisaging any case in which it would
be appropriate to make an order.,,321The change in the law from Bank Mel/at to Ken-Ren
was thus not merely on the question of the exercise of the judicial discretion, but the refusal
to accept that ICC arbitrations fall, as a matter of principle, into a category in which an order
for security for costs by the court has no application.f"
The court's ruling, reaffirming that the court could decide whether or not the claimant in an
international arbitration should provide security for costs, was widely criticised. Lord Saville
said of the Ken-Ren decision that
"It was viewed as confirming the widely held suspicion that the English Courts were only
too ready to interfere in the arbitral process and to impose their own dictat on the
parties, notwithstanding the agreement of those parties to arbitrate rather than
litigate.,,323
It was also realised that the court ordering a foreign claimant to provide security for costs in
an arbitration was not only an interference in the arbitration process but also in effect
discriminating against foreigners arbitrating their claims in England.324 The power to order
security for costs in arbitrations was accordingly removed from the courts. It was also
319 Reymond "Security for Costs in International Arbitration" (1994) 110 LQR 501 at 504, who also relies on
article 26 of the former rules which required the tribunal to make every effort that the award is
enforceable at law.
Reymond 502.
Coppée-Lavalin SA/NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd (in liq) [1994] 2 All ER 449 at 477c.
Lord Woolf was very much influenced by the fact that the Ken Ren company was being financed in the
arbitration by the government of Kenya, as the controlling shareholder of the insolvent company (476j).
Reymond 503.
Saville 107.
Saville 107.
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considered if security for costs should be altogether excluded from arbitrations under the
new English Arbitration Act. However, in the end it was agreed that the power to order
security for costs was a useful tool, which could help to do justice.325 As a result, section
38(3) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 now gives the arbitral tribunal the power to order
security for costs, unless that power is excluded in the arbitration agreement.
The response to the Ken-Ren judgment by the South Africa Law Commission for
international arbitrations was the recommendation to stipulate expressly in the South African
version of article 9 of the Model Law that the court cannot order security for costs.f" The
relevant portions of article 9(2) as recommended by the Law Commission read:
"(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), the High Court shall have the same power as
it has for the purposes of proceedings before that court to make
(a) ( .... )
(b) an order securing the amount in dispute but not an order for security for costs".
The same route was recommended for domestic arbitration. Section 40, dealing with the
general powers of the courts, empowers the court on application to make an order securing
the amount in dispute "but not an order for security for costs". 327 The Law Commission
supported its recommendation by referring to the discussion in its Report on international
arbltratlon.?" The Law Commission's recommendations regarding the provision of a power
for the arbitral tribunal to order security for costs are discussed below.
3.3.2 Security ordered by the Tribunal
3.3.2.1 International arbitration
Regarding the ordering of security for costs in international arbitration proceedings, the Law
Commission proposes that this power should be vested in the arbitral tribunal. This decision
was taken after the Commission had first decided, as explained above, to qualify the powers
of the court to order interim measures, specifically to exclude the power to order security for
costS.329 Therefore, it was found necessary to provide the arbitral tribunal itself with such a
325
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329
Saville 107.
Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa 63.
See the Draft Arbitration Bill 540(1 )(c).
Report Domestic Arbitration 74.
See the Draft International Arbitration Bill sch 1 article 9(2)(b).
89
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
power, because, as stated above, the tribunal has no such power under the current law,
unless the parties confer this power on the tribunal in their arbitration agreement. 330
The Law Commission's project committee took note of the position under the new English
Arbitration Act of 1996, which confers the power on the arbitral tribunal to order security for
costs, unless the parties otherwise agree.331 The project committee was concerned that a
"contract-out" power for the tribunal to order security, which is automatically available, could
be abused as an instrument to delay the arbitral proceeding by respondents routinely
applying for this order. It was therefore initially decided that the power to order security for
costs should be granted on a "contract-in" basis only. But it was later realised that the
respondent might easily find itself in a position where neither the tribunal nor the court would
be able to grant an order for security for costs in a situation where it was highly desirable,
because the parties had not agreed to exercise the "contract-in" option. This result was
considered to be unacceptable.ê"
Instead of the initial approach it was therefore subsequently agreed to empower the tribunal
to order security for costs, unless the parties agree otherwise. The Commission
recommended the following addition to article 17 of the Model Law, which deals with the
tribunal's powers to award interim measures:
"(2) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request
of a party, order appropriate security for costs if the arbitral tribunal considers
such relief to be fair in the circumstances."
This provision clearly gives the tribunal a discretion to order security at the request of a party
("the arbitral tribunal may"). The tribunal is further not bound to the grounds used by the High
Court in court proceedings, as the courts are under the current law.333 The issue as to
whether or not security should be granted is one of procedure rather than substantive law.334
The tribunal in exercising its discretion is also required to consider whether the granting of
the order would be fair in the circumstances and to satisfy itself that the security is
aporoprtate.?" The tribunal's discretion is therefore sufficiently flexible both to avoid the
abuse of the power as a delaying tactic and to ensure the recovery of its costs by a
successful respondent in appropriate circumstances. A situation where an order may be
330
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made is where a limited company is the claimant and the tribunal has reason to believe that
the company will be unable to pay the costs of a successful respondent. 336
3.3.2.2 Domestic arbitration
The Law Commission recommends the same basic route for domestic arbitration as it had
previously recommended for international arbitration regarding security for costs. It therefore
proposes that the power should be removed from the court and given exclusively to the
arbitral tribunal, but on an opt-out basts.?" This power is included among the special powers
of the tribunal in section 31 of the Draft Arbitration Bill. Unless the parties otherwise agree,
the tribunal may, on the application of the respondent, order the clalmant'" to provide
appropriate security for costs (including additional security).339To facilitate enforcement, it is
expressly provided that the tribunal may stay the arbitral proceedings pending compliance
with the order."?
By implication, the tribunal is not necessarily expected to apply the same criteria as the court
when considering an application for security. It is envisaged that arbitration institutions will
provide their arbitrators with guidelines as to how the discretion regarding the order of
security for costs should be exercised.t" Security for costs is frequently ordered by the court
in court proceedings against a plaintiff, which is a juristic person, where there are reasonable
grounds for believing that it will be unable to pay costs if the defendant is successful in its
defence. Section 31 (3) expressly provides that an arbitral tribunal, when exercising its
discretion under section 31(2) may also order security on this basls.?"
Section 31 (4) provides that unless the parties agree otherwise, where the tribunal makes an
order for security under section 31(2) without specifying the amount and method of providing
security, these matters must be determined by the taxing master of the court. This provision
obviously takes account of the fact that arbitrators in a domestic arbitration are not always so
familiar with the procedure for determining what security would be appropriate, either
336
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because they are not dealing with the issue of legal costs on a regular basis, or because
they are not lawyers. The decision whether or not security for costs should be ordered can
therefore be determined by the tribunal on the merits of the application, with the calculation
of the amount being left to the taxing master. Properly used, this option can ensure that
applications for security are dealt with efficiently and competently, as long as the taxing
master is able to deal with the matter expeditiously.
4. Germany
With the implementation of the new § 1041 lPO the current German legislation copied
Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law in its wording and function, although certain
additions were made. The new legislation therefore followed the general international trend
of empowering the arbitral tribunal to order interim measures of protection. The legislature
did not replace the powers of the courts to order interim measures with the new powers of
the tribunal but added the one to the other. Under the current German arbitration legislation
a party can therefore now choose to apply either to the court or to the tribunal for the
required order for interim measures of protection.
In this section, the newly adopted equivalent of article 17 will first be examined. The powers
of the court regarding interim measures as they were and as they are under the current law
will then be discussed. The issue of security for costs in German arbitration proceedings is
also considered. It will become clear from the discussion why a separate section was not
devoted to this topic.
4.1 Interim measures ordered by the tribunal
The lPO and the German arbitration law before 1998 may at one stage have been regarded
as relatively liberal by some commentators. However, the desirability of empowering the
arbitral tribunal to grant anything resembling interim measures of protection would not have
occurred to such commentators. The delegation to or sharing of state power with an arbitral
tribunal so that it could order any kind of interim measure, even without being able to enforce
this order, was not part of the scheme of arbitration. It was rather understood that the
tribunal should act within the powers, which the parties could grant, to resolve the dispute on
the merits on the basis of their arbitration agreement. The parties therefore had to apply in
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the ordinary way, as in court proceedings, to the court for interim relief under §§ 916 - 945
lPO, as described in more detail below.343
Under the new German Arbitration Law § 1041 I lPO provides
"(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a
party, order such interim measures of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider
necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may
require any party to provide appropriate security in connection with such a measure."
By adopting article 17 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the German legislation follows the
positive approach taken by the Model Law of automatically empowering the tribunal to grant
orders for interim measures unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The innovation in this
provision from a German perspective is that for ordering interim measures, the tribunal does
not need the specific agreement of the parties nor powers conferred by institutional rules,
like those of the ICC, to which the parties have agreed. Its power to order interim measures
is derived directly from the lPO.344 Therefore, independently of any express or implied party
agreement, the tribunal today has the power to grant interim measures straight from the
German arbitration legislation.
§ 1041 I lPO, following article 17 of the Model Law, only empowers the tribunal to order
interim measures and is silent about the power to enforce these meesures.?" The German
legislature however amplified article 17 of the Model Law to provide for court enforcement of
interim measures ordered by the tribunal. § 1041 II lPO provides:
"The court may, at the request of a party, permit enforcement of a measure referred to
in subsection (1), unless application for a corresponding interim measure has already
been made to a court. It may recast such an order if necessary for the purpose of
enforcing the measure."
For the enforcement of the order one must establish whether the order can possibly be
enforced by the tribunal itself or whether it needs to be enforced by the court. According to
one commentary, three different types of order can be distinguished for this purpose. First,
the request to perform (Leistungsbegehren) incorporates any measure where one party is
under a duty to perform a certain act, which the arbitral tribunal finds to be necessary. If the
343
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93
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
party is reluctant to perform there is obviously no duress, which could be used by the
tribunal. The executive power of the courts is needed.346
Secondly, the action for a modification of rights (Gestaltungsbegehren) comprises the
modification or termination of a legal relationship between the parties. A party may request
to have a certain legal aspect between the parties altered. But, on the basis of legal certainty
the decision about the legal relationship cannot be provisional but must be final. Obviously
here the court is also needed.
Thirdly, the action for a declaratory statement (Festsellungsbegehren) is also based on the
principle of legal certainty and contains the need for one party to have a certain legal issue
established by the tribunal. The tribunal declares an act or omission of one party to be
justified provisionally, pending the award. In this case the enforcement of the order is not
dependent on the court?"
When making the request for interim measures to the tribunal, the applicant must establish
its need to seek such relief (RechtsschutzbedOrfnis). This requirement is not met if the
requesting party applies for an order to the tribunal after it has already applied to the court
for such order.348 Regarding the variety of measures which may be granted, the tribunal
appears to have greater discretion than the court may have in relation to the same matter, as
the tribunal may order a measure "the arbitral tribunal may consider necessary"?" However,
it can be argued that a tribunal should also tailor the measure ordered to the measures
available from the court under §§ 916 - 945 ZPO.350This may be required by the fact that the
tribunal should bear enforceability in mind when making the order. Also, although there is no
appeal as such against the tribunal's findings, unlike interim measures ordered by a court,351
the tribunal should nevertheless bear in mind the court's statutory power to amend the
tribunal's order before enforcing it.
Before sanctioning the enforcement of interim measures ordered by the tribunal, the court
may amend the tribunal's order.352This may be necessary in cases where the tribunal chose
a measure, which is outside the measures available to the court under the ZPO. The court
will be understandably reluctant to enforce an interim measure which was ordered by a
346
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tribunal, which the court would not be able to order and enforce under the ZPO as its own
measure. Alternatively the court could merely decline to make an order to enforce the interim
measure ordered by the tribunal.
The next issue to be considered is that of security for costs. § 1041 I 2 ZPO empowers the
tribunal to "require any party to provide appropriate security in connection with such
measure". The concluding words refer to interim measures in respect of the subject matter of
the dispute, which would not include security for costS.353The ZPO does not therefore
specifically empower the tribunal to order a party to provide security for another party's costs
relating to the arbitration proceedings.
Although the ZPO is silent on this matter, one could argue that since the tribunal has the
power to conduct the proceedings in such manner as it considers appropriate.P" the tribunal
could order security for costs on that basis, where it considers it to be appropriate. The
tribunal's power is only limited by the arbitration agreement and mandatory rules of the
arbitration statute. Within the ZPO there are no such mandatory rules, which would prevent
the tribunal from ordering security for costs. However, such a restriction could exist because
of the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of 1954, which was based on the previous
Hague Convention of 1905.355
Article 17 of the Convention provides that a national of one of the signatory states, who has
his domicile in one of these states and submits a claim before a court in one of the signatory
states cannot be ordered to provide security for costs by that court. Because of the two
Conventions, security for costs has more or less disappeared from the daily life of
continental lawyers for nearly a century.356
But one may nevertheless question whether compliance with this provision, which applies to
courts, is obligatory for the arbitral tribunal, thereby preventing it from ordering security for
costs.?" This is particularly the case, where the parties have agreed in their arbitration
agreement that the tribunal should have such power. If a request for security by the
352
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respondent, in an arbitration against a claimant from a signatory country, were to be denied
on the basis of the Convention, a respondent from a non-signatory state would be in a
disadvantaged position. This is because the claimant would, if it had been the respondent,358
have been able to request an order for security for costs against its opponent, as that
opponent is from a non-signatory state.
However, one may also argue that, assuming the provision in the Convention is not binding
on the tribunal, it may not be of much use for the tribunal to order security for costs, because
the order may not be enforced, if the claimant is unwilling to provide security voluntarily. The
enforceability of interim measures ordered by the tribunal is, as discussed above, governed
by § 1041 II ZPO, which provides that a party can make a request to the court to enforce the
tribunal's order. The court may enforce the tribunal's order or, where necessary, modify the
tribunal's order before sanctioning enforcement. The modification of the tribunal's order is
permissible where the court is unable to enforce the order as made by the tribunal. It is
arguable that this must apply to the tribunal's order for security for costs. Hence, the court
cannot enforce the order because it is bound by the Convention. There is a flaw in this
argument. As explained above, the tribunal cannot order security for costs under § 1041 I
ZPO, but only under its general powers or because of a provision in the arbitration
agreement, with the result that the court's power of enforcement under § 1041 II ZPO has no
application. Moreover, because of § 1026 ZPO, corresponding to article 5 of the Model Law,
the court has no other power to intervene.
Furthermore, the tribunal's order for security for costs can arguably in any event not be
enforced by a German court, because it would offend the German ordre public. The rule
denying the court the power to order security for costs is based on the Convention of 1905
and is therefore almost as old as the ZPO itself. The rule is based on the principle that no
party to a dispute should be deprived of its right to submit a claim against an opponent,
where it is necessary for it to do so. Considering the costs of the proceedings, a claimant
could be forced to abandon its claim against the opponent if it has to provide security for the
opponent's costs.
358 The claimant would indeed become the respondent to any counter-claim brought by the original
respondent.
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4.2 Interim measures ordered by the court
Comparable to article 9 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the current German Arbitration Law §
1033 lPO confirms the ability of the courts to order interim measures in the context of
arbitration proceedings by stating:
"It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a court to grant, before or during
arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of protection relating to the subject matter of
the arbitration upon request of a party."
With this provision the possible negative effect of § 1032 I lPO regarding the jurisdiction of
the court'" is excluded as regards interim measures. Under § 1033 lPO the court has its
own inherent power to order interim measures of protection, parallel to the power of the
tribunal under § 1041 lPO.360
The power of the court to order interim measures was part of the former legislation, and was
therefore nothing new. It was however argued in the discussions preceding the new
legislation that omitting article 9 would have the effect that, in conjunction with § 1041 lPO,
especially foreign users of the new German arbitration law could think that a request to the
courts for interim measures was no longer available. Thus, this inherent power of the court
was explicitly maintained under the new law.361
As in the case of a request for interim measures to the tribunal, for a request to the court for
such measures to be admissible, the requesting party must establish its need to seek judicial
relief (RechtsschutzbedOrfnis). This need would not exist if the requesting party has already
applied for an order from the tribunal. Therefore, one could argue that a subordinate
relationship between the powers of the tribunal and those of the court to grant interim
measures is only apparent when there has been a prior request. Then the later request
would be subordinate to the earlier one, irrespective of the authority to which the first request
was made.
Contrary to that approach, Zerbe argues that the scope of interim measures which could be
ordered under § 1033 lPO flows from the relationship between § 1033 lPO and § 1041
359 § 1032 I ZPO, corresponding to article 8(1) of the Model Law, compels the court to stay court
proceedings regarding a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement if the respondent so requires,
unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed. As appears above (see n 236), article 8 was not intended to exclude the court's power to
grant interim measures in arbitration proceedings.
Geimer 1998, § 1033 NO.2
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/5274 38.
360
361
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lPO. In so far as the arbitral tribunal is able to order the measure, the tribunal is the primary
authority to order the measure. Only if the tribunal is not able to act, the court's power re-
emerges. Therefore he argues in favour of the general subordinate nature of the court's
power.362
However, the idea that the jurisdiction of the courts to grant interim measures has a general
subordinate or subsidiary character to that of the tribunal has been rejected for several
reasons, which are similar to those discussed above.?"
First, it was argued that need for interim measures is often urgent in the period before the
tribunal is constituted. Prior to its appointment, the tribunal is not able to assist. Furthermore,
one must keep in mind that the prerequisites for granting interim measures by the two
authorities are different. The court has to grant the request, if the legal situation does not
provide an alternative. Under § 1041 lPO the tribunal has a discretion whether to order
interim measures or not.364
Moreover, for the party requesting interim measures, the most important consideration may
be that the measures ordered by the tribunal may need to be enforced, whereas orders of
the court for interim measures are enforceable as such. This indicates that a direct approach
to the court may be the faster procedure.?" In the context of enforcement, the possibility of
enforcement of the tribunal's orders for interim measures is also limited to those with inter
partes effect.
The two possible interim measures which the court may grant by virtue of § 1033 lPO are,
as under the previous law, attachment (Arrestanspruch) under § 916 lPO or the (general)
provisional measure or injunction (Einstweilige VerfOgung) under § 935 lPO. With the new
German arbitration law the measures themselves have not changed, only the way of
applying them.
Attachment under § 916 lPO is available to secure prospective execution of pecuniary
claims (Geldforderungen) or claims, which can amount to pecuniary claims. The attachment
is ordered when the execution of the final judgment of the court (or award) may be
impossible or hardly possible without the requested measure.f" This is the prerequisite of
362
363
364
365
366
Zerbe 197.
See paras IV.3.1, IV.3.2 and IV.4.1 above.
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/527439.
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/5274 39.
§ 917 ZPO.
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urgency, which must be met to justify the measure. In the context of international
proceedings, the requirement of urgency is already met if the final judgment or award must
be executed in another country?"
A request for a general provisional measure (injunction) under § 935 ZPO is admissible if it
is likely that the alteration of the present situation will either enable the requesting party to
enforce its rights regarding the subject matter or prevent such enforcement. The court
thereby has a wide discretion to grant the measure, which it considers appropriate. This may
also include an order to the reluctant party to act or to refrain from acting under certain
circumstances.
In conclusion, the requesting party will have to consider carefully which authority it will
approach for the required interim measures, bearing in mind factors like the measures
available from the relevant authority, the time factor and the need for enforceability.
5. Comparison
The new arbitration law in Germany and the legislation proposed for South Africa by the Law
Commission differ in important respects on the question of interim measures, but only on
points of detail. This is most obvious regarding the effect of the different legal traditions of
Germany and South Africa regarding security for costs. In this respect, it is proposed that the
South African state and its courts should be virtually excluded from the question of security
for costs368 and that the issue should be left to the arbitral tribunal, subject to restrictions
which may be imposed by the parties in their arbitration agreement. The main influence on
the Law Commission's thinking in this regard was the reaction to the English Ken-Ren
decision. Court involvement on this question can seriously disrupt the arbitration process.
The possibility of German courts ordering security for costs in arbitration proceedings is
prohibited by article 17 of the Hague Convention. As discussed above, this provision will also
preclude court assistance for the enforcement of an order of security for costs ordered by the
tribunal, to the extent the tribunal may have such power. The primary method proposed to
encourage compliance with an order for security for costs by a tribunal in a domestic
367
368
§ 91711 ZPO.
In domestic arbitration, assistance by the taxing master of the court to give substance to the tribunal's
directions must still be given in certain circumstances. See s 31(4) of the Draft Arbitration Bill and para
IV.3.3.2.2 above. It is also conceivable that a tribunal's award in both intemational and domestic
arbitration proceedings could be reviewed by the court in certain circumstances because of a lack of due
process in the tribunal's handling of an application for security for costs.
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arbitration in South Africa is a provision that the tribunal may stay the arbitration
proceedings, pending compliance by the claimant with its order.369
A key issue in the context of interim measures ordered by the arbitral tribunal is that of
enforcement in the absence of voluntary compliance. Both Germany, and the South African
Law Commission, in the context of international arbitration, therefore made specific provision
for court assistance in the enforcement of such measures, but the mechanisms differ. The
proposed South African approach is that, providing the tribunal's order complies with the
formal requirements for an award in article 31 of the Model Law, the order can be enforced
under article 35 as if it was an award, subject to the defences in article 36.370 The South
African approach has both advantages and disadvantages. One of the main advantages of
arbitration for international commercial disputes is that an award made in one country will be
readily enforceable in another country, if the latter is a party to the New York Convention. As
pointed out above, it is not the intention to turn an order by the tribunal for interim measures
into an award to facilitate enforcement outside South Africa.371 The purpose of the provision
is to expedite court assistance inside South Africa. The South African court has the
discretion to refuse enforcement only if one of the grounds for refusing enforcement of an
award in article 36 is established. However, a disadvantage of the proposed approach is that
a tribunal, which wants to keep open the possibility of court assistance for the enforcement
of its order for interim measures, will have to comply with the formalities of article 31,
particularly the giving of reasons. Moreover, if the tribunal exceeds its powers to grant
interim measures under article 17, the court will be entitled to refuse enforcement under
article 36.372 There is also no power for the court to adjust the tribunal's order before
ordering enforcement. This could result in tribunals in international arbitrations in South
Africa being less flexible when ordering interim measures than their German counterparts.
Apart from the apparently wide statutory discretion given by § 1041 I ZPO to the tribunal, §
1041 II ZPO, as discussed above, empowers the court to recast the tribunal's order when
requested to enforce it.373 It is possible that these factors will encourage German arbitrators
to adopt a more innovative approach when ordering interim measures. This is more in
keeping with the spirit of arbitration as a truly flexible alternative to litigation. A possible gap
in the South African Law Commission's proposals for domestic arbitration is the absence of
369
370
371
372
See s 31 (2) of the Draft Arbitration Bill.
See the Draft International Arbitration Bill sch 1 article 17(3) and para IV.3.3.2.1 above.
See para IV.3.3.2.1 above.
Compare article 36(1 )(a)(iii). lack of due process leading to substantial injustice in granting the interim
measures will also be a ground for refusing enforcement. See article 36(3)(a) in the Draft International
Arbitration Bill, which is a proposed South African clarification of the original text of the Model law.
See para IV.4.1 above.373
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court assistance for the enforcement of interim measures ordered by a tribunal in a domestic
arbitration.F"
In regard to requests for court orders on interim measures, both the current German
provisions and, more explicitly, the proposed provisions on interim measures for international
and domestic arbitration in South Africa375 set out to encourage the use of the tribunal rather
than the court, where possible. This is in line with the general international trend of avoiding
unnecessary court involvement in the arbitration process. The reasons in this context are,
first, as mentioned previously, a court decision on interim measures may involve the court in
considering the merits of the dispute, which is more properly a matter for the tribunal in its
award. Secondly, the factors on which national courts base their decisions on interim
measures, may differ from factors considered material by an arbitral tribunal, particularly in
an international arbitration. Nevertheless, in both jurisdictions it is accepted that appropriate
interim measures from the court can playa crucial role in the right circumstances.?"
Certainly in the light of the temptation for a party to use requests for interim measures as a
delaying tactic, the tribunal must be considered as the more appropriate authority to handle
disruptions of this kind. The tribunal will usually be more familiar with the circumstances of
the case and possibly have a better feel for a party's hidden agenda. The tribunal's
background knowledge of the case and more informal procedures will also often facilitate a
more expeditious ruling on requests for interim measures.
374
375
See para IV.3.3.2.2 above at n 278.
See the Draft International Arbitration Bill sch 1 article 9(3) and the Draft Arbitration Bill s 40(2), which
are virtually identical.
In a South African context, ex parte applications to court for the preservation of evidence or an anti-
dissipation interdict are obvious examples.
376
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Chapter Three
Practical measures by the arbitral tribunal
I. Introduction
In the previous two chapters of this thesis the reasons why Germany adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law for both international and domestic arbitration and the South
African Law Commission recommended that it should have a major role in South
African arbitration law were discussed. The approaches in the two jurisdictions to
certain more specific issues of arbitration law were considered and evaluated. The
reduction in court interference in the arbitral process in South Africa proposed by the
Law Commission was also investigated. Moreover, the extent to which a foundation
has been laid by improved legislation to reduce the use of delaying tactics prior to the
award was examined.'
Upon analysis, it appears that Germany and South Africa have sometimes the same
and sometimes different approaches to the same legal problem regarding arbitration.
At the end of the day improved arbitration legislation is however only one of the
requirements for effective arbitration in practice. The question therefore remains as to
how the parties to the arbitration, their legal representatives and especially the
arbitral tribunal itself should deal with the problem of ensuring that the arbitral
procedure is efficient."
Even in a jurisdiction in which the arbitration law is not based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law, the obstacles during the arbitration process are similar, as they are
sometimes more closely connected not to arbitration law itself, but to the parties
using that law. Many authors have stated that arbitration practice is recently
developing in a potentially fatal direction and this development must be reversed." To
see how this can be done and the defects can be cured one should refer back to the
roots from which arbitration evolved."
2
3
See eh 2 para II above.
Compare eh 1 n 15 above.
See generally eh 1 para 2 above.
See Hunter (1997) 13 Arbitration /nternationa/346, with reference to the philosophy underlying
the English Arbitration Act of 1996.
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It has been said, that the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of
disputes by an independent and impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or
expense." Arbitration grew out of the desire of commercial persons to have
commercially viable dispute resolution procedures, which could cope particularly with
I
those disputes, for which national courts were sometimes unsuitable. In the earlier
days of arbitration, the parties in dispute would often have represented themselves,
without the assistance of lawyers." But, over the years, the arbitration process has
been "hijacked" by lawyers.' Now arbitrations may often not turn out as was expected
and afterwards the parties who "have embarked upon arbitration emerge sadder,
wiser and poorer people"." A former chief justice of the United States, Warren
Burger, has said:
"The obligation of the legal profession is, or has long been thought to be, to
serve as healers of human conflicts. To fulfil that traditional obligation means
that there should be mechanisms that can produce an acceptable result in the
shortest possible time, with the least possible expense and with a minimum of
stress on the participants. That is what justice is all about."?
The aim of arbitration, to be considered efficient, is therefore for the arbitration
process to be completed in a short time with a minimum of costs. This closes the
circle since this is where arbitration once came from and to where it should be
brought back. The efficiency of the arbitration process is clearly essential to the
viability of arbitration and it is the efficiency of the procedure used in the arbitration,
which ultimately determines whether arbitration remains viable compared to
alternative means of dispute resolution.'? Furthermore, it is suggested, that the future
viability of arbitration as a dispute resolution process depends on the continuing
development of efficient and innovative procedures." A key factor may be the extent
5 Compare the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 1(a) and the Draft Arbitration Bill of the SA Law
Commission for domestic arbitration s 2(a). Whereas the former refers only to an "impartial
tribunal", the latter, under the influence of article 18 of the Model Law, requires the tribunal to
be both independent and impartial.
Compare Mustill1993 10(4) J of Int Arb 122-123.
See Croall "Cost Effective Arbitration: Meeting the User's Needs" (1998) 64 Arbitration 34 at
39.
Harman quoted by Uff (1993) 59 Arbitration 31.
Burger "Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice" (1985) 40(4) The Arbitration Journal 3; Butler
(1994) 6 SA Merc LJ 270.
Uff "The Bill Tompkins Memorial Lecture 1994, Guernsey 9 September 1994" (1995) 61
Arbitration 18; Croall 34.
In this context there can be a benficial interaction between new arbitration procedures and
improved procedures used in the courts. See e.g. Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 256, 268 and
284 regarding the use of innovations in the practice of the Official Referees' Courts in England
to cure defects inherent in the traditional adversarial process in arbitration practice. See also
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 19.
6
7
8
9
10
11
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to which the arbitral tribunal can impose procedures on the parties against the their
wishes and those of their legal advisers."
The main current criticism of arbitration is that this aim is far from being achieved.
Arbitrators and the parties' representatives (whether lawyers or lay advocates) in
South Africa rest comfortably in an adversarial system, which mirrors the practice in
the courts. Lane refers to this as the "sit back and let it happen" syndrome, which
includes all the disadvantages of litigation in the courts and none of the advantages
of arbitration. He concludes that it allows arbitration by ambush and encourages the
"win syndrome" rather than dispute resolution."
What must be changed? First, one may start with the role of the arbitral tribunal in the
arbitration process. The arbitral tribunal has a crucial role to play in the arbitration
and must exercise its procedural powers in a flexible, and perhaps more importantly,
robust way to ensure that the arbitration will proceed in an expeditious and cost-
effective manner." In this context, one must distinguish the powers of the tribunal
from its duties.
The duties define the minimum, which the tribunal itself must do whereas the powers
define the maximum, which it can compel the parties to do. The powers of the
tribunal, unlike its duties, are discretionary, for example, it has the discretionary
power to order discovery without being obliged to do SO.15 Lane, however, complains
that there is amongst arbitrators a lack of leadership qualities, which are urgently
needed to dictate to the parties that the tribunal is in control of the proceedings and
will remain in control of them. 16
Regarding the tribunal's powers it had been said that the arbitrator is the master of
the procedure to be followed, but these powers are subject to certain limitations.
These are first the terms of the arbitration agreement, secondly the provisions of the
applicable arbitration statute and thirdly the obligation to observe the rules of natural
12
13
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 19. See also the discussion in para 11.1below.
Lane, P M M "Address to the Association of Arbitrators: (Southern Africa) Cost Effective
Arbitration" (1997) 63 Arbitration 5; Lew (1999) 65 Arbitration 284.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 257; Uff (1993) 59 Arbitration 31. See also Goode 14; Lew (1999)
65 Arbitration 284.
Mustill & Boyd 291-292.
Lane 5.
14
15
16
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justtce." But, within these limitations the arbitral tribunal is free to design the
arbitration procedure in the way which it considers will best achieve the efficient
resolution of the dispute, and it should do so. To achieve the aim of having resolute
and strong arbitrators who are capable of dealing with reluctant parties, arbitrators
must be skilled in the practice of arbitration and even where they have some
knowledge in this regard, arbitrators should continue to increase their learnlnq."
The second source of improved arbitration practice is through the contribution of the
parties' lawyers, first regarding the drafting of a truly appropriate arbitration
agreement and secondly during the actual arbitration proceedinqs." The attorneys
ought moreover to feel obliged to explain to their respective clients what options are
open to them for resolving the kinds of dispute likely to arise from their agreement. In
particular they should consider whether the parties should have the option or even be
compelled to use ADR20 before resorting to arbitration, where this could result in a
more cost-effective and expeditious resolution of the dispute."
Goode observes that most disputes involve a breakdown in relationships.
Nevertheless, the whole focus of attention in the drafting of contractual dispute
resolution clauses tends to be on the dispute rather than on the relationship. He asks
correctly:
"If prevention is better than cure, why is so little thought given to working out in
advance procedures designed to give early warning of trouble and to avoid a
breakdown of a relationship which may have endured for several years and in
which a huge amount of time, expense and personal commitment have been
invested? And is it not curious that in the typical dispute resolution clause the
parties bind themselves in advance to a single mode of binding dispute
determination without at that stage having the slightest idea what will be the
underlying causes of the dispute or what form it will take?,,22
Contracts are often drafted from standard forms, which contain "safe" dispute
resolution clauses." But the safe option is, however, not always the best one. The
17 Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 258 citing Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South
India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909 (HL) at 985, per Lord Diploek; Anshell v Horwitz
1916 WLD 65 at 67.
Lane 6. See also para 11.2below.
See Croall 34, 38-39.
See eh 1 n 13 above for the definition of ADR.
Croa1l34.
Goode 10-11.
Croall35.
18
19
20
21
22
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attorney's primary role in relation to drafting the dispute resolution clause should be
to ensure that the correct choices are made, including as mentioned above, the
desirability of making appropriate provision for ADR.24 This may also involve
changing the whole culture of dispute resolution from aggression to conciliation and
cooperation."
To justify the need to guide the current arbitration culture back to former customs
some of the often stated advantages of arbitration compared to both ADR and
litigation may be recalled here. First, arbitration is a procedure by which disputes can
be finally resolved, subject only to the possibility of subsequent judicial review on
limited grounds. ADR with all its different advantages does not insure finality as the
resolution of the dispute by ADR generally requires the agreement of the parties."
But notwithstanding this lack of finality, within a modern approach to dispute
resolution one should always understand arbitration within a context of further or
previous application of various ADR measures, such as mediation or conctllatlon."
Moreover, by improving the efficiency and speed of the arbitration proceedings, the
disputing parties may make more determined efforts to get a solution of their dispute
through mediation. Otherwise the parties might find themselves in an arbitration with
the prospect of an imposed solution, because of their failure to take the mediation
seriously." And in most cases the arbitration proceedings will cost much more than
mediation because of the different nature of the two procedures. The prospect of a
successful mediation may even be enhanced where, in the arbitration proceedings,
the arbitrator is authorised to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable oompositeur."
Moreover, the modern arbitrator needs to be prepared actively to promote settlement.
While in German courts, for example, it is a duty of the judge to attempt settlement
before the opening of the trial and during the trial, mediation cannot be part of the
judicial process in England.30 The South African Law Commission wishes to
24
25
26
27
Croall35.
Goode12.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 254.
Although attempts are sometimes made to distinguish between mediation and conciliation, the
better view is that there is no fundamental difference between the two concepts; see Butler &
Finsen 10-11.
Compare Donaldson 104.
Goode 15. The parties must normally make express provision for this possibility (see e.g.
article 28(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law). However, at least in ICC arbitrations little use is
apparently made of this power. Of the 541 requests for arbitration filed with the ICC in 2000,
only one explicitly authorised the arbitrator to act as amiable compositeur. See "2000
Statistical Report" (2001) 12(1) ICC ICArb BullS.
Hermann ''The Draft English Bill: Pulling the Wrong Punches" (1994) 10 Arbitration
Internationa/185 at 186. See also SA LawCommission Report Domestic Arbitration 47-48 and
the authorities cited. It should be noted that the powers of the German judge to settle the
28
29
30
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encourage the use of mediation prior to arbitration. It was however, fully aware of the
dangers of the same person acting as mediator and then as arbitrator, particularly the
perceived and actual effect on the arbitrator's impartiality. It therefore recommends
that such a possibility requires the agreement of the parties and other appropriate
safequards."
More important than the first advantage in the context of effective dispute resolution
is the second. Arbitration, compared to the courts, is subject to very few mandatory
rules and is able to offer almost limitless flexibility. This flexibility extends to the
choice of the tribunal, which may be selected for its expertise in the subject-matter of
the dispute. There is a long tradition of technical arbitrators, particularly in the
construction field, using and applying their own expertise, despite the occasional
setback." The flexibility of the arbitration process is the single most cogent and most
important advantage claimed for arbitration over litiqation." It makes tailor-made
procedures for every particular case and every dispute possible. As the arbitrator is
in principle "master of the procedure?" the goal of a flexible and efficient procedure
may be achieved in theory by appointing a sole arbitrator pursuant to a private
arbitration agreement, which does not specify expressly or by reference any
particular procedural rules. The arbitrator is of course required to observe the
requirements of due precess." In practice, a more detailed arbitration clause is
however desirable."
Thirdly, because of the above-mentioned benefit of flexibility, the arbitration process
is possibly able, in the context of international disputes, to offer procedures for the
resolution of disputes not available in any individual state court. The arbitrator may
have even wider powers than a judge by virtue of the express or implied terms of the
31
dispute do not extend to one of the usual powers of the mediator, namely that of being able to
meet separately with the parties.
See SA Law Commission Report Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for South Africa
40-43 and ss 11 and 12 of the Draft International Arbitration Bill; SA Law Commission Report
Domestic Arbitration 47-48 and the Draft Arbitration Bill ss 14 and 15. A more detailed
discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 20.
Thesen "Preliminary Matters (1)" (1987) 53 Arbitration 16.
See n 17 above.
Compare the UNCITRALModel Law article 19(2), read with articles 18 and 24. Lord Diploek in
Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981]
AC 909 at 985 refers in this regard to "the rules of natural justice" but the terms in this context
may be regarded as synonymous.
See e.g. Croall 35-38, regarding the desirability of an informed choice between ad hoc and
institutional arbitration; if the institutional route is chosen, the careful selection of the institution;
and choices regarding the composition of the tribunal and the place of arbitration, which
determines the law governing the arbitration procedure. Modern institutional rules do not
32
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arbitration aqreernent." The tribunal could decide that it should read the documents
pertaining to the case thoroughly prior to the relevant stage of the oral hearing. This
pre-reading covers not only the pleadings and bundles of documents, but also
witness statements, expert reports and full written submissions and arguments
including legal cltatlons." This use of documents could also extend to a further
possible advantage of arbitration over litigation in the context of oral proceedings.
Traditionally under the common law, litigation must be conducted orally and in open
court except where rules otherwise provide. The arbitrator is entitled to rule on the
length of the oral hearing and, may, subject to applicable rules and legislation, even
direct that no oral hearing is necessary."
Fourthly as the cumulative result of the second and third advantages referred to
above, arbitration proceedings can be cost-effective. The cost-effectiveness of
arbitration, particularly in the context of domestic arbitration, may be the reason in
some cases why the parties initially chose arbitration in preference to the national
courts. But as shown earlier, arbitration all too often is as adversarial as litigation and
is merely litigation in a somewhat more relaxed torm." Moreover, in some cases
arbitration is consensual only in a technical sense, because frequently parties accept
arbitration because it is in a trade association contract form." And, far from being
cheaper than litigation, arbitration is often more expensive because of the need to
pay travel expenses, hire a room for the hearing and to pay the tribunal's and arbitral
institution's fees and expenses. While many arbitrations are conducted speedily,
others, especially in construction disputes, can drag on interminably." thereby
adding to the expense.
Although the arbitrator is the master of procedure in cases where nothing is agreed
between the parties, one could apparently expect the parties' attorneys to advise
37
38
however impose major restrictions on the trbunal's freedom to determine procedure, unless the
parties otherwise agree (see the LCIA Rules article 14.1 and ICC Rules article 15.1).
Uff (1993) 49 Arbitration 31.
Uff (1993) 49 Arbitration 32 and 35; Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 20. Uff is nevertheless a strong
advocate of dividing the oral hearing into logical phases, which may not always be appropriate
in an international arbitration.
See further on documents-only arbitrations para 11.8below. Although the tribunal is entitled to
dispense with an oral hearing under the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 34(2)(e) and (h)
unless the parties otherwise agree, under the Model Law article 24(1) a party is entitled to
require that an oral hearing be held unless the parties have agreed on a documents-only
arbitration.
See the text at n 13 above.
Goode 9.
Goode 9.
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their clients on the right option and procedures to choose." Uff however asks
whether the parties' legal representatives can reasonably be expected to devise and
adopt cost-effective procedures and answers this question in the neqative." The first
reason is that the lawyers have a primary duty to protect their clients' interests, and
that means that they will seek to retain any procedure that might be used to the
advantage of their particular client. Particularly from the perspective of the
respondent's lawyer, this could include delaying tactics and increasing costs to put
pressure on the claimant. Secondly, most lawyers are familiar with the High Court
procedure and will have little experience in cost-saving procedures." It must
therefore be the arbitral tribunal, that should seek to achieve the advantages of
arbitration by imposing measures to save costs and avoid unnecessary delay.
In this last chapter possible measures to counter the sort of delaying tactics which a
party (particularly the claimant) or an arbitrator may typically expect when entering
upon an arbitration," will be discussed. The focus is on factors which are crucial to
the efficiency of the arbitration. These include the abilities required of the arbitrators
and whether they necessarily need to be lawyers;" the use of an "inquisitorial" or
interventionist approach by the tribunal:" the need for preliminary rneetinqs;" the
preparation for and conduct of the hearing50 and some of the advantages and
disadvantages of "documents-only" arbitrations."
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
See Croall 34-35.
Uff (1993) 59 Arbitration 33. See also Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 263,269-272.
Uff (1993) 59 Arbitration 33.
See generally Harris (1992) 9(2) J of Int Arb 87-95, discussed in eh 1 para II above.
See para 11.2 below.
See para 11.3 below.
See para 11.4 below.
See paras 11.6 and 11.7 below.
See para 11.8below.
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II. Measures against delay
When considering likely delaying tactics and the measures which can be employed
against them, it must be mentioned at the outset that not every delaying tactic can be
applied in every arbitration. Moreover, the potential countermeasures will not
necessarily be available in the context of a particular arbitration. For example the
failure to respond to communications and the refusal to appoint an arbitrator" is
certainly more problematic in an ad hoc arbitration'" than in proceedings under the
umbrella of an arbitral institution such as the ICC or LCIA.
The ICC for example requires a response to the request for arbitration to be made
within thirty days of the receipt of such a request." The rules provide for the
arbitration to continue in the event of the failure or refusal of the respondent to
reply.55The rules also deal with a "refusal" by a party to take part in the drawing up of
or to sign the terms of reference.56 However, in practice the ICC takes great efforts to
persuade the absent party to join the arbitration process, even in a later stage of the
proceedings, which itself can be a time-consuming process. 57As a result, refusal or
failure to co-operate does cause some delay. Moreover, neither the arbitral institution
nor the arbitral tribunal itself can side-step these rules, since this would endanger the
enforceability of the final award. However, since the arbitration is created by the
agreement of the parties, the powers of the arbitral tribunal flow from that agreement.
By agreeing to a system of rules, which expressly empowers the tribunal to proceed
to an award in the absence of one of the parties, this absent party cannot later
successfully claim that the tribunal exceeded its powers by using the default
procedure, so as to endanger the award."
Regarding the challenge of an arbitrator, one must concede that it will almost
certainly lead to some delay. But the possibility of the respondent to challenge the
arbitrator in order to avoid the whole arbitration proceedings is again limited. In a
52
53
54
55
56
57
Harris (1992) 9(2) J of Int Arb 88.
See ch 1 n 57 above for the meaning of an ad hoc arbitration.
ICC Rules article 5.1.
Article 6.3, which also applies to a failure or refusal by the claimant.
Article 18(3).
Donahey "Defending the Arbitration against Sabotage" (1996) 13(1) J of Int Arb 93 at 97. The
article refers to the previous edition of the ICC Rules. An example in support of the statement
in the text appears in article 18(3) of the current rules, which only permits the ICC Court to
approve the terms of reference where a party has refused to take part in drawing up the terms
or to sign them. In practice, the tribunal will normally ensure that the respondent has a
reasonable opportunity to sign the terms before they are submitted to the ICC Court. A failure
to respond will then be treated as a refusal. See Derains & Schwartz 244-245.
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study of ICC arbitrations regarding the challenge of arbitrators it was shown that
where the challenge, based on an alleged lack of independence, was raised prior to
appointment or confirmation of the arbitrator, the arbitrator was not confirmed or
appointed in 72% of the cases." In contrast, the challenge of an arbitrator on the
same basis following appointment or confirmation was successful in only 9% of the
cases."
Challenges after appointment remain one of the most frequently usedweapons in the
"arbitral saboteur's arsenal".61 Arbitration institutions examine such belated
challenges carefully, requiring a far stronger showing of lack of independence and a
strong reason why the challenge could not have been made earlier. Thus, the
effectiveness of this tactic has been considerably reduced."
Generally one can imagine that all the delaying tactics mentioned by Harris'" could
be attempted. Regarding delaying tactics after the appointment of the tribunal and
prior to the award, their chances of success in causing substantial delay, thereby
achieving the respondent's object, will be significantly greater where a weak or
inexperienced arbitrator is in charge of the case. Compared to litigation, the
respondent in an arbitration before a weak arbitrator can regrettably indulge in blatant
delaying tactics, with a resulting increase of costs, which would not be tolerated by a
judge.54
1. The arbitrator as master of the procedure'"
It is up to the arbitral tribunal to choose the right procedure for the particular
arbitration in order to oppose delaying tactics and ensure a suitable and speedy
arbitration process. The tribunal may be given wide freedom by the arbitration
agreement for this purpose and it is not necessary for the tribunal to follow the
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Donahey 97.
In terms of article 5(1)(d) of the current ICC Rules the respondent can comment on the
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for arbitration.
Donahey 104.
Donahey 104.
Compare too the position under the LCIA Rules. In terms of articles 5.5 and 7, al/ arbitrators
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procedure of the High Courts. Even in England the law never required this and it was
merely the English legal profession, which transformed the originally informal
arbitrations by businesspersons or technical experts into "wig less litigation".66
Nevertheless, the tendency to follow court procedure resulted in English and South
African arbitration practice being infected by what have been called "the three
English diseases". These consist of uninformative pleadings, the abuse of the
procedure for the discovery of documents and an excessive reliance on oral
proceedinqs."
The effect of the legal profession on the arbitration process has been described as
follows:
"Now the law has come to be recognised as a vehicle for winning cases.
Lawyers use legal argument before an arbitrator to overcome the technical
shortcomings of their client's case. Expert witnesses write long reports,
frequently based on disputed facts. The full disclosure of documents, relevant
and irrelevant, is commonplace. Lawyers indulge in protracted openings, and
arbitration has become a mirror of court procedure, with the consequent
increase in costs. It is not surprising that there is now an increasing advocacy for
mediation and conciliation as means of settling disputes.t'"
Even assuming a general obligation to follow the adversarial procedure, a strict
compliance with the High Court procedures would not be necessary. The courts have
emphasised that arbitrators are the masters of their own procedure and if this
proposition has any meaning at all it must permit sensible and fair adaptations of
traditional adversarial procedures." Moreover, even where the parties do not agree
on a set of arbitration rules, the arbitral tribunal has the power to continue the
proceedings and determine how the case will be conducted." subject to the law of
the place of arbitration. The English Arbitration Act of 1996 goes further by imposing
a new duty on the tribunal. Section 33 (1)(b) requires the tribunal to adopt procedures
suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or
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expense." Section 34, dealing with the powers of the tribunal, commences with the
proposition that it shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential
matters, "subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter". It is therefore highly
doubtful whether section 34, even when read with section 33(1 )(b), gives the tribunal
the "last word" on procedural matters, and if so, whether this is can be reconciled
with the basic principle of party autonomy.
To answer this, one must acknowledge that the parties can, at any stage of the
arbitration, dismiss the tribunal and start a new arbitration." The apparent
inconsistency between party autonomy and the duty of the arbitral tribunal to provide
an effective arbitration may be resolved in English law (and under the Model Law) by
the fact that the tribunal is free to resign.73
But neither the dismissal of the tribunal nor its resignation from office seems to be an
appropriate tool to ensure an efficient arbitration, since it may force the parties to
start all over aqain." In such circumstances, it may well be asked to what extent the
tribunal and the parties can afford a disagreement upon the procedure and how far
the tribunal can dictate the procedure to be adopted against the wishes of the parties.
One view is based on the premise that the arbitration is consensual and the arbitrator
is bound by anything the parties agree upon. These agreements between the parties
can certainly include procedural steps and measures about how the arbitration
should be conducted." Arbitrators are obliged in terms of their own agreements with
the parties to comply with all the terms of the arbitration agreement. This is logical as
the terms of the arbitration agreement form the basis of the arbitrators' jurisdiction.
Although the agreement between an arbitrator and the parties is separate from the
71 See also the LCIA Rules (designed to apply under any system of national arbitration law
chosen by the parties) article 14(1)(ii), which imposes an identical duty. A similar duty on the
tribunal has been proposed by the SA Law Commission for domestic arbitration in South Africa;
see the Draft Arbitration Bill s 28(1)(b).
Hunter 347.
Hunter 347. This is implicit in s 25, which empowers the court to regulate the financial
consequences of the tribunal's resignation. See too Butler (1998) 9 Stell LR 17 and article 15
of the Model Law.
Compare s 27 of the English Arbitration Act, which in the absence of an agreement between
the parties allows the reconstituted tribunal to decide whether the previous proceedings (e.g.
written submissions and oral evidence) should stand. The position is in effect the same under
the UNCITRAL Model Law. See article 15 read with article 19 and Holtzmann & Neuhaus 466.
See Steyn (1994) 10 Arbitration /ntemationa/10: "The principle of party autonomy requires the
tribunal to respect any agreement of the parties whenever it may be concluded and however
informal it may be." Steyn's basic premise regarding the supremacy of party autonomy finds
support in the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 34(1). However, an agreement between the
parties to vary the arbitration agreement during the course of the arbitration to restrict the
arbitrator's powers would now have to be in writing to be effective (see s 5(1».
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arbitration agreement, it is subject to the terms of the arbitration aqreernent." It is
furthermore possible to argue that, absent a contrary intention, the separate
agreement is subject to the arbitration agreement between the parties as the latter
agreement may be varied from time to time.
The other view questions how far an agreement between the parties is binding on the
arbitral tribunal as regards the extent of its procedural powers. The arbitration
agreement itself could include a general provision that the arbitration should be
conducted under a certain set of rules, which would grant the arbitrator a wide
discretion about procedural matters. Uff contends, however, that the consensual
basis of arbitration means only that the parties must initially agree to arbitration as
the way to resolve their dispute." He asks why should it be supposed that if the
parties agree informally upon a particular mode of procedure and so inform the
arbitral tribunal, it should necessarily be bound?" He leaves the question
unanswered as to what should be understood by "informal". Certainly an informal
agreement does not refer to an agreement "in writing", hence writing is not in
principle a prerequisite for the validity of this aqreement." Thus any valid agreement
between the parties, whether formal or not, about procedure should be binding upon
the arbitrator. Uff,80to demonstrate the limits of the effect of the parties' consent upon
the powers and duties of the arbitrator, uses the example of two parties both
becoming insolvent during the arbitration. They agreed on a procedure in terms of
which the respondent would not offer any defence, which procedure was intended to
result in an award in favour of the claimant. The arbitrator suspected that the purpose
of the agreement was to obtain an award to be used to deceive a third party. The
arbitrator refused to co-operate so the arbitration lapsed. Modern arbitration statutes
deal with this situation by providing for an "award on agreed terms"."
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safeguards are intended to protect the arbitrator against being compelled to issue what
appears to be an ordinary award obtained in the usual way which is then used to deceive a
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It is doubtful on the facts stated by Uff whether the arbitrator could have been
compelled to give an award on the lines of the parties' agreement. The arbitrator
could also have resigned. Either way, the example does not provide a sufficient basis
to support a general proposition that an arbitrator is entitled to ignore agreements
between the parties on matters of procedure.
Uff also asks whether the arbitrator is bound by party agreements about procedural
matters, should the parties formally change these procedural rules midway.82 He
contends that the agreement binds the parties, but not the arbitrator. If the arbitrator
does not agree to the new rules, that arbitrator is only bound by the rules initially
agreed on. "Common sense suggests that he could not be bound without further
agreement, in default of which the parties would have to seek to agree to replace the
arbitrator. ,,83
It is submitted that the former view based on the supremacy of party autonomy is
preferable and it is now clearly the view accepted by the English legislature. If the
tribunal cannot persuade the parties to conduct the arbitration under its rules, it
cannot ignore the party's agreement, but must either follow the rules the parties have
agreed on, or resign.84 In practice, agreements between the parties, which make it
impossible for the tribunal to act effectively, are not likely to occur often. It makes no
sense for the parties to appoint an arbitral tribunal, partly on the basis of its skill and
experience in the conduct of arbitrations, and then to deny it a substantial say in how
the proceedings are to be conducted."
2. The professional background of the arbitrator
Regarding the appointment of the arbitrator, the parties may ask what other
qualifications the arbitrator should possess apart from "leadership qualities"? An
often suggested quality of an arbitrator is expertise in the field of the subject-matter in
dispute." This implies that the arbitrator will not be a full-time arbitrator, but rather
conducts arbitration on a part-time basis. The advantage of a part-time arbitrator can
82 Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 24. Uff supports his contention with some extreme examples, such as
an agreement to change the language of the proceedings to one which the arbitrator does not
speak, or a change of venue.
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 24.
See the DAC (Saville) Report para 96; Butler (1998) 9 Stell LR 17.
Butler (1998) 9 Steil LR 17.
Butler & Finsen 74, writing in the context of domestic arbitrations. Compare Refern & Hunter (3
ed) 205-206 for the view that in international commercial arbitrations with a sole arbitrator, it is
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be that the expertise of the professional may not be maintained if the arbitrator
deserts the field of his or her profession and becomes a full-time arbitrator."
Also in some technical fields the subject-matter of the dispute will require a fair
amount of specialised knowledge. The fact that the basis of the arbitrator's expertise
is in the same technical field may be helpful, since it will not be necessary to explain
basic principles underlying the facts in dispute. Additionally, the appointment of a
"technical arbitrator" will be advantageous where the dispute is concerned only with
technical issues, like whether the right quality of goods were supplied, where
important procedural or legal issues are unlikely to artse." In these cases, an
arbitrator who bases his or her knowledge on legal education more than on technical
expertise would be inappropriate, since it would be necessary in addition to call
experts on the technical questions in dispute. If the arbitral tribunal has the required
technical expertise, it may warn the parties that it may disallow the cost of any
experts which it finds to be unnecessary having regard to its own expernse."
Finally it is necessary to stress that the arbitrator, whether from a legal or technical
background, should be experienced in the law and practice of arbitration, particularly
in an international context." It is also vital in the interests of effective arbitration that
the arbitrator keep abreast of the latest developments in arbitration law and
practice."
3. The "inquisitorial" or interventionist approach
Regardless of whether the arbitrator is a lawyer or a "technical arbitrator", several
authors have demanded for many years that the style of arbitration proceedings must
move away from the English adversarial approach." towards "inquisitorial" forms of
proceedings. Already in 1980 Sir Michael Kerr wrote that arbitrators
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Lane 6.
Under the adversarial system, the role of the judge or arbitrator is traditionally reduced to sitting
and ruling on disputed questions as they arise from the presentation of facts by the parties and
granting measures properly requested by a party. The adjudicator's function is therefore to
decide the dispute on the information presented by the parties. See Borris "Common Law and
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"should not allow themselves to be dominated by English procedures. In long
and complex cases the Continental inquisitorial [court] procedure is often more
effective than our adversary system. It is often better for the tribunal to limit
discovery in the first instance, to appoint its own experts, and then to exercise
control over the volume of discovery and the witnesses whom it wants to hear.
Our arbitrators will have to be more imaginative than to follow the mirror-image
of the procedure in our courts.?"
The question must be asked as to what is meant by "inquisitorial"? It has been said
that "[under] the inquisitorial system the judge conducts his own enquiries into the
factual and legal issues, with the assistance of the parties and their lawyers".94 The
role of the adjudicator under the procedure used in civil proceedings in the countries
of Western Europe is however not truly inquisitorial in this sense but merely more
interventionist than that under the adversarial system. It is still up to the parties to
present all the facts in support of their respective cases to the adjudicator. The
adjudicator will however assume a more active role in questioning witnesses and
may possibly indicate during the hearing if facts have not been proved to the
adjudicator's satisfaction, while being careful to avoid creating an impression of
partiality by helping one of the parties."
The term "inquisitorial" when used by advocates of the reform of arbitration practice
therefore often simply means "intervention by the arbitrator and, to a degree,
direction of the course of the proceedings given that they will still be conducted on
the basis of each party presenting its case"." In this context the tribunal must
carefully inquire how far it may intervene in the process, to avoid non-compliance
with the requirements of due process, thereby imperilling the enforceability of the
award. It is submitted that a return to the "inquisitorial" or interventionist approach
formerly used by "technical arbitrators" could result in a renaissance of the
understanding of arbitration as a truly alternative way of dispute resolution by an
independent tribunal, as opposed to privatised litigation using the High Court
procedure.
93 Kerr "International Arbitration v Litigation" 1980 Journal of Business Law 164 at 180, quoted by
Steyn (1983) 48 Arbitration 310.
See Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 282.
See Borris 79; Butler & Finsen 168.
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 23.
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Regarding the extent of the arbitral tribunal's powers under the new English
Arbitration Act of 1996, Hunter refers to section 34(1 )(g), which, unless the parties
otherwise agree, empowers the tribunal to decide "whether and to what extent the
tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law".97 He
concludes correctly that this provision confirms the power of the tribunal to act
inquisitorially in the true sense of that term, which was according to some authorities
only possible under the old legislation if expressly so agreed by the parties." Hunter
is nevertheless of the view that this power is unlikely to be exercised in practice
where the parties are represented by lawyers.
The power to conduct the arbitration in an interventionist or inquisitorial manner may
be regarded as an important tool for the tribunal to ensure cost-effective proceedings.
As indicated above, this power does not allow the tribunal to conduct the proceedings
as it deems fit. As in civil-law countries, where the interventionist style of arbitration is
rather the norm than the exception, the tribunal must observe the requirements of
due process. This means that it must give the parties a reasonable opportunity of
commenting on the result of any inquisitorial investigation that the tribunal may
make."
The earlier mentioned role of the arbitral tribunal as "master of the procedure" clearly
includes the power of conducting the arbitration in an interventionist style. This style
in particular enables effective intervention by the tribunal to the extent of becoming
involved in the planning and the progress of the arbitration, by giving timely
directions, which will shape the future course of the proceedinqs."?
4. Utilising preliminary meetings
Whatever the tribunal wants to impose on the parties as appropriate measures in
terms of timetables and other procedural directions, it needs to be asked when these
measures should be taken. It is generally agreed that this can be done at a
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In the Bremer Vulkan case [1980] 2 WLR 905 at 923 Roskill LJ emphasised that an arbitrator,
who, in the absence of an agreement that he should do so, attempts to conduct an arbitration
along inquisitorial lines may expose himself to criticism and possible removal. Nevertheless,
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preliminary rneetinq.'?' In preparing for the preliminary meeting, particularly in the
context of an international arbitration, the tribunal would be well advised to refer to
the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings.102 The purpose of the
Notes is to assist arbitration practitioners by identifying questions on which
appropriately timed decisions may facilitate effective arbitration and to provide advice
on possible alternative courses of action. The Notes are not intended to be used as
rules as this could have undermined the flexibility of the arbitral process.!"
Particularly useful is the "List of Matters for Possible Consideration in Organizing
Arbitral Proceedings" provided in the Notes which can be used as a checklist at the
preliminary meetinq.'?'
In an ad hoc arbitration, with no appointing authority, this preliminary meeting may
serve firstly to finalise the terms of appointment of the tribunal. More importantly, in
an international arbitration, especially where the legal representatives come from
different cultural backgrounds and different legal systems, it can be sensible for the
tribunal to convene a preliminary meeting at an early stage of the proceedings. This
will ensure that the tribunal and the parties have a common understanding of how
the arbitration is to be conducted, and will enable a carefully designed framework for
the conduct of the arbitration to be established.l'"
Furthermore, and most significantly in the interests of effective arbitration, the
preliminary meeting provides the opportunity for the tribunal to begin to impose its
authority on the proceedings and the partles.'?" It is through the mechanism of
preliminary meetings that the tribunal is best able to control the hearing, impose its
leadership during the arbitration and give procedural directives designed to deal with
the dispute in question. Moreover, the discussion of the procedure at a preliminary
meeting with the parties before the tribunal gives procedural directives increases the
transparency of the process.'!" However, the tribunal may not be in a position at the
first procedural meeting to have a proper understanding of what issues are in
101 See generally on the preliminary meeting Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 292-297; Butler (1994) 6 SA
Mere LJ 265-269; Bernstein, Tackaberry & Marriott 126-130.
The text of the UNCITRAL Notes was approved by UNCITRAL in 1996 (see Ceccon
"UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral proceedings and the Conduct of Evidence" (1997)
14(2) J of Int Arb 67-68).
See the UNCITRAL Notes paras 1, 3 and 4 and Ceccon 67 and 71.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 295.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 293. They point out that although modern communication devices
enable the "meeting" to be held e.g. by video or telephone conference, which may save costs,
there is no substitute for a face-to-face meeting. Compare the UNCITRAL Notes paras 7-9.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 266.
See Ceccon 71 and the UNCITRAL Notes para 5.
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dispute, if the case is complex and complicated. Without that understanding it is
unable to give the necessary directives as to the procedure to be adopted.!" This
aspect is given further consideration in the text below.
Finally, the preliminary meeting enables the tribunal and the parties or their
representatives to review the procedure provided for in the arbitration agreement,
and so to seek means of adapting it to the needs of the particular dispute.!"
The tribunal should ensure that each party is represented at the preliminary meeting
not merely by its legal advisers, but also by a senior executive empowered to take
decisions."? The reasons for this are firstly that the presence of the parties will make
it more difficult for the lawyers to reject out of hand suggestions by the tribunal
towards shorter and more cost-effective procedures, because they will have to
present cogent reasons to their clients for doing SO.111
Secondly, if a senior executive is involved, it is more likely that he or she will have a
broader view of the issues involved and may be more interested in a cost-effective
resolution of the dispute and continuing the relationship with the other party than in
winning the case by any means. In cases where the parties to the dispute appear
without their legal representatives, they are more likely to defer to the tribunal's views
about procedure. The lack of legal experience may be such that they are content to
leave the whole direction of the proceedings to the tnbunal.!"
Another benefit of involving the parties in the preliminary meeting rather than only
their legal representatives relates to defining the issues in dispute. Often the dispute
is initially presented to the tribunal by the lawyers, and naturally from a legal point of
view. Often both the content of the message and the emphasis are changed from
what the client itself would have stressed. Furthermore, the preliminary meeting may
be the appropriate venue for the parties to present the issues in dispute to the
tribunal in a non-legal manner. Often during the hearing the parties are not allowed
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to speak except to answer questions and these are framed with a view to the
relevance of the issue as defined in the pleadings and by rules of evidence. One can
imagine that matters which the parties want to be able to voice when they have their
"day in court" during the hearing remain unarticulated, either because of the lack of
an opportunity to express them or because when they try to do so they are ruled out
of order.'"
Commonly, at the outset of an arbitration, the arbitral tribunal knows practically
nothing about the issues, the parties' lawyers know a little and naturally the parties
themselves know a great deal. In many cases, where the parties define the issues,
the tribunal and the legal representatives could contribute much more to the
economic resolution of the dispute by discovering more about the issues in the
preliminary rneetinq.!" Alternatively, in complex cases it may be wise to define and
submit the issues in dispute in writing even before the preliminary meeting, so that
the issues, after having been read by the opponents and the tribunal, can be further
discussed during the preliminary meetinq.!"
As mentioned previously,116 court-style pleadings will not always identify the true
issues in dispute. Furthermore they will not properly inform the tribunal or the other
party of the evidence to be produced to prove the allegations of fact or the legal
arguments, which will be advanced in support of the pleader's case. The other party
may therefore gather evidence on issues that will never seriously be pressed at the
hearinq.!" The tribunal should therefore require written submissions from each party,
outlining the issues of the case. These submissions inform the tribunal as to what it
must decide in making the award. This is important because an award, which
decides either more or less than the matters submitted, is open to attack.!" A party's
submissions are in effect a written statement of its case containing allegations of
fact, a summary of evidence in support and its contentions on the legal issues,
accompanied by copies of the essential documents on which the party will rely.!"
The extent to which the preliminary meeting (combined with other modern methods
of case management) can have a positive effect on the arbitration regarding cost-
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effectiveness and saving time can be illustrated by a comment about an arbitration
conducted in t.ondon.!" Before the arbitration commenced the tribunal was told by
the parties' lawyers that the hearings were expected to last three months or more.
The tribunal considered that three months was far too long for the matter in dispute
and that drastic measures were required. After the close of pleadings, the tribunal
called for a preliminary meeting with the parties, and put both sides on notice that it
wished to explore ways of dealing with the matter more expeditiously. After the
preliminary meeting, the tribunal issued directions as to how the arbitration had to be
conducted.
These directions included limited discovery to be given by a certain date, the
requirement that evidence-in-chief of witnesses and of experts should be adduced by
affidavit and that such affidavits should be exchanged on a certain date. Additionally,
the so-called rule that a witness's evidence stands unless he or she is cross-
examined on every point that is challenged, would not apply. At a further preliminary
meeting it was decided that each party would have one week to cross-examine the
other party's witnesses and this hearing took place. A further week for oral argument
was then scheduled. Although at the time of the comment the final hearing had not
yet taken place, it was likely that the hearing would have been reduced to three
weeks instead of three months.
As an additional point one should bear in mind that in complex disputes it may not be
practical to take final decisions on all matters regarding the arbitral procedure at the
initial preliminary meeting. The arbitration could develop in a different direction from
that expected in the preliminary meeting, where the decisions about the procedural
matters have been made. Therefore, the tribunal could expressly reserve matters like
limited discovery of documents and meetings between experts for further
consideration at a subsequent preliminary meeting.121
5. Imposing timetables
A matter of great concern regarding the conduct of international commercial
arbitration is the length of time between the filing of the request for arbitration and the
issuing of the award. In cases where the tribunal failed to impose a binding timetable
on the parties, the delivery of documents by the parties, including written
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submissions and witness statements, will probably take place on a reciprocal basis.
The exchange may well be conducted in a leisurely fashion, ignoring time limits in
any applicable rules, as it may suit the parties and especially their busy lawyers if
there is a delay in the delivery of each reply.
Considerations like these like these led the ICC in the latest edition of its rules to
impose the duty on the arbitral tribunal to draw up a provisional timetable for the
arbitration, either simultaneously with the terms of reference or as soon as possible
thereafter.!" The timetable must be communicated to the ICC Court and to the
parties. The rules thereby "oblige both the arbitrators and parties to look beyond the
immediate next steps in the arbitration and to focus as concretely as possible on the
needs of the [arbitral process] as a whole".123 This timetable should be prepared in
consultation with the parties and is provisional, in that the tribunal, again in
consultation with the parties, may modify it if circumstances so require.?" In
arbitrations not conducted under the ICC Rules, the logical time to draw up the
timetable is at the preliminary meeting.
By imposing a timetable, which binds the parties as to the dates by which they have
to submit documents like submissions and witness statements, and by setting the
date and duration of the hearing, both the parties and the tribunal can foresee how
much time the arbitration will consurne.!" Particularly the claimant will now have
some idea as to when payment may be received from the respondent. The
imposition of a timetable, after consultation with the parties, is particularly desirable
in international commercial arbitrations, where the participants may be accustomed
to different styles of conducting arbitral proceedings. Without such guidelines, a party
may find aspects of the proceedings unpredictable and difficult to prepare for, which
may lead to misunderstandings, delays and increased costs.!"
But, the coin of strict time limits has another side. The tribunal has to weigh the need
for efficiency and expeditious procedure against each party's entitlement to an
adequate hearing of the merits.
"The arbitrator's concern to respect procedural due process should not be
permitted to lead to untoward delay, particularly at the instance of a dilatory
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Derains & Schwartz 246.
Derains & Schwartz 246.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 267.
Compare the UNCITRAL Notes paras 4-5.
123
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
litigant for whom delay may be viewed as an objective in itself. In practice it
would appear that, for every legitimate criticism that a given arbitration
procedure risks jeopardising the rights of a party, there are ten legitimate
complaints that the procedure adopted by arbitral tribunals are too time-
consuming and do not provide a schedule to move the dispute to resolution in
the shortest time-frame consistent with due precess."!"
An excessive fear of the challenge of the award on grounds of lack of due process or
unfair arbitral hearings may result in an immensely delayed award instigated by
subversive parties and acceded to by arbitral tribunals in the name of natural justice
or due process.
On the one hand one could also argue that it should be on the duty of the legal
representatives to establish a chronological schedule which would serve the interests
of their clients by avoiding time-consuming and thus costly procedures.!" The
reason that the lawyers themselves do not suggest a strict timetable is firstly, that
most practitioners are not familiar with the procedure. Secondly, because of pressure
of work, the practitioner concerned tends to look at the dispute simply in terms of the
next step. The result is that a proper investigation of the issues is postponed until just
before the hearing.129 The opportunity to establish a timetable, which is suitable for
the dispute in question and which is not just a copy of the High Court procedure will
have been lost by that stage.
On the other hand, if the parties are aware of the issues and the fact that time is
precious and expensive, it is possible for them to impose time-limits on the arbitral
tribunal in the arbitration agreement regarding the periods within which various
stages of the arbitration are to be completed and the period within the tribunal is to
deliver its award.!"
127 See Donahey 106. The comment was made regarding the position under the previous edition
of the ICC Rules.
Compare the duty imposed on the parties (and by implication on their legal representatives) by
the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 40.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 270.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 262.
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6. The hearing
During the course of an arbitration it is likely that the hearing itself will be the most
expensive part of the proceedinqs.!" This is particularly evident in international
commercial arbitration where the place of the hearing is usually different from the
domicile of at least some of the parties and arbitrators. The costs of the hearing
would include the travelling expenses to and from the place of the hearing of the
parties, their legal representatives, the arbitrators, witnesses and experts.
Furthermore, in cases with lengthy hearings, accommodation is required for most if
not all the persons involved.
It is therefore a prerequisite for cost-effective proceedings not to expand the hearing
beyond what is actually required through unnecessary procedural tactics. It is also
generally accepted that hearings in arbitration have become unacceptably lengthy
and cosny.!" The arbitral tribunal moreover has the power to control the length of
the hearing.133 But to conduct an efficient hearing can be a challenging task to
achieve. Traditionally under the adversarial approach, there is too much talking at
arbitration hearings as regards counsel's opening and closing speeches, the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reading from documents.
Nevertheless, one should "avoid a too drastic swing of the pendulum away from the
undoubted advantages of an oral hearing.,,134 For example, effective cross-
examination can be vital for exposing the truth, whereas the cogency of written
evidence may ultimately depend more on the skills of the dratter.!"
However, opinions as to what is a reasonable length of time for a hearing differ
widely. In English practice, hearings can last for many weeks. By contrast, arbitral
tribunals, which are dominated by arbitrators from civil-law countries will regard any
hearing that takes more than three days as a long one, and would probably be
unwilling to allocate more than at the most five days consecutively to any case.!"
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Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 20.
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In the absence of an agreement excluding such right, each party to an arbitration is
entitled to insist on a "full" oral hearlnq.!" But there is no requirement that the
tribunal must afford the parties an unlimited hearing. Where the parties disagree
about the length of hearing required, there can be little doubt that the tribunal will act
properly and within its powers by determining that some designated length of hearing
is appropriate.!" The tribunal must nevertheless observe the fundamental
requirement of due process whereby each party must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence and argument and to test the case against it.139
Regarding the management of the hearing of a large complex multi-issue case, the
last thing the arbitral tribunal should ordinarily countenance is to set down the whole
case for hearing at one time."? It may be wise to arrange a splitting of the hearing in
order to deal with certain connected issues at a time and finalise these issues with
an interim award.!" before proceeding to hear the next issue.
A further "modern" suggestion to reduce the length of costly adversarial hearings is
to present the relevant documents to the tribunal for pre-reading, in advance of the
hearing.142 Reading all documents in open session to the tribunal is very a time
consuming and costly exercise. Those same documents could be read in less than
half the time in private. "The traditional system of a full scale oral hearing on every
matter in issue may be the finest way of arriving at the correct answer but it is often
not cost effective, notably in relation to subsidiary issues which do not greatly affect
the final outcornev.l" A further advantage of a hearing based on pre-reading is that
the tribunal is furnished with a written opening statement. This will facilitate firstly the
understanding of the other documents made available before the hearing and
secondly the ability of the tribunal to prepare itself for the hearing. An important if
somewhat controversial application of the pre-reading of documents concerns the
possibility of the tribunal requiring the exchange of written witness statements by
137 See the UNCITRAL Model Law articles 18 and 24(1), but compare the English Arbitration Act
of 1996 s 34(2)(h) and the SA Law Commission's proposed Draft Arbitration Bill for domestic
arbitration s 33(1).
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 20.
Uff (1993) 59 Arbitration 33. The requirement in article 18 of the Model Law that each party
must be given "a full opportunity" of presenting its case must obviously be read subject to the
requirement of reasonableness.
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 23. See too Butler & Finsen 204-205 and compare the UNCITRAL
Notes para 76.
An interim award, as the expression is understood in South Africa, deals with only some of the
substantive issues in dispute and is final on the issues that it decides. See SA Law
Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 79 n 317.
Compare the UNCITRAL Notes para 61 regarding written witness statements and Uff (1995)
61 Arbitration 20.
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witnesses of fact. These statements would then also be available for pre-reading by
the tribunal and facilitate the questioning of the witness by the tribunal during the
hearing and effective cross-exarnlnatlon.!"
7. Documentary evidence and limited discovery
Another of the principal causes of unnecessary delay and expense in modern
arbitration has been the greater tendency on the part of today's commercial and
professional persons to generate documents. If the flood of documents potentially
involved in a complex arbitration is unleashed by the floodgates of discovery, it is
hard to get it under control again. The extent of discovery will usually be a material
factor in the extent of the investigation, which the parties can conduct, and therefore
the amount of the client's money, which will be spent, directly and indirectly.145
An order for discovery obliges the party concerned to disclose documents which are
or have been in its possession, custody or control relating to any matter in issue and
which contain information which may advance the adversary's case or damage its
own.!" Although discovery may be an essential characteristic of the adversarial
system, it is unknown to the European Continent and its civil-law system. Particularly
in international arbitration, where one party is from a civil-law background and the
legal representative is unfamiliar with discovery, the danger exists, that the parties
may not be equally thorough, which could result in grave injustice.!" The civil-law
parties may be surprised by a system, which requires them to produce documents
passing within their own organisation, which were never intended for general
distributlon.l'"
In general it is doubtful whether the full discovery of documents is helpful in an
international commercial arbitration.l" The principle that it is safer to copy and
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Steyn (1983) 48 Arbitration 310.
See generally on written witness statements the UNCITRAL Notes paras 61 and 62; the IBA
Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration (1999) ("the IBA Rules
of Evidence") article 4.4-4.5, which gives the tribunal the discretionary power to order the
exchange of witness statements; BOhler & Dorgan "Witness Testimony Pursuant to the 1999
IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration" (2000) 17(1) J of Int Arb 3 12-
16; Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 283-285.
Uff (1993) 59 Arbitration 34; Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 276.
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Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 277.
MustiII & Boyd 325.
See Griffin "Recent Trends in the Conduct of International Arbitration" (2000) 17(2) J of Int Arb
19 at 20-21 for the view that many parties regard the common-law procedure of full discovery
as "excessive, costly and burdensome". He suggests that the tribunal and the parties should
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include rather then to omit, leaving the sifting process to be done not earlier than at
the actual hearing is counterproductive. But through a careful exercise of its
discretion, the tribunal can do much to ensure that the benefits of discovery are
available, without being offset by the dlsadvantaqes.!" The tribunal should direct full
discovery only in exceptional circumstances; normally only limited discovery should
be ordered. This could involve the tribunal ordering discovery in accordance with
requests for specific documents or categories, with disputes in this regard being
resolved by the tribunal as and when they arise.!" A positive consequence of this
approach is that it makes clear to the parties that they are not denied the opportunity
of making later requests, which will encourage the moderation of their initial
demands. In the context of encouraging a cost-effective procedure, it may calm the
appetite of lawyers for full discovery if the tribunal makes it clear that there is no
automatic right to recover the costs of such discovery if the applicant is successful in
the arbitration. This could possibly be achieved by the threat that the relevant costs
will be disallowed, if the documents are later shown to be unnecessary for the
cese.!"
From a practical perspective, the following three-stage procedure is suggested as a
useful general approach.l" First, the parties must produce the documents upon
which they rely. Secondly, the parties request each other to produce additional
documents, or categories of documents. Those requests must be limited to
documents related to the issues raised in the statements of the case and must be
identified with sufficient particularity. Only in the third stage, if either party refuses to
produce any requested documents, mayan application be made to the tribunal to
make such order. The tribunal could also encourage compliance by indicating that a
party which refuses to comply with an obviously reasonable direction to produce
risks an adverse finding of fact.154
Under the current South African legislation both the arbitral tribunal and the court
have the power to order discovery on the application of a party.155A party therefore
has no automatic right to require full discovery unless the arbitration agreement
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aim for a workable compromise between the common-law and civil-law systems on this point,
based on article 3 of the IBA Rules of Evidence.
Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 278.
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 21.
Uff (1995) 61 Arbitration 21.
Hunter 350.
Hunter 350.
See the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 ss 14(1 )(a)(i) and 21 (1)(b).
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provides otherwise.P" A party dissatisfied with the tribunal's rejection of an
application for discovery could however possibly use the court's statutory power to
order discovery as a method for attempting to upset the tribunal's ruling and delaying
the arbitration while the issue is determined by the court!" Under the proposed
International Arbitration Act, the tribunal is empowered to conduct the arbitration in a
manner it considers appropriate, unless the parties otherwise agree.158 This general
power includes the taking of evidence and ordering disclosure of documents. Article
27 regulates court assistance in taking evidence. The court can only be approached
by the tribunal, or by a party with the approval of the tribunal. The approval of the
tribunal is required to give the tribunal greater control over evidential matters 159 and
diminishes the possibility of a reluctant party involving the court as a delaying tactic.
In the Law Commission's proposals for new domestic arbitration legislation, the
tribunal retains its power to order discovery on the application of a party. The Law
Commission takes the view that discovery in arbitration proceedings is not a matter
for the courts, with the result that the courts' power to order discovery has been
intentionally omltted.!"
Also under English law, the rules of court regarding discovery do not apply to
arbitration. Consequently, there is no automatic discovery in English arbitration
proceedings. Discovery forms part of arbitration proceedings only where the parties
so agree or where the tribunal so orders in the exercise of its discretion.l"
It appears from the above discussion that control of discovery and judicious pre-
reading of relevant documents 162 are able to give the whole arbitration process a
new character in terms of efficiency.
8. Documents-only arbitration 163
The importance of the pre-reading of relevant documents before the hearing has
been referred to above.!" In a documents-only arbitration there is no hearing and
156
157
158
159
Butler (1994) 6 SA Merc LJ 278.
Butler (1994) 27 CILSA 142.
Sch 1 article 19.
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83.
See SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 74 and the Draft Arbitration Bill ss
29(2)(b)(i) and 40(1).
Hunter 350. See too the English Arbitration Act of 1996 s 34(2)(d).
See para 11.6above.
See generally on documents-only arbitrations Butler & Finsen 197-201; Harris "Maritime
Arbitrations" in Bemstein, Tackaberry & Marriott 318-319.
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the dispute is decided on documents only. It has been said many times that the only
thing wrong with "documents-only" arbitrations is that there are not enough of
them.165
Whether an arbitrator has the power to dispense with a hearing will depend on the
applicable arbitration agreement, rules and legislation. Usually, a party is entitled to
require an oral hearing, unless the parties have agreed that the arbitration is to be
conducted on documents only.166However, section 34(2)(h) of the English Arbitration
Act of 1996167 reverses the usual position in providing that unless the parties
otherwise agree, it is up to the tribunal to decide "whether and to what extent there
should be oral or written evidence or submissions". The tribunal thus has full
discretion to dispense with oral proceedings if this seems to be approprlate.!"
Documents-only arbitration has a significant advantage over litigation, since the latter
must be conducted orally and in open court. Significantly, an eminent English jurist,
Lord Griffiths, has stated, when reflecting on his earlier long career as a trial judge,
that he could recall no more than a handful of cases where the result might have
been different if he had been called upon to decide on the basis of the pleadings and
documents, which he had read prior to the start of the hearing.169
Obviously, the "documents-only" arbitration has some considerable advantages
compared to arbitration conducted with hearinqs.?? The greatest one surely is its
cost-efficiency. The earlier mentioned travel and accommodation expenses, the cost
of the venue and other costs of a formal hearing are avoided. The saving in time for
the parties, their lawyers and the arbitrators is another significant advantage. But one
must bear in mind that "documents-only" proceedings are not suitable for every type
of dispute. The procedure is most appropriate in less complex cases where oral
testimony can add little to what can be ascertained from contemporaneous
164
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See para 11.6above.
Redfern & Hunter (3 ed) 329; Hunter 357. Nevertheless, Harris in Bernstein, Tackaberry &
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the Draft Arbitration Bill s 33(1).
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Lord Griffiths during a conference in Brussels 1995, quoted by Hunter 357. See too Harris
"The Importance of Documents in Maritime Arbitration" (1998) 64 Arbitration 253-256 regarding
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docurnents.!" In complex cases a preliminary meeting may be necessary to help the
tribunal to understand the disputed issues in the first place, before continuing with an
arbitration hearing.
171 Butler & Finsen 197.
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III. Conclusion
The discussion above and in particular chapter three illustrates that although the
legislature in Germany and the Law Commission in South Africa have sometimes
chosen the same approach and sometimes a differing approach to cope with the
various problems of modern arbitration, at the end of the day, efficient arbitration will
be the result of a conscious effort by the arbitral tribunal, hopefully with the
assistance of the parties.
The need for more efficient arbitration proceedings cannot be doubted. But, who
should be the one to introduce and safeguard such proceedings? One could argue
that the principle of party autonomy implies that it should be the parties themselves,
who must ensure a procedure, which is suitable for the matter in dispute. If they are
not willing to place the necessary emphasis on a procedure, which ensures the
saving of their own money, who should?
But instead one could preferably reason that a cost-effective arbitration is part of the
principle of fairness and justice. A party, who enters into an arbitration agreement
and thus into arbitration proceedings should be able to expect not only to obtain an
enforceable award, but to obtain that award as a result of an arbitration, which was
reasonable in its costs and the time and effort tnvesteo."? The party must be able to
expect proceedings, which are financially justifiable having regard to the issues and
amounts in dispute. As part of the concept of justice one must assume that the
arbitral tribunal will be able to conduct an arbitration process, which will not be
hijacked by reluctant parties aiming to transform the proceedings into an endless
battle and the arbitration itself into a costly risk.
An arbitral tribunal which claims to be able to produce a fair and just award must also
be judged on its abilities to render its decisions within a reasonable time-limit, which
makes the proceedings for the parties bearable. The main reason for the parties to
agree on arbitration and the claimant to initiate the proceedings is the belief that
arbitration, compared to litigation, is the better way to deal with the matter in dispute.
If the tribunal is not able to conduct the arbitration in the expected manner, first,
wasted time and money as well as disappointment will result. Secondly, the result
172 Compare SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 14-15.
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will be that the parties will not easily enter into arbitration agreements again.173 The
approach of the South African Law Commission towards aspects of the proposed
legislation for domestic arbitration must be understood in this context. Unnecessary
delay by the tribunal, in breach of its proposed statutory duty to adopt procedures
which avoid unnecessary delay and expense.!" is a ground for removal from
office.!" A tribunal, which is compelled by the parties' agreement to adopt
procedures which objectively speaking do not avoid unnecessary delay and
expense, can therefore resiqn.!"
As indicated above, an important feature of best modern arbitration practice is the
growing emphasis on "judge management" during the stage prior to the actual
hearing. The result is a trend towards a "cards on the table" approach, rather than
"trial by arnbush'"!" Nevertheless, generally a fundamental problem, when planning
for dispute resolution, remains to change the culture of arbitration by identifying cost
reduction and saving of time as major objectives to be tackled from the outset. The
focus on eliminating avoidable cost and delay should not only take place at the
outset but also at regular intervals subsequently.!" The dispute resolution process
needs to be properly planned in the pre-contract stage with the emphasis on
restoring relationships through active participation of the principals rather than
through pursuit of legal remedies by lawyers on assumption of breakdown.!" This
should be stressed even more, where both parties are economically dependent on
the continuance of the relationship in the interest of further trade with each other.
Of course, due regard must be had to the wishes of the parties, but in this context
the wishes of the parties are rather too readily identified with those of the lawyers,
whose own convenience and pressures of other work are too often allowed to
influence negatively the conduct of the arbltranon.!" Moreover, one must still also
bear in mind that when conducting an arbitration, the arbitrator must almost certainly
invest as much effort in resolving the merits of the dispute as in the matter of "case-
management". The arbitrator's fundamental task is to decide the merits of the
dispute, albeit in a fair, expeditious and cost-effective manner.
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In future it will be essential for arbitrators to be thoroughly familiar with the extent of
their powers and be ready to give consideration to the practical aspects of the use of
such powers in the circumstances of particular cases. This applies as much to
arbitrators in South Africa with a common-law procedural background, as to
arbitrators with a German civil-law background. Nevertheless, regarding the adoption
of a more "inquisitorial" approach, this may be easier for arbitrators from civil-law
countries, because they are accustomed to taking control of the proceedings from
the outset. In contrast, many arbitrators with a common-law background are or have
been in the habit of allowing the parties or, more usually, their legal representatives
to drive the proceedings and will thus intervene only when asked to determine a
procedural dispute.!"
An arbitrator who claims to be thoroughly prepared to conduct a cost-effective
arbitration, must not only have a thorough understanding of the applicable procedural
rules like those of the ICC or the LCIA. That arbitrator should also have a sound
grasp of relevant national arbitration laws, including the provisions regarding
potential court involvement in the arbitration process. In this respect, the
implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law for international commercial arbitration
by a growing number of countries must certainly be welcomed by international
lawyers and arbitrators as well as by the judges of national courts, because of its
harmonising effect and balanced powers for the courts.
Indeed, the viability of the arbitration process ultimately depends upon the
willingness of the courts to enforce arbitration agreements and awards. English and
South African courts have on the whole been very supportive of the arbitration
process and have been increasingly reluctant to interfere with the procedure adopted
by an arbitral tribunal, unless that procedure is contrary to the rules of natural justice.
This has encouraged some arbitrators to adopt a more active and innovative role in
arbitration proceedlnqs.l"
It is submitted that it will be crucial for the future of arbitration as a sought after
dispute resolution process to recognise and uphold the principle that the arbitral
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Butler (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 255. The SA Law Commission Report Domestic Arbitration 17 has
stated in 2001: ''The issue which requires to be addressed here is not the fear that the courts
are incapabable of exercising the powers conferred on them by arbitration legislation. The
problem is the danger of the court's statutory powers being abused by unscrupulous parties as
a delaying tactic."
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procedure can only be fair if it is not unduly prolonged and expensive, having regard
to the nature of the particular dispute. One can predict that if this principle is not
observed, the reputation of arbitration will be such that it will only be chosen by
informed persons as a way of dispute resolution, if nothing better is available, that is
to say, as the second worst choice.
However, the international arbitration community is aware of the current defects of
arbitration practice and the difficulties they face, and strenuous efforts to improve the
situation are being made. In conclusion, it is submitted that modern arbitration
statutes and the latest editions of available rules, like those of the ICC and LlCA,
provide an adequate framework for cost-effective and expeditious arbitration. They
incorporate the principle that, subject to party autonomy and due process, the arbitral
tribunal is the "master of the procedure", which enables the tribunal in theory to
conduct the arbitration in the required way.183Taking the proposed South African
legislation for domestic arbitration as an example, the tribunal is given not only the
powers but is also subject to the duty to conduct the arbitration using procedures
which avoid unnecessary delay and expense.!" As a German lawyer, who has made
a comparative study of German and South African arbitration law and who has
investigated the needs of disputants in practice, one must express the hope that the
South African legislature will speedily implement new arbitration legislation,
substantially in the form proposed by the South African Law Commission.
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